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This thesis is an empirical investigation which focuses on the role of the board in 
small and medium sized enterprises in Iceland and the relationship between boards 
and organisational performance. The research will support the claim that there are 
three main roles that boards focus on: Strategic role, Monitoring role and Resource 
and Advice role. Furthermore the research will indicate there is a positive 
relationship between boards of directors and organisational performance within the 
context of the study. 
 
The board of directors has somewhat been the black box of organisations as there 
has been lack of research exploring the process of the board. Although corporate 
governance as a research field has grown, the focus has mostly been on the 
structure of the board rather than the process. Only a handful of studies have 
collected primary data and there has been a need for studies exploring the process 
rather than the structure of boards. Furthermore there has been growing interest in 
studies from another legal context than the Anglo-Saxon dimension. This study 
responds to these calls as the study collects primary data with focus on the process 
of the board in SMEs in Iceland. The response rate was 21% from a target group of 
560 companies.  
 
It is argued in this thesis that the main problem of corporate governance is to 
establish there is a positive relationship between the board of directors and 
organisational performance. The relationship would reject the claim that boards do 
not have any value as an organ within the organisation, other than being a legal 
formality. This is the claim of management hegemony theory, which describes the 
board as a rubber stamp for managerial decisions. Agency theory claims on the 
contrary that the board can have value as an instrument for monitoring 
management and stewardship theory claims the board’s role in strategy is what 
makes the board valuable. Other theories have different claims. This study rejects 
the management hegemony perspective and supports stewardship theory. Further 
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 Chapter 1. - Introduction 
 
 
This introduction sets out the background, purpose, and objectives of the thesis. It 
sets the context, highlights key issues, and answers the ‘why’ and ‘what’ of the 
research. It introduces the problem at the core of the thesis and discusses 
approaches for the research. The chapter presents the perception of this researcher 
of the field of corporate governance, presented in terms of claims and arguments 
based on interpretation of theories and previous work in the field.  
 
Figure 1.1: The outline of the introduction chapter. 
  1. Introduction
  2. Literature
      review
  5. Conclusions
  4. Results and
      analysis
  3. Methodology
  1.1. Common
         ground
  1.2. Problem
         formulation
  1.5. Mission
         plan
  1.4. Practical
         motivation
  1.3. Solving the
         problem
 
Based on Booth et al. (2003).  
 
The outline of the chapter is found in figure 1.1. The chapter starts with a general 
discussion of corporate governance in order to introduce some of the relevant issues 
for further analysis. It is, in other words, a way to establish common ground 
between the reader and the writer. The second section describes the problem to be 
explored in this thesis: the question of the relationship between the board of 
directors and performance of organisations. The third section discusses the purpose 
of this thesis in terms of exploring a solution to the problem. The fourth section is a 
personal reflection of why the researcher has chosen this topic for a doctoral thesis. 
It is a profile of the rationale and the passion of the researcher, the practical 
motivation behind this work. The last section outlines the structure of the thesis in 







1.1 Common ground 
 
The beginning is the most important part of the work.  
 
Plato (427 BC – 347 BC) 
 
 
This thesis concerns the field of corporate governance, which has gained increased 
attention in the last few years, especially after the Enron scandal at the start of the 
21st century. The roots of the field can be traced back to Berle and Means’ (1932) 
thesis concerning the problem of separation between control and ownership. Their 
thesis focuses on the role of the board of directors and the central question of 
corporate governance: Does the board matter? Does it influence the performance or 
the value of organisations? This is the common ground, the starting point, and 
theme of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1.1: The outline of discussions of the common ground.  
  1.1.1 Defining
corporate governance
  1.1.2 Perspectives
on board of directors
  1.1.3 Framework for
corporate governance
  1.1. Common
         ground
  1.2. Problem
         formulation
  1.5. Mission
         plan
  1.4. Practical
         motivation
  1.3. Solving the
         problem
 
 
This section describes the common ground of the research. It is a lead-in discussion 
to the description of the central problem of corporate governance and the problem 
around which the thesis is built. The first part focuses on finding a common 
definition of corporate governance. The second part describes some of the 
perspectives of board theories that dominate the literature. The last part summarizes 
the discussion as a framework for the common ground between the reader and the 





1.1.1 Defining corporate governance 
Corporate governance has been defined in various ways, but the general view is 
corporate governance is a system for directing and controlling companies. A few 
examples from different country codes illustrate the point:  
 
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Cadbury Report - Cadbury, 1992, p. 15). 
 
Corporate governance refers to the set of rules applicable to the direction and control of a 
company (Cardon Report - Cardon, 1998, p. 5). 
 
Corporate governance is the goals, according to which a company is managed, and the 
major principles and frameworks which regulate the interaction between the company’s 
managerial bodies, the owners, as well as other parties who are directly influenced by the 
company’s dispositions and business (in this context jointly referred to as the company’s 
stakeholders). Stakeholders include employees, creditors, suppliers, customers and the local 
community (Norby Report - Johansen et al., 2001, p. 3). 
 
Researchers use similar definitions of corporate governance. Demb and Neubauer 
(1992, p. 187) define corporate governance as “the process by which corporations 
are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders.” It can be argued the 
‘process’ is what is meant by the concepts of ‘controlling’ and ‘directing’. Another 
definition emphasizes the shareholder perspective, or a broader financial 
stakeholder perspective, and is found in the work of Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 
737). They define corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance 
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” Again it 
can be argued the process is control and direction. Others have offered a more 
descriptive definition of the process of control and directing. Hilb (2006, p. 9), for 
example, defines corporate governance as “a system by which companies are 
strategically directed, integratively managed and holistically controlled in an 
entrepreneurial and ethical way and in a manner suited to each particular context.” 
Hilb (2006) emphasises the importance of context. Other definitions are grounded 
in more specific theories and they emphasise controlling more than direction, as 
agency theorists tend to do (for example, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 





definition of corporate governance defines it as a “system by which companies are 
controlled and directed” (Cadbury, 2002).  
 
This definition seems simple and straightforward. The concepts encompassed by the 
definition, e.g. ‘company,’ ‘system,’ ‘control,’ and ‘directing,’ are very well known, 
but not without problems. Just trying to define an ostensibly simple concept like 
‘company’ can lead to contradictions and differing perspectives. Monks and 
Minnow (2004) take great pains to define ‘company’ in their work.1 The second 
concept is ‘system,’ which seems clear enough until an examination of the literature 
presents different interpretations. The problem seems to concern different 
understandings of the actors in the system, the context in terms of environment, and 
what the actors do. Monks and Minow (2004), for example, include the board, 
management, and shareholders as actors in their interpretation of the system, while 
others take a much broader perspective associated with stakeholder theory where 
the actors also include governments, financial institutions, employees, and 
customers (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones and Wicks, 1999). The context of 
the system can vary widely, from the board of directors as the research unit, to an 
entire nation. Hilb (2006, p. 12) claims the system needs to have an external context 
of national, industrial, and organisational culture. However, agency theorists are 
more interested in the investor – board – management relationships (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and often disregard any broader perspectives. Furthermore, the 
nature of the relationships in terms of functions varies widely, as illustrated by the 
multitude of theoretical perspectives in the corporate governance literature (eight 
theories are described in the literature review and others are mentioned). Most 
researchers have, however, made the board of directors the central actor in their 
studies (for example Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Lorsch and 
Carter, 2004; Hilb, 2006).  
 
Finally, the question of the interpretation of the concepts of ‘controlling’ and 
‘directing’ is very dependent on how the other concepts have been interpreted, as to 
who is directing and controlling whom, and what is being directed and what is 
being controlled. Apart from that, the concepts themselves are not clear either. 
                                                 





Turnbull (1997) has pointed out there seems to be some ambiguity concerning the 
meaning of ‘control’ in the literature.  ‘Control’ was the main focus of Berle and 
Means (1932), who maintained those who had control of the firm could direct it, 
implying the existence of power. ‘Control’ is also widely understood to mean ‘to 
make sure that things are done correctly’. Zahra and Pearce (1989) describe the role 
of control in terms of monitoring performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) distinguish 
between ‘decision management’– the initiation and implementation of decisions – 
and ‘decision control’– the signing-off and monitoring of decisions. There is even 
less agreement on the term ‘directing,’ which can range from being a passive 
approach as an effect of monitoring, to being a very active approach of setting and 
even implementing strategy (for example, Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Lorsch and 
Carter, 2004; Hilb, 2006). There is no reference to the purpose of these functions in 
the definition of corporate governance. It can also be argued these functions differ 
somewhat when they are considered as means to achieve certain goals. To ‘control’ 
and ‘direct’ to secure ownership or elite power would differ if the goal were, for 
instance, to maximize corporate value. ‘Control’ and ‘direct’ would again vary to 
ensure stakeholder interests were valued, to secure the survival of the corporation, 
or strive for growth or knowledge enhancement. Although the concepts are easily 
understood they may equally become victims of misunderstanding.  
 
The point of this exploration into the meanings of the concepts within a simple 
definition of corporate governance is to attempt to clarify confusion about what 
corporate governance is, and what it is about, both within the literature and in 
general discussion.  
 
The board of directors is the focus of this research, as in most previous theoretical 
and empirical studies of corporate governance. The board is the central actor in the 
system, a separate organ, and the unit of analysis. The board is by law the 
mechanism responsible for governing the company and for controlling and directing 
it. The functions emphasised in this study are ‘monitoring’ and ‘directing.’ The 
former indicates a reactive approach and the latter a more proactive approach of the 
board. The functions are means to the board’s goal of better corporate performance. 





restated as: Corporate governance is a system where the board of directors is the 
central actor as it monitors and directs organisations for the purpose of better 
performance.    
 
1.1.2 Perspectives of the role of the board 
Discussions about the role of boards in companies are often puzzling because the 
underlying theoretical frameworks differ. In the literature at least eight challenging 
theories can be found underpinning various perspectives and which may possibly 
lead to challenging arguments (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Hung, 
1998). Some researchers argue a general theory of the board is needed which avoids 
such confusion (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), as well as an appropriate conceptual 
framework to adequately reflect the reality of governance (Tricker, 2000). Different 
perspectives and a vivid theoretical debate are not unusual in a relatively young 
field of study such as corporate governance (Ulhøi, 2007). Tricker (2000) points out 
research in corporate governance is merely a few decades old, and the phrase 
‘corporate governance’ was seldom used until the 1980s. This is interesting, as 
boards of directors can be traced back to the nineteenth century (Chandler, 1977) 
and because The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Berle and Means, 
published in 1932, is often quoted as the introduction to the field. Therefore, a short 
exploration into the history of the field follows, to understand its different 
perspectives.  
 
The corporate governance debate seems to have been driven by corporate scandals 
(O’Brien, 2005). Although it is not noted in Berle and Means’ (1932) thesis, it is 
hard to disregard the fact their book was written during one of the most severe 
recessions in modern times, a recession which had an immense influence on politics 
and commerce around the world. There are indications waves of interest in 
corporate governance occur at the break of prosperous times and (irrational) 
corporate confidence. MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) have, for example, studied the 
history of corporate governance in parallel with the waves of mergers in the 20th 
century. This is even more noticeable in the emergence of corporate governance 
codes. The Cadbury Code of 1992 was a response to a series of scandals in Britain 





International, and Maxwell enterprise (Cadbury, 2002). At the same time, some 
legendary corporations like IBM, General Motors and Sears were faltering in the 
United States, which led to increased pressure from institutional investors, takeover 
firms, and judicial interpretations of fiduciary duties (MacAvoy and Millstein, 
2003). The Sarbanes-Oxley act in the United States was pushed through congress in 
the aftermath of corporate scandals like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, 
Lucent, Williams, Dynegy, K-Mart, and HealthSouth (MacAvoy and Millstein, 
2003; Coffee, 2006; O’Brien, 2006). This did not come as a surprise. To quote 
Warren Buffett (Buffett and Clarke, 2006, p. 47): “It's only when the tide goes out 
that you learn who's been swimming naked.”  
 
The effect of this scandal-driven process of discussion of corporate governance was 
an emphasis on the monitoring duties of the board (MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). 
At the same time, interest in the ‘directing’ concepts decreased (Lorsch and Carter, 
2004). It is important to acknowledge the Delaware courts in the United States have 
emphasised both the monitoring and directing functions of the board. As has been 
made clear in a series of famous cases, e.g. Paramount Communications; Grobow v. 
Perot; Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Acquisition; Moran; Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
“boards could and should determine key strategic decisions, acting independently of 
management, through a thoughtful and diligent decision-making process” 
(MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003, p. 23). Furthermore, directors themselves have 
emphasised the need for increased strategic participation (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Lorsch and Carter, 2004). Therefore, it can be argued 
the monitoring function has been fed, while the directing function has been starved. 
A parallel theoretical discussion emphasises a kind of duel between the monitoring 
function and the directing function. Agency theory, which is often used 
synonymously with governance theory, emphasises the monitoring function of the 
board (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
stewardship theory, a counter theory to agency theory, proposes the main function 
of the board should be directing (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1994). 
However, agency theory has received the most attention in the literature (Stiles and 






Most discussion on corporate governance is dominated by the Anglo-Saxon 
perspective (Huse, 2005). Also, most initiatives for governance reform have been 
initiated in the USA and the UK, the Cadbury code and Sarbanes-Oxley act being 
the most notable. There is little doubt these Anglo-Saxon initiatives have had a 
global influence, for better or worse (Bauer et al., 2004; O’Brien, 2004; Ali and 
Gregoriou, 2006). Although the pressure for change has been the most obvious in 
the USA and UK, the winds of change have blown all over the world. According to 
the European Corporate Governance Institute, by 2003 at least 50 countries had 
introduced a governance code for companies, countries as different as Mauritius, 
Russia and Switzerland. A governance code was introduced in Iceland early in the 
year of 2003. There are concerns that although the initiatives of the Anglo-Saxon 
perspective have been well received, these approaches may not apply or may be less 
effective when, for example, legal traditions, cultures, institutional structures, and 
ownership structures differ (Weimer and Pape, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Huse, 
2005). Therefore, the perspective may need to be broadened when corporate 
governance is discussed in an international context, although the Anglo-Saxon 
perspective can be used as a starting point.  
 
There are many different perspectives, and different dimensions of perspectives, in 
the corporate governance literature, which make it both complex and paradoxical. It 
is not surprising as theorizing is important in a new field of research (Weick, 1995). 
By understanding the origin of the different perspectives it is easier to understand 
the implications and the relevance of those perspectives.  
 
 
1.1.3 A framework for the thesis 
This section so far has focused on the background for the corporate governance 
discussion and this research. The aim is to establish common ground for the more 
theoretical and empirical discussions of corporate governance in the literature 
review found in the next chapter. Our exploration so far concludes there seems to be 
common agreement the focus of corporate governance is the board of directors and 
their role in monitoring and directing the company. Because the history of the 





board as a monitoring device, rather than an organ for directing the course of the 
organisation, has been the focus of attention. This point is important because this 
research emphasises both the directing function of the board as well as the 
monitoring function. Omitting the directing function, as has widely been done in 
previous work, would undermine the premises of this research. Therefore, the quest 
for common ground is a quest for a broader view of the role of the board than often 
implied within some theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory. Once common 
ground has been established, the central problem of this research can be explored. 







1.2 Formulating the problem 
 
The greatest challenge to any thinker is stating the problem in a way that 
will allow a solution.  
 
Bertrand Russell (1872 - 1970) 
 
 
A thesis must be built around a research question, a central problem, which it then 
tries to solve (Booth et al., 2003, Popper, 2002). It is not an easy task to state the 
research question in such a manner it is both understandable and testable. It may be 
over-optimistic to believe a thesis might solve the problem. It is more realistic to 
seek some answers and indications of what could become the solution. The first 
step in both processes is to describe the problem and assure that it is a problem. As 
is argued in the following section, the problem and the focus of this research is the 
same central problem of the corporate governance literature. It is the question of 
whether boards have any influence on the performance of companies.  
 
Figure 1.2.1: The outline of the problem formulation. 
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                     Based on Booth et al. (2003). 
 
This section is a description of and argument for a problem that needs to be solved. 
The first part describes and argues for the problem (figure 1.2.1). The second part 
focuses on the board of directors, and the third part focuses on the concept of 
performance, the two main variables in the problem. The last part discusses the 







1.2.1 The problem 
Researchers tend to describe the problem of corporate governance in very different 
terms according to their theoretical, practical, legal, and cultural perspective. 
However, it may be argued if the focus of corporate governance is concentrated on 
the board of directors, the implied problem is similar, if not the same, although how 
the problem is perceived could vastly differ. This is easier to understand if the 
discussion is turned on its head, in a sense. One could begin with the claim the 
board of directors should be abandoned and eliminated as an organ from the 
structure of the organisation because it has no potential value for the company. This 
claim may seem odd at first, as the board is a legal requirement for most types of 
companies. It helps, however, to focus the discussion on how to interpret theories as 
counter-argument or falsification of this claim. 
 
Some arguments and evidence claim although the board of directors may be a legal 
necessity, it has no practical importance. Such observations were common 
throughout the 20th century. Berle and Means (1932, p. 245) note their view of the 
board: “Legally, the proxy is an agent for the shareholder; and necessarily under a 
duty of fidelity to him. Factually, he is a dummy for the management, and is 
expected to do as he is told”. Drucker (1954, p. 178) similarly points out in law the 
board of directors is the only organ of the enterprise. “Legally it is considered the 
representative of the owners, having all the power and alone having power.” 
Drucker, however, understood perceptions can be deceptive. He adds at a later date 
the board of directors is an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction (Drucker, 1974). 
Mace (1971) concludes in his seminal study directors are like ornaments on a 
corporate Christmas tree. E. Everett Smith (1958, p. 41) describes the general view 
of the board as follows: 
 
Unfortunately, however, in most companies the board has become more and more a legal 
fiction in practice. Its role as a vital organ of the business has deteriorated, and in many 
cases it has been deposed by operating management. In fact, this trend has gone so far that 
recently a well-known educator stated that in his opinion the board was as dead as a dodo, 





this is an extremist view, but many experienced observers would go along part of the way 
with it. 
 
In the words of Drucker (1974, p. 628): “There is one thing all boards have in 
common ... They do not function”. The term ‘rubber stamp’ has frequently been 
used to describe these non-functioning boards. Lorsch and MacIver (1989) describe 
the board as “pawns [rather than] potentates” and Gillies (1992, p. 3) points out: 
“Boards have been largely irrelevant throughout most of the twentieth century”. 
MacAvoy and Millstein (2003, p. 7) claim this irrelevance of the board is a 
recurrent crisis of corporate governance, as both legislators and the public demand 
in the aftermath of scandal: “Where was the board of directors?” In short, the claim 
boards could be eliminated has some support in the literature and in reality.  
 
If this claim is used as a starting point for understanding corporate governance, the 
mission is to find evidence and arguments that disprove or falsify this claim. The 
problem is to show the board has value or relevance to defend its continuance. This 
is in fact the central problem of corporate governance literature, as outlined in 
previous sections of this thesis. If the claim holds true, the board has no value or 
relevance for the company or, more disturbingly, obstructs gains or destroys value. 
If in fact the board of directors as an organ within the organisation does more harm 
than good from the perspective of company value and performance, it could 
represent one of the biggest structural mistakes in corporate history.  
 
This claim is grounded in the shareholder view the board should exist to serve their 
interests. Some theories, for example, management hegemony theory and class 
hegemony theory, may be interpreted to mean the purpose of the board is to serve 
other interests, for instance management or elites. Theories differ on the role of the 
board. In the end, however, it can be argued those perspectives are means either to 
reduce or increase the value of the company. The board can act as a management 
‘rubber stamp’ when management interests differ from shareholders,’ and 
management wants to transfer value from the shareholder to its own pockets. The 
argument holds shareholders would be better without boards, as they are costly to 
maintain. In other words, theories imply a different role for the board can be 






Researchers from different theoretical perspectives have taken on the quest of 
finding value for the board from the shareholders’ perspective. Consciously or 
unconsciously, they seek a connection between the board of directors and company 
performance (figure 1.2.2). The approach and the arguments vary depending on the 
theoretical and practical position of the researcher. 
 
Figure 1.2.2: Boards of directors and company performance. 
 
 
As stated in previous sections theoretical perspectives within the corporate 
governance field differ. A comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory 
makes the point. Theoretical arguments for the value of the board of directors also 
differ. For the sake of clarification, the model of decision process proposed by 
Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 4) is used here, as follows: 
 
Initiation – generation of proposals for resource utilisation and structuring of 
contracts; 
Ratification – choice of decision initiatives to be implemented; 
Implementation – execution of ratified decisions;  
Monitoring – measurement of the performance of decision agents and implement 
rewards.  
 
Agency theorists claim the role of the board is ratification and monitoring (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Stewardship theorists state boards may initiate and even in some 
cases implement strategy, as well as participate in the ratification and monitoring 
process (Donaldson, 1990). The role of the board is very different according to 
these two theories. The potential relationship with corporate performance is also 
different. In the stewardship perspective, the influence on performance can be seen 
as direct, as a function of independent decisions of the board and joint decisions 
with management. In the agency perspective, the relationship is more indirect, as it 









and performance. In either case, a rubber stamp board has little, if any, value for the 
corporation. The problem of demonstrating the importance of the board varies 
according to any given theoretical perspective.  
 
The problem for researchers is therefore not only to test whether there is a 
relationship between the board of directors and corporate performance, but also to 
discover the reason for that relationship. It is not clear what to test for, as the 
theoretical assumptions are fundamentally different. This makes the problem 
somewhat more complicated. The problem does allow a solution so long as the 
perspective is to disprove the statement claiming the board has little, if any, value. 
 
1.2.2 The board of directors 
The board of directors is the independent variable in establishing whether the board 
has a positive relationship with corporate performance. Corporate performance is 
the dependent variable. Although it is theoretically easy to designate the board as 
independent variable, in fact it is difficult to measure this variable. Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) describe the board as a bundle of variables: composition, 
characteristics, structure, process, and roles that are affected by internal and 
external contingencies. Most researchers, however, have gone for a more simple 
approach. Basically two approaches have been used. One that focuses on the 
composition of the board, and another that focuses on the process of the board or 
the roles of the board.  
 
The focus on composition as a measurement of the function of boards has 
dominated research efforts in the field of corporate governance (Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003, Sonnenfeld, 2004). This approach has been called the structural 
based perspective of the board (Daily et al., 2003). The composition variables tend 
to be the same throughout the studies, and independence of directors, split role of 
CEO and chairman, and size of boards have been dubbed the ‘usual suspects’ 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005). The argument for this approach is by 
knowing who is on the board one may estimate performance. Therefore, the aim of 
these studies has been to show a relationship between the composition of boards 






Figure 1.2.3: Composition of boards and company performance. 
 
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) emphasise the importance of using intermediate measures 
that better describe what boards actually do, rather than judging the book by its 
cover. Several researchers have taken this route to explore the implications of what 
happens in the black box of the board (for example Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The claim is the board processes, not just its 
composition, are important for effective corporate governance (Ward, 2003; Zahra, 
2007). The process research most often focuses on the role of the boards in terms of 
tasks and purpose (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Westphal and Carpenter, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004). The focus of many research models is the relationship 
between the process of the board and company performance (figure 1.2.4).  
 









The difference between the composition approach and the process approach lies 
partly in research methodology. Composition of boards can, in most cases, be 
determined from such secondary data sources as annual accounts and statistical 
databases. The process of the board is hard to determine without actually asking 
directors or CEOs for information about what happens within the boardroom 
(Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). The process approach therefore employs surveys 
or qualitative techniques such as interviews, focus groups, case studies, or 










The purpose of this discussion is to highlight problems in measuring the board as a 
variable, and the two main approaches which have been used to do so. Chapter 2 
shows this is an even more complex task than is indicated here.  
 
1.2.3 The concept of performance 
Organisational performance is the dependent variable in the formulation of the 
problem. Most models in corporate governance literature use corporate performance 
as a measure. Dalton et al. (1998), in a meta-analysis of 131 samples, note 
governance structure and financial performance research have relied mostly on 
accounting-based indicators, although some studies use market-based indicators or 
both types together. Several researchers claim Tobins Q, the standard 
approximation of market value, is the leading indicator of performance in corporate 
governance (for example: McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Yermack, 1996; Carter et 
al., 2003; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003). Dalton et al. (1999) note, however, 
corporate governance research has relied on many different types of accounting 
measurement for performance.  
 
Performance measures have received little attention in the corporate governance 
field. Organisational performance, however, is a major research topic and has been 
for the last thirty years (Maltz et al., 2003). Organisational performance is 
considered to be a complex and multidimensional phenomenon (Dess and 
Robinson, 1984; March and Sutton, 1997). There is some concern simple outcome-
based indicators as measures of organisational performance are insufficient (Brett, 
2000; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Chakravarthy, 1986; Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1989). Some claim the trend in research is moving away from the tradition 
of measuring only financial performance of organisations (Ramanujam and 
Venkatraman, 1988; Caruana et al., 1995; Brett, 2000; Sandbakken, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, researchers focusing on the process of boards are proposing different 
approaches to measure the outcome of the board as an intermediate between the 
board and company performance (for example Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Huse, 
2005). This mediator has been conceptualised as the efficiency or the effectiveness 










The purpose of this discussion of performance measurement is to indicate there is 
no simple approach and researchers have employed various methods. 
 
1.2.4 The problem with the problem 
The research question or rather the problem statement, which is a theoretical and 
practical formulation of the research question (Booth et al., 2003; Popper, 2002), 
which this thesis focuses on, is the following: What is the role of the board and is 
there a relationship between the board of directors and organisational performance 
which rejects the claim that the board has no value as an organ in the organisation.   
 
The problem of disproving the proposition the board has little if any value seems 
simple enough. The problem with the problem, however, is measuring the two 
concepts, the independent and dependent variables of the equation. An attempt at 
solving the problem and showing the claim is false necessitates finding an approach 
for measuring the concepts.  
 
Still, the problem is interesting and important because it lies at the heart of the 
corporate governance discussion. The solution may offer better understanding of 
how and why boards have value, rather than just whether or not they affect 












1.3 Solving the problem 
 
We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when 
we created them. 
 
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) 
 
 
There is truth in the statement alternative thinking is needed for solving problems. 
If approaches used to solve problems are not working, alternative thinking is 
indicated. One does not find oil by digging a deeper hole, one has a better chance 
digging another (DeBono, 1992). In previous corporate governance research much 
effort has been put into solving the dilemma of the importance of the board by 
relating composition of boards to corporate performance (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Zahra and Pearce (1989) propose a different 
approach for resolving the dilemma, and it has been used as the model for this 
research.  
 
Figure 1.3.1: The outline of the problem-solving discussion. 
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This section describes what this research is about and how it is related to the 
problem discussed in last section. The first part describes the aim, focus and 
objectives of the study. The second part focuses on the research approach. The last 
part summarises the discussion of this section and outlines the potential contribution 






1.3.1 Aim, focus and objectives 
The aim of this research is to investigate if there is a positive relationship between 
boards and organisational performance. Such a relationship could indicate boards 
are important and valuable for organisations. The focus of the study is process 
related, meaning the core emphasis is on the role of the board. The reason for this is 
theoretical discussion within corporate governance literature is highly associated 
with the role or roles boards adopt. It is further a response to a call for studies 
emphasising what boards do, rather than what they look like (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Daily et al., 2003; MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). In 
other words, the focus is on process rather than composition, which has been the 
main emphasis of research efforts to date (Dalton et al., 1999; Daily et al., 2003). 
This study also includes variables used in research focusing on the composition of 
boards. Therefore, this study includes both the structural-based and process-based 
view of the board.  
 
There are many implications of focusing on the process view of the board. First, it 
calls for a study of the perspectives of CEOs or directors, rather than for a study 
based on secondary data. This research methodology gives the researcher more 
freedom to explore the issues, as secondary data research is limited by the quality of 
the data set. Secondly, a more complex and multi-dimensional discussion is needed 
to understand the board processes rather than its composition. Thirdly, the 
theoretical discussion here needs to be based on a multi-theoretical approach, as one 
theory alone would only partially explore the role of the board (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001; Westphal and Carpenter, 2001; Daily et al., 2003). Fourthly, the process view 
permits a more complicated and multi-dimensional operationalisation of concepts, 
instead of using single indicator variables as in the structural-based view (Bøhren 
and Ødegaard, 2003). In fact, operationalisation becomes one of the central tasks of 
this thesis. This focus on the process-based view calls for a much more complicated 
piece of work than the structural-based view. However, the result is a potentially 






This approach includes the independent variable as well as organisational 
performance, thereby increasing the scope and richness of the study, and applying a 
much broader measure of performance than used in most previous studies. This 
broader view of performance is based on subjective perceptional measures, in 
contrast to objective measures, to better clarify how the board relates to different 
performance measures.  
 
The aim of this study is to use a broader-based view of board measures and 
organisational performance measures to disprove there is no relationship between 
the two concepts. The relationships are tested by rejecting a standard null 
hypotheses which indicates no relationship between variables. The research 
methodology used is the survey method. A literature review of previous research 
using the survey method is also presented.    
 
1.3.2 Research approach 
As was noted in the beginning of this section, the focus of this study is the 
relationship between boards and corporate performance. This aim is held in 
common with the central thrust of most corporate governance literature, which 
endeavours to demonstrate a relationship between the two, and thus support the 
importance of boards of directors. Research propositions generally reflect that 
emphasis. The model appears straightforward, although it will be shown here to be 
more complex when all items and concepts within each factor are included.  
 
The main research hypothesis is the following: Is there a positive relationship 
between boards and company performance in SMEs.  
 
This is tested from three perspectives, based on the Zahra and Pearce (1989) model. 
The composition variable relates to the structural-based view of the board, and the 
roles and process variables both relate to the process view (figure 1.3.2).  
 
Three main hypotheses have been developed: 






H2. There is a positive relationship between the process of boards and company 
performance. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between the composition of boards and 
company performance. 
 











A survey method is used to test the hypotheses.2  Access is considered the biggest 
hurdle in research of boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), as in research generally 
(Gummesson, 1991). As Stiles and Taylor (2001) point out, much of the work on 
boards has been conducted without actual access to the boards: the main issues 
being composition of the board, executive remuneration, CEO duality, ownership, 
performance, and similar factors. Most of this work involves, studies of secondary 
material attempting to show correlations between various variables. Tricker (1994, 
p. 2) notes such research is “produced without talking to a single director, or anyone 
else in the corporate governance power base.” Therefore, only a small body of 
primary research is available from which to draw any methodological insights 
(Stiles, 2001).  
 
The survey here was sent out to 560 SMEs in Iceland, and 21% of the companies 
responded to the survey. Iceland was chosen primarily to solve the problem of 
access (Fidler, 1981; Hill, 1995; Stiles, 1998; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The 
Icelandic Stock Exchange was the main sponsor of the survey, which lent more 
credibility. Most companies in Iceland fall into the category of small and medium-
                                                 
2 The words ‘proposition’ and ‘hypothesis’ are used synonymously in this thesis. ‘Proposition’ is 
regarded as the language of realism (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002) and ‘hypothesis’ is the language 






sized enterprises, however, this was not considered a limitation to the research. 
SMEs are a very interesting subject for study in this context, as will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2.   
 
Researchers in corporate governance have used triangulation models in their study 
to overcome the shortcomings of the single method approach (Snow and Thomas, 
1994; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Lorsch and MacIver (1989) and Stiles (2001) for 
example, used interviews, case studies, and questionnaires in their studies. This 
research uses open-ended questions and focus groups to verify and discuss the 
results of the questionnaire.  
 
1.3.3 Potential contribution 
The potential contributions of this study can be described both in terms of academic 
contributions and practical implications. The first indicates originality of the 
research and the contribution to the body of knowledge (Remenyi et al., 2002).  It 
is, however, not clear what this implies (Dunleavy, 2003, p. 27):   
 
All good universities in either the classical or the taught PhD models still demand that the 
thesis or dissertation should be novel research making some form of distinctive contribution 
to the development of knowledge in a discipline. What kind of work meets this criterion is 
famously difficult to pin down. Most European universities’ doctoral rules (or rubrics) are 
almost silent on how originality is to be determined. 
 
Remenyi et al. (2002, p. 20) suggest a contribution to the body of knowledge should 
include one or more of the following: extending our ability to understand 
phenomena, new ways of applying existing science or theories, creating new 
theories, rejecting invalid theories, and providing unifying explanations for events 
and circumstances. Dunleavy (2003) notes ‘originality’ is expressed either in the 
form of ‘discovery of new facts’ or by displaying ‘independent critical power,’ or 
both.  
 
A potential academic contribution by this study might therefore be ‘discovery of 
new facts,’ as this is an original study which may increase understanding of the 





relationship between the board and organisational performance is realised, this may 
represent an important contribution to corporate governance literature. The practical 
implication of this study may be CEOs and directors, as well as other stakeholders, 





1.4  Practical motivation 
 
Science is organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life.  
 
Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) 
 
 
Often it is the vision and the engagement of individuals, more than the details and 
the techniques of the approach that inspire and evoke interest. The passion and the 
goals of the researcher are the true starting point of any research project. This thesis 
is the result of a four-year project completed outside normal working hours, as the 
DBA program is a part-time doctoral program. Such a challenge demands passion 
and persistence. This section provides a personal rationale for undertaking this 
journey. It is a discussion continued at the end of this thesis in a more reflective 
way.  
 
Figure 1.4.1: The outline of the discussion of practical motivation. 
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This section focuses on personal reasons for doing this research and taking on the 
challenge of the doctorate journey. It introduces the man, not just the mission. It 
may provide a better understanding of why this project has been selected and the 
approach chosen. The first part focuses on the choice of corporate governance as a 
research field. The second part describes some personal goals for the doctoral 
journey. The last part describes passion as a conclusion to the practical motivation 






1.4.1 Choosing the challenge 
The process of choosing a problem to solve is time consuming and hard work. It is 
am important part of the process, which defines the challenge that the doctorate 
thesis is going to be all about. The previous sections in this introduction have to 
some degree described:   
 
a) The narrow field of study: corporate governance. 
b) The broad topic: the role of the board in organisations.  
c) The narrow topic: the contribution of boards on performance of small and 
medium-sized companies.  
 
The previous sections have, however, not at any length described:  
d) The personal perspective. 
e) The applied perspective.  
 
The personal perspective is important both as motivation for the research and 
developing the research question, as well as applying the results to practical 
problems (Booth et al., 2003). My first real exposure to corporate governance as an 
interesting research area and the boards of directors as a topic was in 1999 when I 
was asked to review the OECD corporate governance recommendations (OECD, 
1999; 2004) in regards to the Icelandic situation. That review became a series of 
articles exploring the recommendations section by section and published in a 
journal of which I was the editor at the time. It occurred to me boards as organs 
within organisations were run usually in a highly ineffective manner. This 
observation at the time evoked my curiosity. A better understanding of corporate 
governance might help resolve contradiction about the issue in media, books, and 
research articles. However, I became discouraged as I found it too confusing the 
more I read about it, and soon I ventured into different fields. When I decided to do 
a doctorate, my original plan was to study the field of entrepreneurship, where I had 
done most of my writing, and not corporate governance. A series of coincidences 
changed my mind and led me to corporate governance. A very influential 
coincidence was the discovery one of the authors of my favourite book on corporate 





College, Professor Bernard Taylor, who later became my supervisor. It became 
evident to me the College was better known for its reputation within the field of 
corporate governance than entrepreneurship. Although I had written several articles 
about corporate governance issues, I did not consider it to be one of my fields of 
specialisation. The challenge of learning more about it and making it into my field 
of speciality intrigued me, especially the question of how to make the board into a 
more effective organ within the organisation.  
 
DBA research is by definition applied, rather than pure research, as the research 
problems do as a rule emphasise practical consequences. The applied perspective of 
this research is to explore the importance of the role of the board. It is based on the 
belief boards need to realise what their role is, what role fits the situation, and the 
context. My hope is this research on boards, and whether they relate to company 
performance, may lead to practical propositions regarding the strategy and structure 
of boards. By understanding what can be described as effective boards, this thesis 
may help guide small companies and start-ups just beginning to function. All too 
often boards have been regarded as a mere formality to ‘rubber stamp’ management 
decisions. It is my belief a better understanding of the value of the board and its 
different functions may ensure more time and effort is spent on designing boards, 
training them, and developing them as an important organ within the organisation.   
 
Doctoral research should make an academic contribution so as to add to the body of 
knowledge. The potential academic contribution has been described in the 
preceding sections and will, as the personal and applied rationality, be discussed in 
more detail in the concluding chapter of this thesis. The three perspectives, that is 
personal, practical, and academic, are both related and complementary. It is the aim 
of this thesis to satisfy the objectives of all three perspectives. 
 
 1.4.2 Personal goals 
As part of the CDP programme (Competence Development Programme), which 
forms a part of the DBA programme, I made some clear goals for the doctoral 
journey. The idea was the doctoral journey was more than a means to the goal of 





journey to lead to improvements for me on both a personal and professional level. I 
hoped to see those improvements in the progressive growth of sets of skills I 
thought would be important for me in the future. The following were personal goals 
set at the beginning of the journey: 
 
 Researcher – As an editor and writer of hundreds of journal articles, the 
author of one book and two masters’ theses, I have gained some 
understanding of the role of the researcher. I hoped the DBA would impart a 
more profound understanding of the research process, and give me 
confidence to plan and complete research projects important to business and 
society.  
 Consultant – I have been a consultant on a part-time basis for the past ten 
years, mostly for Icelandic companies. I hoped the DBA would give me 
more skills as a consultant and be a doorway into more challenging 
international opportunities. 
 Educator – I have limited experience in teaching and designing educational 
programmes. I hoped the DBA would give me possibilities to design new 
programmes and opportunities to teach part-time in universities in different 
countries. 
 Writer – I am an experienced business and economics writer in Icelandic. I 
hoped the DBA would give me the confidence and the opportunity to write 
books and articles in English. 
 Entrepreneur – One of my main research fields is entrepreneurship. I have 
written a book on the subject and nearly a hundred articles, taught it, 
designed programmes, and helped people start their own companies. What I 
have not done is start my own company. Even though the DBA programme 
is not directly associated with entrepreneurship, I hoped to develop my skills 
in this field and gain the confidence to start my own companies. 
 Student – Learning has become one of the most important aspects of my life. 
One of the reasons that I have been an editor for the last five years is it 
allows the opportunity to learn while working, because I wrote about 
different issues for specialists every week. I hoped the DBA would give me 





 Network – One of the greatest opportunities of an international program like 
the Henley DBA program, is the possibility of establishing an international 
network. I lacked the international network to open doors to opportunities. I 
hoped the DBA could be a first step in establishing a wide network of 
partners and friends all around the world.  
 A new research area – My main research areas have been entrepreneurship, 
internationalisation of companies, and business strategy. I hoped the DBA 
would give me a new specialisation, upon which I could build and profit in 
the future.  
 International life – I wanted the opportunity to establish myself and make a 
very good living wherever in the world I chose to be. I hoped the DBA 
would strengthen the foundations of that dream by expanding professional 
opportunities and giving me the confidence and the skills to take on 
challenges at an international level.  
 
Although these goals or hopes are not part of the CDP programme, or the broader 
DBA programme, they are relevant for me and important factors in the project. The 
reason for stating these goals here is testimony of the passion for the project. These 
goals are reflected throughout the thesis in the choices I have made as a researcher. 
In the end, in my mind, these goals test the success of the doctoral journey. In short, 
the DBA programme represents a new turning point in my life. 
 
1.4.3 The passion 
This section has described the personal reasons for the research. It is a short 
description of the rationale and the passion of the researcher for taking on the 
challenge. In retrospect, this thesis would never have been completed without a 
clear vision. The personal goals played a huge role in staying the course, although 
they were also at times distracting and the reason for taking less travelled roads 
when a more straightforward approach would have been satisfactory from an 
academic perspective. The personal perspective and the goals are revisited at the 







1.5 The mission plan 
Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront one 
another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a 
glance, an examination, a language.   
 
Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984)  
 
 
Complicated work can be made more clear and easier to understand by organising it 
in a systemic way. Order implies relationship between different parts. In a thesis 
such as this, it is usually a story line or a red thread the reader can follow. It 
provides a prescription of how pieces fit together. This last section of the 
introduction explains the structure of the thesis. The basic outline of the thesis can 
be seen in figure 1.5.1.  
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The structure of the thesis is based on the classical five-chapter framework 
commonly used in universities in the UK (Dunleavy, 2003). The main chapters and 
underlying sections are listed in figure 1.5.1. It is a big book thesis of 80 to 100 
thousand words (Dunleavy, 2003). The framework indicates a logical process, used 
to a large extent in this thesis. Following are the main structural points of each 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction: The structure of the chapter is based on Booth et al. 
(2003), and is intended to introduce the problem and how and why it is to be solved.  
  
Chapter 2 – Literature review: The structure of the chapter is based on the problem 
formulation and the methodological discussion of Silverman (2005), taking the 
discussion from theories to concepts. The research framework is introduced at the 
end of this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology: The structure of the chapter is based on the 
methodological discussions of Silverman (2005), Churchill (1995) and Hair et al. 
(2006) intended to bridge the gap between theorisation and instrumentalism. It 
outlines how the research is done, focusing on the survey method.  
 
Chapter 4 – Results and analysis: The structure follows steps suggested by Hair et 
al. (2006) for analysing results from a questionnaire. This is the longest chapter of 
the thesis. It is largely a technical chapter, although the latter half discusses results 
reflected against the literature reviewed in Chapter 2.   
 
Chapter 5 – Conclusions: The structure is based on the triad of academic, practical, 
and personal implications introduced in Chapter 1. It is designed to reflect on the 
questions and issues raised in the first chapter.  
 
Each chapter is concluded with a summary snapshot of the chapter, and a bridge to 






Summary of Chapter 1. - Introduction 
 
This introductory chapter sets the stage for the thesis in terms of background, 
purpose, and objectives. It argues to establish common ground for understanding 
the concepts of the thesis, describes the problem or proposition, and proposes an 
approach to the research. The main objective of the thesis is to make an academic 
contribution, however, it is hoped it may also make both a practical and a personal 
contribution.  
 
The main points from this chapter are: 
 
 Corporate governance is defined: Corporate governance is a system where the 
board of directors is the central actor as it monitors and directs organisations for 
the purpose of better performance. 
 The common ground: the focus of corporate governance research is the board of 
directors and their role in monitoring and directing the company. 
 The problem/proposition: to establish whether there is a relationship between 
the board of directors and organisational performance, and to define that 
relationship. 
 There are two approaches to the measurement of board effectiveness, the 
structural-based and the process-based view. This thesis focuses on the process-
based view of the board.  
 Organisational performance has been measured with accounting measures in 
previous studies. This thesis takes a broader view of performance measures. 
 Three propositions are tested in this research, the relationship between 
composition, roles, and process to organisational performance.  
 A survey method is used. A questionnaire was sent to 560 Icelandic SMEs, 
supported by focus groups and open-ended questions. 
 The personal perspective is to gain understanding of corporate governance as a 
field of science, as well as use the doctoral process to achieve goals that reflect 
a turning point in the life of a research apprentice.  
 
The next chapter reviews the literature of corporate governance and focuses on the 





Chapter 2 – Literature review 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature concerning boards of directors 
and organisational performance. The purpose of the chapter is to build foundations 
for the research. The discussions explain why a single theoretical perspective is not 
a plausible approach for knowledge-creation on corporate governance, and how a 
pluralistic theoretical approach is more likely to provide insight. The chapter leads 
to a discussion of the research focus and methodology. 
 
Figure 2.1: The outline of the literature review.  
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The chapter is divided into eight sections (figure 2.1). First, board role theories 
presented in the literature are described and explored. The theoretical review then 
focuses on a more practical approach to research, outlining some descriptive models 
influential during the last fifteen years. In sections 3 to 5 the discussion is focused 
towards concepts developed for boards, as attributes and roles of boards, and the 
concept of organisational performance. In the sixth section the implications of 
context are reviewed. The seventh section presents a critique of previous work in 
the field. Finally, concluding remarks and the proposed agenda for the research are 







2.1 Theories of the board 
 
If human life were long enough to find the ultimate theory, everything would 
have been solved by previous generations. Nothing would be left to be 
discovered.   
 
Stephen Hawking (1942 - ) 
 
This section is about theories of corporate governance. The ultimate theory 
regarding roles of boards and corporate governance in general is yet to be 
discovered (Pettigrew, 1992; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Ulhøi, 2007). Instead, several 
challenging and complementary theories are found in the literature, although agency 
theory is often considered synonymous with governance theory (Lubatkin, 2007). 
However, there has been a call for a general unambiguous theory of the board 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001), and an appropriate conceptual framework to adequately 
reflect the reality of governance (Tricker, 2000).  
 
Figure 2.1.1: The overview of board theories. 
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This section describes the theoretical background of boards, in part one in terms of 
typology (figure 2.1.1). The second part describes their content. Part three compares 
theories, and the section concludes with a discussion of the importance of a multi-






2.1.1. Typology of theories 
Several theories have been used as a framework for research on boards of directors, 
although agency theory has been the most notable, both as a theoretical perspective 
and in empirical research (Dalton et al., 2003). Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) 
support this claim in a review of 127 empirical articles on boards and governance, 
in six leading academic journals from 1990 to 2002. They found in more than half 
the studies agency theory was employed as a main theoretical perspective. Resource 
dependency theory and social network perspectives were each used in roughly 15% 
of cases. Several other theories were also employed. Even more interesting is the 
fact 18% of the articles did not rely on any one theory, but used arguments from the 
literature and empirical results. The results of this overview crystallise the 
theoretical fragmentation of corporate governance research, and indicate the 
primacy of agency theory.    
 
Figure 2.1.2: A typology of theories. 
 
Adapted from Hung (1998, p. 105). 
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Although researchers are aware of the fruitful use of theories in corporate 
governance research, few have tried to categorise different theories. Hung (1998) 
offers a typology based on the board involvement in the decision-making process. 
Several theories other than agency theory are identified (figure 2.1.1), e.g. resource-
dependency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory, institutional theory and 
managerial hegemony theory. The basis for the typology is the contingency 
perspective on one hand, and the institutional perspective on the other, where each 
perspective is considered from both an internal and an external focus.  
 
Using prominent theoretical perspectives, the contingency perspective and the 
institutional perspective, to categorise board functions, is an interesting and 
important approach to classification (Judge and Zeithamls, 1992). Gupta, Dirsmith 
and Fogarty (1994) argue the two approaches take almost opposite positions 
regarding development of formal structures. The institutional perspective, or the 
intrinsic influence perspective, describes how and why organisational structures and 
processes have evolved as a result of socialisation and institutionalisation. The 
governing body, therefore, needs to perform in accordance with institutional 
expectations of traditional practices (Hung, 1998). The contingency perspective or 
the extrinsic influence perspective, on the other hand, emphasises governing boards 
are shaped by the task environment and organisational structure (Hung, 1998).  
 
2.1.1.1 The institutional perspective 
Institutional theory is considered to have originated in the writings of Max Weber 
(Weber, 1978) and has since been developed by others (for example, Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985, Meyer et al., 1987). 
Institutional isomorphism describes the progressive convergence of institutions 
through imitation. There are mainly three types of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic 
and normative (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Coercive isomorphism describes the 
pressure to conform, exerted through standards and regulations; mimetic 
isomorphism describes the borrowing and imitation of successful competitors and 
industry leaders, often based on best-practice ideology; while normative 






The institutional perspective claims organisations are institutionalised through 
internal and external pressures (Hung, 1998). Tolbert and Zucker (1983) argue the 
governing board can only act to maintain the relationship between the organisation 
and the environment. It is therefore called a maintenance role. The environment in 
institutional theory is the repository of two types of resources: economic and 
symbolic (Mintzberg et al., 1998). The role of the board is to maintain the status 
quo in the face of pressure from outside the board. These pressures restrict and limit 
what the board can do, as it is constrained by social rules and taken-for-granted 
conventions (Ingram and Simons, 1995). Hung (1998, p.107) uses Selznick’s 
(1957) argument to emphasise the link to institutional theory. By instilling value, 
institutionalisation promotes organisational stability and persistence of the 
organisational structure over time.  
 
Internal institutional pressures are described from the instrumental view of directors 
in the Hung (1998) classification. Mace (1971) observed boards are a management 
tool to support decisions of professional managers, and hence the label support role. 
This is commonly known as the ‘rubber stamp’ in managerial hegemony theory, a 
term also used by Mace (1971). This is in essence what Berle and Means (1932) 
thesis was about, the power of managers, although they were only employees, not 
owners, had been institutionalised. This is the perspective of institutional 
economics, where top and senior managers design the governance structure, with 
the ultimate aim of reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; 1979; 1984).  
 
2.1.1.2 The contingency perspective 
The contingency perspective was initiated in opposition to the view there is ‘one 
best way’ to run an organisation (Mintzberg et al., 1998). The perspective is usually 
traced back to Lawrence and Lorch (1967), as they characterise environment by the 
complexity and uncertainty it poses to organisations. Contingency theory has two 
main assumptions: (1) there is no best way of organising, and (2) different ways of 
organising are not equally effective (Galbraith, 1973). The argument is 
organisations must fit their structure and processes to their environment. First, 
companies should align their structure with environmental uncertainty. A 





organic approach is needed in an unstable environment. Secondly, companies need 
to align their structure to the overall environment, meaning companies in a more 
complex environment require a more complex structure to cope with it (Hedman 
and Kalling, 2002). Galbraith (1973; 1977) suggests organisations should minimise 
environmental uncertainty by processing information to better handle the 
complexity of the task and the uncertainty posed by the environment. He offered 
two strategies: (1) to reduce information processing needs, and (2) to increase 
capacity to handle more information. Strategic contingency theory emphasises the 
importance of choice, different interests and goals, and the role of power in 
determining organisational structure (Child, 1984; Pfeffer, 1982). 
 
Huse (2005) states, based on contingency theory, there is no best way of designing 
a board or a corporate governance system for accountability. There are two sets of 
factors that influence the design, the internal and external environment (Hung, 
1998). The external arm of the contingency part of the typology is based on the 
need for external control, where control is independent of the management, and the 
board is the manifestation of control, as it is control of external coalition that 
matters (Mintzberg, 1983). On one hand, there is the pluralism of stakeholder 
theory, where the role of the board is to coordinate different perspectives of 
stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Hung (1998) labels this the 
coordinating role. On the other hand, there is the phenomenon of networking, or 
interlocking directorates, where the role of the board is a linking role, and directors 
sitting on two boards or more act as links between those boards (Hung, 1998). 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1987) argue interlocking directorates are important for 
obtaining valuable resources, and at the same time for controlling other 
organisations through manipulation of the available resources. This can be further 
explained by resource dependency theory, which assumes corporations depend 
upon one another for access to valuable resources, and try to establish links to 
regulate their interdependence (Hung, 1998).   
 
The internal arm of the contingency part of the above typology is what has 
dominated discussion and research in the last decade, as it is linked to agency 





conformance and performance functions, where conformance relates to the past and 
performance to the future. These functions represent the control role and the 
strategic role. The control role becomes the role of the board in agency theory, as it 
is concerned with resolving problems in the contract between the principal and the 
agent, a mechanism which limits the opportunism of the agent (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Stewardship theory emphasises the importance of the performance function, 
or the strategic role of the board. According to this theory there is no need for 
control in the relationship of principal and the agent as they have a mutual goal, 
which means the board is responsible mainly for setting strategy (Donaldson, 1990).   
 
2.1.1.3 Hung’s Typology 
Typology, by definition, implies ideal types or illustrative endpoints, rather than a 
complete and discrete set of categories (Patton, 2002). Hung’s (1998) typology 
offers an interesting way to explore the different theories in context, as well as in 
content. It highlights different theoretical perspectives and how they aim to research 
various aspects of corporate governance. Furthermore, it emphasises the reason for 
different theories in the literature, as they represent categorically opposing 
viewpoints on what the role of the board should be and why. Such a typology,3 as 
Patton (2002) put it, is an important building block for a deeper understanding of 
the subject, and it helps to disentangle the forest of ideas sprouting up in corporate 
governance literature.  
 
However, it can be argued Hung’s typology is not waterproof. Many researchers 
consider agency theory, for example, more an advocate of institutional theory than 
contingency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lubatkin, 
2007; Ulhøi, 2007), as it originated in new institutional economics (Fama, 1980; 
Eggertsson, 1990). Furthermore, strictly speaking, none of the above theories 
represent contingency theory as initiated by Lawrence and Lorch (1967), as 
different organisational responses are, for example, functions of environmental 
dynamics, complexity, market diversity, and hostility (Mintzberg et al., 1998). This 
is more in line with the argument for lack of contingencies in governance research 
(Huse, 2005). It seems, however, the labels used in Hung´s (1998) typology are not 
                                                 





to be taken so literally. Contingencies have been discussed in a much broader sense 
in the literature. Zahra and Pearch (1989), for example, use external and internal 
contingencies in their model. Furthermore, it is logical to consider agency theory as 
a response to internal contingencies, although usually not described as such. 
Agency theory has been interpreted in many ways, according to the author’s 
disciplinary tradition (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007), as discussed in the 
review of the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2000). Another 
problem with Hung’s (1998) typology is there is no clear distinction between 
institutional perspective and institutional theory, although managerial hegemony 
theory becomes a subset of the former but not the latter. In this discussion the 
institutional perspective and theory are treated as one and the same.  
 
The logic of introducing Hung’s (1998) typology is it describes an interesting 
method of categorising the most popular theories within corporate governance 
literature, which is more helpful than describing them mechanistically. The 
typology is intended to give a broad overview of theories used in corporate 
governance, although the context may be debated. In the next subsection a more 
detailed description of the theories (except contingency theory and institutional 
theory which were discussed in this section) will be provided for a better 
understanding of the background of board role theory.  
 
2.1.2 Description of theories 
There is no shortage of theoretical perspectives in corporate governance literature. 
The number of perspectives, considered theories within the discipline, depends on 
the definition of ‘theory’ (see section 3.1 for a discussion of definitions of theories). 
Hung (1998) identifies six theories that could be categorised as typology. 
Furthermore, Zahra and Pearce (1989) described a legalistic perspective and a class 
hegemony theory. This makes eight challenging and complementary theories (table 
2.1.2), in essence the same theories on which other reviewers have focused (Fried et 
al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall et al., 2003). 
The purpose is to give a richer picture, although only a sketch, of the theoretical 






2.1.2.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory (and transaction-cost theories) is usually described as part of 
organisational economics (Barney and Ouchi, 1986; Donaldson and Preston, 1995) 
or new institutional economics (Eggertsson, 1990). As originated in the study of 
Berle and Means (1932), the use of new institutional economics in relation to 
corporate governance has primarily focused on the relationship between 
shareholders and managers of large public companies (Ulhøi, 2007). There are 
serious doubts as to whether the theory is applicable in other settings, or even 
whether it was ever intended for any other settings (Ulhøi, 2007; Lubatkin, 2007). 
As observed by Gabrielsson and Huse (2004), agency theory is the most common 
approach in empirical research within the governance field. It has been considered 
the dominant theoretical perspective in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Dalton et al., 2003). Furthermore, it is often used synonymously with 
governance theory (Lubatkin, 2007).   
 
Agency theory is based on the master-servant metaphor that can be traced back to 
Roman law, where slaves were perceived as practical extensions of their masters 
(Ulhøi, 2007). The theory is concerned with the problems arising when one party 
(the principal) contracts with another (the agent) to make decisions on behalf of the 
principals (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Three factors play a key role in this problem 
and capture the nature of the principal-agent relationship: (1) information 
asymmetry between principals and agents, (2) bounded rationality by both 
principals and agents, and (3) potential goal conflict (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 
2007). The separation of ownership and control gives rise to conflicts of interests 
between shareholders and managers, their agents, because of the opportunism of 
managers (Lubatkin, 2007).  
 
Williamson (1975, 1984, and 1992) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue the role of 
the board of directors, and more generally of the corporate governance system, is to 
harmonise agency conflicts. The board is principally an instrument by which 
managers control other managers (Williamson, 1984). It is an instrument of control 
with the primarily role of monitoring management activities in order to minimise 





can therefore be argued agency theory is at least partially, if not completely, about 
control (Mace, 1971; Boyd, 1990; Zahra and Pearce, 1992) and power (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). The contractual relationship of 
the principal and the agent is related to potential moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 2007). Moral hazard arises when agents 
shirk their responsibilities, as they believe their behaviour is unobservable (Arrow, 
1962). Adverse selection arises when one party has information the other party in 
the contract cannot obtain without some cost (Akerlof, 1970). Moral hazard and 
adverse selection create the need for a governance mechanism (Gomes-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 2007). As information asymmetries increase, it becomes harder for the 
principal to know whether the agent is fulfilling his contract (Balkin, Markman and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  
 
The main assumptions of agency theory are still being debated, as recent 
publications demonstrate (Lubatkin, 2007, Ulhøi, 2007, Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman, 2007, Zahra, 2007). It is argued some researchers emphasise the 
opportunism of managers too heavily, as the main premise is not distrust (Ulhøi, 
2007), but rather insurance or protective measures. In other words ‘it is better to be 
safe than sorry.’ There is, however, little debate whether ‘monitoring’ and ‘control’ 
are the main theoretical areas for board role research.  
 
2.1.2.2 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory takes a different view from new institutional economics of the 
relationship between management and the board of directors. It can be described as 
a counter theory to agency theory. Managers are considered good stewards of 
corporate assets, rather than opportunistic and self-interested actors as within 
agency theory (Donaldson, 1990). It originates from organisational psychology and 
sociology, claiming executives are generally trustworthy (Herzberg et al., 1959; 
Argyris, 1964; Donladson and Davis, 1991; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Davis et 
al. (1997) compare the two theories and point out the limits and boundaries of the 
two theories rest in their definition of behaviour, or the model of man. While both 
theories concentrate on the relationship between the board (or shareholders) and 





agency theory, managers are self-serving individualists focused on the short term, 
while stewardship focuses on managers who serve the collective and are long-term 
orientated (Davis et al, 1997). The psychological differences can be noted in table 
2.1.1.  
 
Table 2.1.1: Comparison of agency theory and stewardship theory. 
 Agency theory Stewardship theory 
Model of man Economic man Self-actualising man 




Motivation Low order/economic needs  
   (physiological, security, 
    economical) 
Extrinsic 
 
Higher order needs (growth, 
   achievement, self- 
   actualisation) 
Intrinsic 
Social Comparison Other managers Principal 
Identification Low value commitment High value commitment 
Power Institutional (legitimate, 
   coercive, reward) 





   Risk orientation 
   Time frame 










Cultural differences Individualism 
High power distance 
Collectivism 
Low power distance 
     Adapted from Davis et al. (1997, p. 37) 
 
Stewardship theory and agency theory are described in terms of Theory of X and 
Theory Y (Gay, 2001), originating from McGregor (1960). From the Y perspective, 
from which stewardship theory draws its insight, individuals need development and 
achievement (Davis et al., 1997). Furthermore, shareholder interests and executive 
interest are often naturally aligned (Davis et al., 1997; Lane et al, 1998; Daily et al., 
2003) and reputations and careers are naturally interwoven (Baysinger and 
Hoskinson, 1990).   
 
In this sense monitoring is less important as a function for the board (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1994), although some researchers argue for the need to review strategies 





within this theory is defined by its activity and involvement in guiding management 
to achieve the corporate mission and objectives (Hung, 1998). Directors and 
executives seek to become a team for governing the company, thereby creating 
value for shareholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1991; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; 
Davis et al., 1997). This may be considered an argument for combining the role of 
the chief executive and chairman (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).  
 
2.1.2.3 Resource-dependency theory 
The main claim of resource-dependency theory is the board serves as a ‘co-optive’ 
mechanism to link the company to the external environment, to secure resources 
and protecting against adversity (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The board is a linking 
instrument between the organisation and the external environment (Hung, 1998; 
Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The board focuses on resource exchange between 
companies and the external environment, essential for survival and effective 
performance (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). However, as the 
theory stems from interest in distribution of power in the firm (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989) and the market, it uses interlocking directorates to facilitate and obtain 
valuable resources (Zeitlin, 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In companies where 
executives lack experience, non-executive directors provide skill and knowledge 
about the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Castaldi and 
Wortmann, 1984; Borch and Huse, 1993; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
 
Resource-dependency theory focuses on the importance of human and social capital 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2004a). Human capital consists of experience, expertise, and 
reputation, while social capital consists of networks, status, and goodwill (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Social capital, described as a 
network of individuals, is used to leverage information, influence, and solidarity, as 
well as talent and external information (Adler and Knoeber, 2002, Rosenstein et al., 
1993, Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993).  
 
Carpenter and Westhpal (2001) suggest networks of directors through appointments 
to other boards are important in determining whether boards have the appropriate 





cognitive perspective indicates experience on other boards can either enhance or 
diminish directors’ ability to contribute to strategy by focusing their attention on 
relevant strategic issues. The theory suggests individuals cope with complex 
decision-making tasks by relying upon the schemata or ‘knowledge structures’ they 
have developed about their environment (Kiesler and Sproull, 1982; Walsh, 1995). 
In the absence of more complete information, or given uncertainty regarding the 
relevance of different pieces of information, individuals tend to follow a top-down 
or theory-driven approach to decision-making, rather than a bottom-up or data-
driven approach based on current information (Abelson and Black, 1986; Nisbett 
and Ross, 1980; Ocasio, 1997). This is important given the extreme information 
complexity facing directors evaluating strategic decisions (Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989). This perspective is based on the assumption knowledge structures 
individuals use to cope with information processing demands, are developed from 
experience in similar roles (Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1995). Useem 
(1982) notes executives use their board appointments as a way to scan the 
environment for timely and pertinent information. Directors treat experience on 
other boards as a vehicle for learning (Useem, 1982) and to observe consequences 
of management decisions (Haunchild, 1993). Information acquired from fellow 
directors may be particularly influential, because it often comes from a trusted 
source (Davis, 1991; Useem, 1982; Weick, 1995b).   
 
2.1.2.4 Class hegemony theory 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) describe class hegemony theory as one of four leading 
theoretical perspectives. However, it is omitted in Hung’s (1998) typology. Gay 
(2001) draws a comparison between class hegemony theory and resource-
dependency theory, as class hegemony theory focuses on the relationship between 
companies and their origin in organisational theory and sociology. The theory is 
based on an elitist paradigm in which boards of directors perpetuate the power and 
control of the ruling capitalist class over social and economic institutions, hence 
wealth (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). They envision the task of the board as 
coordinating actions by the firms they serve and ensuring capitalist control of 






Class hegemony theory is different from management hegemony theory. 
Managerial hegemony theory sees the board as a “rubber stamp” for managerial 
decisions (Mace, 1971; Nader, 1984; Perham, 1983). In managerial hegemony 
theory, boards are seen as lackeys of the CEO who, as joint chairman and CEO, can 
pick and choose members of his board (Patton and Baker, 1987). Class hegemony 
theory proposes a different spin on this ineffectiveness of boards, where they are 
described as a tool of the ruling capitalist elite (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). The main 
thesis of Berle and Means (1932) was ownership had become so dispersed nobody 
actually owned big corporations any more, and therefore it was the CEO, not the 
owners, who controlled the company. In class hegemony theory the CEO represents 
the capitalist elite, and the role of the board is highly influenced by concentration of 
ownership and CEO power and style (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Therefore, interests 
of the “establishment,” rather than management, set the agenda.  
 
2.1.2.5 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory stresses corporations and boards must accept responsibility for 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees, and the community, rather 
than just shareholders (Lorsch and Carter, 2004). The theory challenges the 
predominance of shareholders as the only real stakeholders, and assumes interests 
of all stakeholder groups have intrinsic value (Jones and Wicks, 1999). In agency 
theory and stewardship theory, companies are run for their owners, the 
shareholders, based on a simple profit-maximising perspective. The stakeholder 
approach to the role of the governing board implies negotiation and compromise 
with stakeholder interests (Hung, 1998). Stakeholder theory takes the broad view 
companies are not just profit maximising entities, but rather need to consider all 
stakeholders of the company. It can be argued this approach has at least two 
implications for the role of the board and its functions: (1) monitoring, as an 
example for ethical standards or environmental standards not directly linked with 
shareholder interests, and (2) negotiations and compromise, where the board acts as 
a link and coordinator between management and shareholder interests on one hand, 






The role of the board is to satisfy multiple stakeholder interests, rather than to 
monitor conventional economic and financial factors (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995). The focus of the theory is not just shareholder-board-management 
interaction and goals. It becomes stakeholder-board-management interaction and 
goals. The model of the firm changed from a simple input-output model to a more 
interactive stakeholder model, as portrayed by Donaldson and Preston (1995; p. 68). 
The comparison of the input-output model and the stakeholder model provided by 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) indicates how much more complicated the 
stakeholder model is, in comparison with the shareholder model.  
 
















Input - output model
Stakeholder model
 







The stakeholder theory differs from resource dependency theory, although it too 
focuses on the external environment. Resource dependency theory, like agency 
theory and stewardship theory, focuses on the shareholder perspective. The two 
theories can be contrasted in another way. While stakeholder theory focuses on the 
role of board in establishing long-term relationships between the firm and the 
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Freman and Evan, 1990; Blair, 1995), resource 
dependency theory focuses on the board as an instrument to facilitate access to 
resources critical to the firm’s success (Johnson et al., 1996), both in the short and 
long term.  
 
2.1.2.6 Managerial-hegemony theory 
In managerial-hegemony theory, the board is, in effect, a legal fiction dominated by 
management control (Berle and Means, 1932; Mace, 1971; Kosnik, 1987). The 
power lies in the hands of management (Finkelstein, 1992; Hill, 1995). The ensuing 
weakness of shareholder control is likely to lead to self-serving management 
behaviour, where they pursue objectives of their own choosing (Parkinson, 1993). 
The board, therefore, adopts the role of ‘rubber stamp’ (Herman, 1981, Mace, 1971; 
Vance, 1983; Kosnik, 1987). The board cannot monitor effectively without 
authority. The board exists to comply with legal requirements, with no function 
other than to agree with what management says and thinks. The board is only 
involved with strategic decision-making when faced with a crisis (Mace, 1971).  
 
The CEO is responsible for strategy and the key link between the board and the 
managerial hierarchy, with influence over the flow of information in both directions 
(Aram and Cowan, 1983; Hill, 1995). Within this context, the CEO is the power 
broker (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), inviting only friends and protégées to serve on the 
board (Rosenstein, 1987; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Westphal and Zajac, 1995) and 
dismissing viable successor candidates (Cannella and Shen, 2001). The power of 
the CEO is drawn from a variety of sources (Shen, 2003): control over board 
nominations (Mace, 1971; Foster, 1982; Goodrich, 1987; Kosnik, 1987; Patton and 
Baker, 1987; Wade et al., 1990; Westphal and Zajac, 1995), control over 
remuneration (Aram and Cowan, 1983; Geneen, 1984), the limited time allocated 





prestige and status (Finkelstein, 1992), equity ownership (Cannella and Shen, 
2001), the merged role of CEO and chairman (Daily and Dalton, 1994) and the 
culture of the boardroom, which has the potential to stifle independent voices 
(Mace, 1971; Herman, 1981; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Hill, 1995; Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1995). The main point being, it is the CEO who controls what the board 
is and does.  
 
2.1.2.7 Legalistic perspective 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) develop another “theory,” which may be labelled the 
legalistic perspective, mandating boards contribute to performance by carrying out 
their legal responsibilities. It views the board responsible for selecting and replacing 
the CEO, representing the interests of shareholders, providing advice and counsel to 
top management, and serving as a control mechanism by monitoring managerial 
and company performance. However, Taylor and Stiles (2001) point out how the 
role of the board is to be interpreted from a legal standpoint, and what kind of 
power is delegated to the executive, differs a great deal among companies. 
Although it can be argued the legalistic perspective may fit into Hung’s (1998) 
typology as part of institutional theory, it is important to view it separately, because 
of increased initiatives of the legal body to mould the role of the board, and its 
dominance in practice. Dulewicz and Herbert (1997) found, in their study of listed 
UK companies, boards do focus on the importance and effort of fulfilling their legal 
and fiduciary duties.  
 
There is a somewhat vague difference between the legalistic perspective and agency 
theory. Both perspectives are emphasised by Johnson et al. (1996). One of the 
fundamental differences between the two perspectives is in the source of power of 
directors. In agency theory, this power comes from the shareholders, and in legal 
theory, power emanates from state law (Budnitz, 1990). Legal theory is therefore 
less specific in identifying board duties to shareholders than agency theory 
(Budnitz, 1990). Johnson et al. (1996) point out there are more similarities between 
the theories than differences, as both focus on control and monitoring. The 
difference has been emphasised with reference to research on bankruptcies, where 





initiatives for change in board practises in the last few years have come from 
institutional changes in law, or ‘comply or explain’ regulation, rather than from 
shareholders. On the other hand, agency theory initiatives regarding management 
incentives are not supported by legal theory.     
 
Legal theory can be described as a subject of the institutional perspective, rather 
than contingency theory, in Hung’s (1998) typology, as board-mandated 
responsibilities emanate from law and regulation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Legal 
obligations are, therefore, an example of external institutional pressure. The legal 
theory differs from institutional theory, as law and regulation are the sole 
motivation. In institutional theory the pressure is more pluralistic, as social pressure 
and convention structure the behaviour of the board. It may be argued legal theory 
stands for more formal institutional pressure, while institutional theory focuses on 
more informal external pressure.   
 
2.1.2.8 Theoretical forest 
A range of other theories has been explored in the context of corporate governance: 
for example, strategic leadership theory, justice theory, and team theory (Fried et 
al., 1998; Dalton et al., 1999, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Lynall et al., 2003, 
Long, 2005). An overview provides an outline of the different theories and their 
emphasis, although boundaries between theories are not clear. A further description 
of the eight theories discussed in this chapter can be found in table 2.1.2, which is a 
bundle of three literature surveys exploring those theories.  
 
2.1.3 Multi-theoretical perspective 
The discussion in this section has shown there is no ultimate board role theory, but 
rather different perspectives with different emphases. Referring to the Hawkins 
quote at the beginning of the section, it may be just as well there is no ultimate 
theory, because that means something remains to be discovered within the field. 
The bundling of theories has been enlightening, as, for example, Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) use that approach to develop their integrative model of board roles and 
attributes. This is why more and more researchers recognise the importance of a 





theoretical approach (Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Huse, 2005). A 
multi-theoretical approach to corporate governance is essential to investigate the 
many mechanisms and structures that might reasonably enhance organisational 
functioning (Dalton et al., 2003).  
 
This section has focused on theories within the corporate governance literature. 
Hung’s (1998) typology and the intergraded view of Zahra and Pearce (1989) have 
guided the discussion. In conclusion, a combination of theories is more likely to 
describe what boards of directors do, how they do it, and why. The next section 






Table 2.1.2. Summary of corporate governance theories. 





2.2 Models of board attributes and roles 
 
The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they 
mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, 
with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed 
phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and 
precisely that it is expected to work.  
  
     Johann Von Neumann (1903 - 1957) 
  
This section discusses some of the research models used or suggested in the 
literature. Most of the models introduced in corporate governance research can be 
described as simple input-process-output models, with or without contextual 
contingencies. There is little agreement about what should be included in each box, 
although most models can be traced back to an article by Zahra and Pearce (1989).  
 
Figure 2.2.1: Outline of the board models section. 
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This section focuses on models developed to research the role of boards. The first 
part describes the integrated model constructed by Zhara and Pearch (1989). The 
next four parts focus on four other models. The section concludes with a 





2.2.1 The ‘usual suspects’ model 
The ‘usual suspects’ are variables that have become classic in corporate 
governance, where research has focused on simple input-output models (Finkelstein 
and Mooney, 2003). The relationship between the usual suspects and corporate 
financial performance, as shown in figure 2.2.2, has driven board and governance 
research for almost two decades now (Huse, 2005). The usual suspects are: (1) 
number of board members, (2) insider/outsider ratio, (3) CEO duality, and (4) 
director shareholdings. In other words, the usual suspects are composition 
characteristics of boards (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
Figure 2.2.2: The ‘usual suspects’ model. 
                     Based on Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
 
The focus on composition has been called the structural-based perspective of the 
board (Daily and Cannella, 2003). Focault (2002, p. 147) describes the term 
‘structure’ by quoting a botanist: “By structure of a plant’s parts, we mean the 
composition and arrangement of the pieces that make up its body.” That is in 
essence what is reflected in the structural-based perspective. It refers to the ‘body’ 
of the board. Several researchers argue research from the structural-based 
perspective has not proven fruitful, and has been inconclusive and misleading (for 
example, Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pettigrew, 1992; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et 
al., 1999; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003; Dalton and Dalton, 2005).  
 
The leap from composition input variables to the output variables of organisational 
performance by structural-based research has been criticised for leaving out 
everything in between the two sets of variables (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pettigrew, 
1992). The missing element is what is commonly known as ‘process’ in the 
classical input-process-output format of models. Pfeffer (1983) and others argue the 
study of such intervening processes is not necessary, as the beliefs and behaviour of 
executives and directors can be inferred successfully from demographic 









or organisation-level impact of demography is, there is no necessity to determine 
‘why’ demography operates in the observed way (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) offer three arguments as to why this perspective is 
flawed. First, the literature has failed to lead to any clear consensus as to which 
demographic characteristics lead to which outcomes (Daily and Schwenk, 1996; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). “This conclusion suggests that the 
influence of board demography on firm performance may not be simple and direct, 
as many past studies presume, but, rather, complex and indirect” (Forbes and 
Millken, 1999; p. 490). Secondly, the assumptions behind demography-
performance theories have been shown unreliable (Lawrence, 1997; Walsh, 1988; 
Melone, 1994). Thirdly, studies of process constructs have demonstrated the 
potential to expand and refine understanding of group dynamics (Smith et al., 1994; 
Amason and Sapienza, 1997). Furthermore, recent debate has emphasised the 
importance of understanding processes, not just composition, in relation to boards 
of directors (Zahra, 2007).  
 
The following section discusses other models with slightly different perspectives 
for empirical research. They all address the ‘process’ in the classical input-process-
output model.4 
 
2.2.2 The integrated model 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed an integrated model from four theoretical 
perspectives: the legalistic, agency, class-hegemony, and resource dependency 
theories. The model (figure 2.2.3) consists of four interrelated attributes, 
composition, characteristics, structure, and process, which in essence define the role 
of the board, and in effect how they influence corporate financial performance. 
These four attributes are affected by internal and external contingencies.  
 
With regard to the four other theories not mentioned by Zahra and Pearce (1989), 
(stakeholder, stewardship, institutional, and managerial hegemony theory) the 
model basically stands the test of time, although stakeholder theorists prefer to use 
measurements other than financial performance.  
                                                 





Figure 2.2.3:  A model of board attributes and roles. 
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Adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 305).5 
 
Some researchers have used the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989) as a 
starting point for model building, sometimes changing one or two variables. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), for example, use the Resource role, which is part of the 
Service role in the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Furthermore, 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) use ‘board capital,’ a measure of the human capital of 
the board, but which relates closely to attributes in the integrated model (figure 
2.2.4).  
 
Examples of more simple research models based on Zahra and Pearce (1989) are 
Huse (1993) and Kula (2005). Huse (1993) uses independence and relational norms 
as inputs, control and service for process, and company performance as output. 
Kula (2005) uses structure and process attributes as inputs, control, service, and 
resource dependence for process roles, and company performance as output.  
                                                 
5 The relationship between Composition and Board roles is missing in the original drawing, but 














Adapted from Hillman and Dalziel (2003, p. 390).  
 
 
2.2.3 The Henley Model 
Another interesting model was developed by Henley Management College as a 
result of extensive research published by Dulewicz et al. (1995; 1995b) and by the 
Institute of Directors. It is described as a simple input-process-output model, 
although it includes many variables (figure 2.2.5). The input part, “personal 
competences and knowledge,” consists of 38 separately-defined competences 
grouped under six headings: strategic perception and decision-making, analytical 
understanding, communication, interaction with others, board management, and 
achieving results. Process is described under four headings: clarification of board 
and management responsibilities, board composition and organisation, planning and 
managing board meetings, and improving board effectiveness. The output part 
consists of 16 tasks described under four headings: establishing vision, mission and 
values, setting strategy and structure, delegation to management, exercising 
responsibility to shareholders and other interested parties. Output is further defined 
as “indicators of good practice” and is, therefore, a different measurement than the 
financial performance measure in the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
While the Henley model does not offer the broad scope of the intergraded model 





competence, process, and tasks of the board in a more detailed fashion. Therefore, it 
gives a much richer picture of what boards do, and even how they do it. However, 
internal and external contingencies can better clarify understanding of why and 
when boards act as they act. The answer to these questions may lead to a better 
understanding of the role of the board.  
 
Figure 2.2.5: The Henley model. 
 
Adapted from Dulewicz, MacMillan and Herbert (1995). 
 
2.2.4 The Intellectual Capital Framework 
Another input-process-output model has been developed by Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004), in which the transformational process is fitted between the intellectual 
capital of the board and the roles of the board. Nicholson and Kiel (2004) view the 
board as a dynamic and open social system, in a framework describing the 
relationship between the board and corporate performance as a set of interrelated 
elements.    
 



























A more detailed version of the Nicholson and Kiel model (2004) shows the inputs 
consist of organisation type, legal framework, constitution, history, and strategy 
(figure 2.2.7). The board’s intellectual capital is a dynamic relationship between the 
team’s social capital and structural capital, and individual human, social, and 
cultural capital. The board’s roles are control, advice, and access to resources, 
affected by the internal and external environments. The output is board 
effectiveness, meaning team and individual effectiveness, which affects 
organisational performance. The framework draws upon Stewart’s (1997) and 
Bontis’ (1999) conceptualisation of intellectual capital, as well as the intergraded 
model by Zahra and Pearce (1989), and the review of Johnson et al. (1996).    
 
Figure 2.2.7: The board intellectual capital framework. 
Adapted from Nicholson and Kiel (2004). 
 
Another version of the intellectual capital model by Nicholson and Kiel (2004b) 
more closely resembles the original model of Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
Furthermore, it is more focused towards research hypotheses, rather than being 
“just” descriptive, as the correlation or causal links are more evident, although it is 




































































Figure 2.2.8: Intellectual capital model of the board. 
Adapted from Nicholson and Kiel (2004b; p. 12). 
 
 
2.2.5 Board as a decision-making group 
Some researchers have looked at boards as decision-making groups (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), although with a different emphasis. 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) introduced a model based (figure 2.2.9) on the literature 
of small decision-making groups, the work of Bettenhausen (1991), Cohen and 
Bailey (1997) and Gist et al. (1987).  
 
Figure 2.2.9: Board as a decision-making group. 
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It is a model of board processes, defined as the effort each individual on the board 
puts into a task, the cognitive conflict of board members, and use of their own 
knowledge and skills. The measures of effectiveness of the boards are task 
performance (Control and Service roles), and the board’s ability to continue 
working together, measured as the cohesiveness of the group. Board cohesiveness is 
defined as the degree of attractiveness and longevity of board members. Board-level 
outcomes are then associated with firm-level outcomes.  
 
2.2.6 The Board behaviour model 
Some researchers argue for a different kind of framework to explore board 
behaviour (Roberts et al., 2005; Huse, 2005). Huse (2005) offers a framework that 
focuses on role expectations, board task performance, actors, context, interactions 
and influencing processes, formal and informal structures and norms, and board 
decision-making culture (figure 2.2.10).  
 
Figure 2.2.10: The board behaviour model. 
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The model is based on critiques of previous models, not the least  the work of Zahra 
and Pearce (1989), Pettigrew (1992), Johnson et al. (1996) and Forbes and Milliken 
(1999). The point is only very few studies have been published in leading journals 
about board behaviour. Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) found thirteen articles within 
the period of 1990-2002. Huse’s (2005) framework consists of four main areas: (a) 
splitting the link between board composition and corporate financial performance in 
intermediate steps through mid-range theories, as Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
suggested, (b) using a pluralistic approach to board role theories (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001), (c) applying theories from 
group and cognitive psychology to understand board decision-making culture, as 
Forbes and Milliken (1999) have emphasised, and (d) understanding the board as an 
open interactive system with various influence and power relationships among 
internal and external actors, as Pettigrew (1992) suggested. Thus the board 
behaviour model involves a complicated set of relationships. 
 
2.2.7 Comparison of Models 
The above models add dimension to the input-output equation of the ‘usual 
suspects’ model. The input part of the models demonstrates variables other than 
composition may be considered. These models provide a different method to 
measure the implications of corporate governance, as they focus on the processes of 
the board, not just the structure. Therefore, this perspective is called the process-
based view of the board.  
 
It is helpful to analyse these models in terms of inputs, outputs, processes, and 
contingencies. However, the distinction between different boxes is not always clear 
when the models are compared. The five models, the intergraded model of roles and 
attributes (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), the Henley model (Dulewicz et al., 1995), the 
decision-group model (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), the board intellectual capital 
framework (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004), and the integrated board behaviour model 
(Huse, 2005) offer a detailed picture of board roles and attributes. The process part 
of the models shows researchers are considering different influences and elements 
that drive board performance. Furthermore, it is interesting to note an effort is made 





board become part of the process in some of the models (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, Nicholson and Kiel, 2004b), 
while remaining an outcome in other models (Dulewicz et al, 1995, Dulewicz et al., 
1995b; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). The Henley Management College model 
designates ‘indicators of good practice’ as the ultimate outcome measure, and not 
firm performance (Dulewicz et al., 1995).  
 
The above discussion of the process-based view of the board shows efforts are 
being made to build more comprehensive models of what boards do and how that 
affects the organisation. The approaches are different, although usually built on 
linear input-process-output as model-forms. Furthermore, they emphasise a multi-
theoretical approach, rather than just one theory. The models are based on different 
theoretical assumptions, rather than a simplification of a theory to test. On the other 
hand, the above discussion of process models has demonstrates there is little 
agreement among researchers on elements within the process-based view of the 
board. The literature is fragmented theoretically, and the approach to model-
building differs among scholars. Concepts and measures vary, and often are 
incompatible (Heuvel et al., 2006). It can be argued that general terms used by 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) can accommodate most features of the other models. The 
four terms used in the discussion of concepts are: attributes, roles, performance, and 
contingencies (figure 2.2.11).  
 











The four main concepts identified in this section will be discussed in further detail 
in the next four sections of this chapter, in the following order: attributes, roles, 
performance, and contingencies. The purpose is to understand and break down the 
main concepts into more simple concepts that can be used for conceptualisation and 






2.3 The attributes of boards 
Number and magnitude can always be assigned by means of a count or a 
measure; they can therefore be expressed in quantitative terms. Forms and 
arrangements, on the other hand, must be described by other methods: 
either by identification with geometrical figures, or by analogies that must 
all be ‘of the utmost clarity’.  
        
Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984) 
 
It is easiest to categorise elements that can be seen and counted. However, such 
luxury is not always available. What is usually described as attributes of boards 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996) have elements that can be seen and 
counted, as well forms and arrangements which need to be documented in different 
terms, to rephrase the above quotation from Foucault (2002, p. 147). The purpose of 
attributes is to describe boards.  
 
Figure 2.3.1: The overview of discussion of attributes. 
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Based on Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
 
This section focuses on attributes of boards, and concepts also generally classified 
as attributes. The structure of the section follows the classification of Zahra and 
Pearce (1989), which distinguishes four elements of attributes: composition, 








Composition of boards has been the main focus of corporate governance research, 
and the ‘usual suspects’ the main variables (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 
2005). Zahra and Pearce (1989) describe three composition variables, size, outsiders 
vs. insiders, and minority representation.  
 
In their annual survey of board practices in large US companies, the executive 
search firm Spencer Stuart (2002) found  board size had shrunk from 15 directors in 
1988 to 10.9 in 2002, indicating boards generally are shrinking. The reason is 
smaller boards are considered more effective. Yermack (1996) found an inverse 
relationship between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large US 
industrial corporations during 1984-1991. Furthermore, evidence from 334 hospital 
boards shows big boards hinder strategic change (Goodstein et al., 1994), and Boyd 
(1990) found boards tend to be smaller in a more uncertain environment.  
 
Spencer Stuart’s study (2002) of large US companies showed those in which the 
CEO was the only inside director, increased from less than one-tenth in 1992 to 
nearly one-third in 2002. Agency theory supports the hypothesis outside directors 
play a larger monitoring role than inside directors (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), and 
lack of monitoring by the board has been the basis of corporate scandals throughout 
history (Drucker, 1974; Coffee, 2006). Stewardship theory, however, holds the 
opposite view, that inside director and chief-executive duality has a positive effect 
on performance (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). There is support for both views. 
Baysinger and Butler (1985), in a study of 266 large US corporations, found 
relatively independent boards had a positive effect on average return on equity. 
Similarly, Kesner (1987), Zahra and Pearce (1992), and Ezzemel and Watson 
(1993) found a positive relationship. Donaldson and Davis (1991), Vance (1983), 
and Sullivan (1988) found, on the other hand, a greater proportion of executive 
directors led to a more positive performance. Other studies, like Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988), found board composition had no impact on corporate 
performance in their sample of 142 NYSE firms. 





According to the Spencer Stuart study (2002), in 1992 only 11 percent of boards 
featured a female director, and 9 percent had a director from an ethnic minority. By 
2002 some 82 percent of boards had a female director and three-quarters of S&P 
500 companies had African American directors. Several studies have found board 
diversity has a positive effect on performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 
2003).  
 
Much of the research on composition of the board has sought a link to firm 
performance. Dalton et al. (1998), in a meta-analysis of 54 studies of board 
composition, found no substantive relationship between board composition and firm 
performance. Rhoades et al. (2000), in a meta-analysis of 37 studies, found board 
composition, especially the proportion of outside directors, had only an 
inconsequential relationship with firm performance. As Nicholson and Kiel (2004, 
p. 443) point out: “Despite press, academic and practitioner interest, however, there 




Zahra and Pearce (1989) discuss two components under characteristics of boards. 
‘Directors’ background,’ which reflects the age, educational background, values, 
and experience of directors, and ‘personality of the board,’ which stands for the 
distinct style of the board. Personality reflects the focus on internal versus external 
issues, level of directors’ independence from management influence, and directors’ 
vested interest in the firm as evidenced by stock ownership. However, both the 
Henley model (Dulewicz et al., 1995) and the intellectual capital framework 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2004) introduced earlier, offer a richer picture of what could 
be categorised as characteristics of the board. Both models focus on competences of  
board members, both individually and as a group.  
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) emphasised that each role, control, service, and strategy, 
requires distinct skills and abilities. For example, independence from management 
is necessary for the control role (Molz, 1988), balance between external 





competence and prestige are necessary for the service role. Norburn (1986), in a 
study of 354 directors in 18 industries, found three industry settings – growth, 
turbulence, and decline – were associated with distinct director traits, abilities, 
beliefs, and skills. Many authors have described the characteristics of an effective 
board (Aram & Cowen, 1983, Castaldi & Wortman, 1984; Vance, 1983; Dulewicz 
et al., 1995; Charan, 1998; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Garratt, 2003), however, most have 
focused on the ‘one and only’ model of the board, rather than differing roles for 
individual organisations.  
 
2.3.3 Structure 
The literature on board structures has been growing, especially regarding 
committees. Charan (1998, p. 39) states overemphasis has been placed on the 
structural dimension of boards, which can distract a board from the real issue.   
 
There is wide agreement committees are important for the board. For example, 
Klein (1998) reports the independence of key board committees is related to firm 
value. Beasley (1996) finds independent boards are important in deterring 
accounting fraud. Furthermore, studies support the relationship between the 
presence of board committees and board effectiveness, for example, the audit 
committee (Klein, 2002), remunerations committee (Conyon and Peck, 1998), and 
nominating committee (Vafeas, 1999). 
 
Another structural issue is the flow of information between the CEO and directors 
(Tashakori and Boulton, 1983). “Directors can never know as much about the 
operation of the company as management, so they are dependent on the CEO for 
being supplied with accurate, timely, and material information” (Monks and 
Minow, 2004; p. 203). Very little research has focused on the attempt to identify 
factors that determine whether boards have adequate knowledge and information to 
make meaningful contributions to strategic decision-making (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). Even when the board is staffed by a majority of outside directors, 
the board still functions on information provided by the CEO (Aram and Cowan, 
1983). Some have questioned whether directors have suitable knowledge or 







Board process studies have focused mainly on what happens at meetings and the 
overall process, whereas an effective process is required for all the roles of the 
board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). For the service role, it is 
necessary to have effective processes to enable the board to identify issues of 
concern to the firm, and ensure a plan for managerial succession is in place. For the 
strategic role, processes to encourage discussion, evaluation and strategic proposals. 
For the control role, to ensure frequent evaluations of the CEO and company 
performance by the board or a committee.  
 
The annual Spencer Stuart survey (2002) concludes the average S&P 500 board met 
7.5 times in 2002, down slightly from the year before when it was 8.2 meetings. 
Lorsch and Carter (2004) state because of time limitations, most boards are set up to 
fall short of expectations. However, recent studies focus more on the debate, 
culture, and integration of board processes (Sonnenfeld, 2002, Nadler, 2004). Even 
so, empirical research on processes is very limited.  
 
2.3.5 Structure and processes of the board 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) identify four themes of attributes: composition, 
characteristics, structure, and process. The different attributes have been described 
in this section. According to Foucault’s (2002) definition of structure, it is possible 
to simplify the discussion of attributes into structure and process. The elements of 
composition, characteristics, and structure in the integrated model (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989) can be summarised in the structural-based view of the board, as they 
all refer to the ‘body’ of the board. The process part of attributes in the integrated 
model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), is better fitted for the process-based view of the 
board. Information flow, which Zahra and Pearce (1989) describe as a part of 
structure, can, furthermore, be fitted into the process view, as Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004b), Forbes and Milliken (1999), and Huse (2005) do in their models. Only 
limited research has been done on most attributes in the integrated model (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989). The ‘usual suspects’ are the exception, as they define the 





described as composition in the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). It is 
important to note attributes, as part either of the structural-based view or the 
process-based view, are considered to have direct links to organisational 
performance in the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989), and can therefore be 
tested as independent variables, with organisational performance as the dependent 
variable. However, research has indicated work concerning the relationship of 
boards of directors to organisational performance is not very fruitful.  
 
The next section further explores the process-based view of the board by examining 







2.4 The Roles of boards 
All over the place, from the popular culture to the propaganda system, there 
is constant pressure to make people feel that they are helpless, that the only 
role they can have is to ratify decisions and to consume.  
 
Noam Chomsky (1928 - ) 
 
This section discusses the concept of roles of boards of directors. In the wake of 
recent business scandals there is a growing tendency to take the institutional 
perspective, or emphasise the conformance role of agency theory as the one and 
only role of boards in all companies. At the same time, directors’ main complaint 
about the role of the board is their limited involvement with strategy, and desire to 
become more involved with this task (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Lorsch and Carter, 
2004; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). The purpose of this section is to acknowledge 
boards have more than one role.  
 
Figure 2.4.1: The overview of the discussion of roles.  
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This section focuses on the role of the board, starting with theoretical labels 
discussed in section 2.1.  Archetypes of roles are examined in the second part. The 
third part concerns roles as tasks. Part four discusses classifying boards in terms of 






2.4.1 Theoretical origins of roles 
Most roles identified in the literature can be traced to theories discussed in the 
previous section. Whether a role stems from any one given theory, or whether it is 
better described by several theories, remains debatable. Hung (1998), for example, 
tries to identify main roles of the board as originating from particular theories, and 
many roles can be identified with Hung’s (1998) approach. Zahra and Pearce 
(1989), on the other hand, describe few roles, for example Control, Strategy and 
Service, which are represented to different degrees in several theories. Many other 
researchers argue for a combination of different theories to explain the roles of the 
board (Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005, Heuvel et al., 2006). 
Both approaches are helpful to understand what the board does, although they have 
different emphases.   
 
As to Hung’s (1998) typology of theories, the main roles of the board are classified 
according to underlying theory, and shown in table 2.1.2. The two other theoretical 
perspectives included by Zahra and Pearce (1989), class hegemony theory and the 
legalistic perspective, may best be described as ceremonial and compliant. Zahra 
and Pearce (1989, p. 299) focus on the ceremonial role of the board when they 
describe it as “a means of perpetuating the powers of the ruling capitalist elite.” It 
may be argued the board has a more active control role within class hegemony 
theory than managerial hegemony theory, as the board is more powerful when 
ownership is more concentrated. The theory is not very clear on this issue. The role 
of the board within legalistic theory is best described as one of compliance, as 
“boards contribute to the performance of their firms by carrying out their legally 
mandated responsibilities” (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, p. 292).  
 
Although Hung’s (1998) typology is helpful for understanding the theoretical roots 
of the corporate governance discussion, and the focus of those theories in the form 
of roles, there is a lack of detailed discussion in the literature about how those 
theories differ from a practical perspective. From the above discussion it can be 
seen the theories handle authority differently. Owner authority is the focus of 
agency theory, stewardship theory, and resource dependency theory, while the CEO 





even greater authority, call it society, is the focus of stakeholder theory, legal 
theory, and institution theory (table 2.4.1).  
 
Table 2.4.1: Roles categorised as authority. 
Theories and roles Authority 
Theory Roles CEO Owners/Board Society 
Managerial hegemony Support role X   
Class hegemony Ceremonial role X   
Resource dependency Linking role  X  
Agency Control role  X  
Stewardship Strategic role  X  
Stakeholder Coordinating role   X 
Institutional Maintenance role   X 
Legalistic Compliancy role   X 
            Adapted from Hung (1998), Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Johnson et al., (1996). 
 
Categorisation like this is important for understanding what boards actually do, and 
why. Zahra and Pearce (1989) take a different path with their integrated model of 
agency, legal, class hegemony, and resource dependency theory. They identify from 
a literature search, three main roles of the board, control, strategy, and service 
(figure 2.2.3). These roles have become a good contestant for being named the 
archetypes of roles. Agency theory and resource dependency theory refer to all 
three roles, while class hegemony theory and legal theory consider only two of the 
three roles (table 2.4.2).  
 
Table 2.4.2: Different theories explain the main roles.  
Theory/Role Control Strategy Service 
Agency X X X 
Legal X  X 
Class hegemony X  X 
Resource dependency X X X 
           Adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1989).  
 
Furthermore, other researchers have developed a different approach, where the roles 





than searching for theoretical implications (Gabrielson and Huse, 2005). The trend 
in categorisation of roles has been shifting towards a dualistic categorisation of 
control and direction, as can be seen in the next subsection. 
 
2.4.2 Archetypes of roles 
There is ambiguity in the literature as to what roles boards perform, and the 
definition of those roles (Heuvel et al., 2006). Many labels for roles often seem the 
same, and researchers interpret these roles differently.  
 
The first study of roles and tasks has been traced back to Mace (1948) (Heuvel et 
al., 2006). However, there are not a lot of studies on the role of boards. Gabrielson 
and Huse (2005) found 127 empirical articles on boards and governance in six 
leading academic journals from 1990 to 2002, only 27 with primary data. Heuvel et 
al. (2006) note around 30 articles have discussed board roles and tasks from 1980 to 
2004. It is not surprising there has been a constant call for research focused on 
board roles and tasks (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Leblanc and 
Gillies, 2005).   
 
However, tasks are not the only classification used to define boards. The 
relationship between the CEO and the board has also served to identify roles. Huse 
(2003) describes boards based on this relationship either as a clan, a barbarian, or an 
aunt. Zahra and Pearce (1991) use power of CEOs and the board to differentiate 
boards as caretaker, statutory, proactive, and participating boards, to integrate 
different models from the literature. Caretaker boards are characterised by low 
board power and low CEO power. Statutory boards are characterised by a strong 
CEO and weak board (Aram and Cowan, 1984; Vance, 1983; Wood, 1983). 
Proactive boards are characterised by the commanding power that surpasses the 
power of the CEO (Herman, 1981; Molz, 1985). Proactive boards are usually 
composed primarily by outside directors to enhance their independence of 
management (Zahra and Pearce, 1991). Participating boards are characterised by 
equal power of the CEO and board, where discussion, debate and disagreement are 






It is important to note this approach covers non-task roles, which are sometimes 
disregarded in task-role categorisation. The Statutory board of Zahra and Pearce 
(1991) is a metaphor for one of the first roles ever identified, the non-role described 
as a ‘rubber-stamp’ (Mace, 1971; Nadler, 2004b).   
 
The most common approach is to define board roles as tasks (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Huse, 2005; Kula, 2005; Heuvel et al., 2006). The 
starting point for discussion is often the literature review by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989). The three roles, Control, Strategy and Service, are often considered 
representative of key activities board need to address (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; 
Huse, 2005). However, there is some confusion in the literature about what these 
roles constitute in terms of tasks.  
 
There is least confusion about the Control role (Heuvel et al., 2006). The labels 
Control and Monitoring are often used synonymously, although they may be 
defined differently. According to agency theorists, effective boards independently 
monitor strategic challenges facing the firm, and evaluate management performance 
addressing them (Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Directors may 
overturn poor decisions and replace ‘underperforming’ managers as a result of such 
monitoring (Brudney, 1982). The board, therefore, controls management by 
monitoring its decisions and actions. The definition of the control role is much the 
same in the integrated model, where directors monitor managers as fiduciaries of 
stockholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
  
The Strategy role leads to the most confusion, as it sometimes forms part of the 
Control role (which can be related to the Zahra and Pearce (1989) discussion of 
agency theory), and sometimes part of the Service role, when not defined as a 
separate role on its own. For example, in the review of Johnson et al. (1996), which 
is an update on Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) work, the strategy role is omitted, and the 
Service role, Control role, and Resource dependence role as used instead. Johnson 
et al. (1996) define the Service role as directors advising the CEO and top managers 
on administrative and other managerial issues, as well as more actively initiating 





therefore partially included in the revised definition of the service role. The 
Resource dependence role, facilitating the acquisition of resources critical to the 
firm’s success, is found in the description of resource dependence theory (Johnson 
et al., 1996). Nicholson and Kiel (2004; p. 454), referring to Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) and Johnson et al. (1996), describe the three roles as follows: (1) controlling 
the organisation (including monitoring management, minimising agency costs, and 
establishing the strategic direction of the firm), (2) providing advice to management 
(which may include providing advice on strategy and is sometimes classified as a 
component of the control role), and (3) providing the firm, through personal and 
business contacts, access to resources (including access to finance, information, and 
power).  
 
Researchers emphasise the importance of the Strategic role (Zahra, 1990; Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Directors, in some cases, may provide 
ongoing advice to top managers on possible strategic changes, or the 
implementation of existing strategies (Demb and Neubauer, 1992, Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989). Nicholson and Kiel (2004b) add a separate Strategy role for three 
reasons: (a) increasing performance pressures applied by institutional investors 
(Black, 1992), (b) board perception of the importance of the strategising role 
(Tricker, 1984), and (c) recent legal precedent placing corporate goal-setting and 
strategic direction within the board’s charter (Kesner and Johnson, 1990). 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004b) use four roles in their study, monitoring and 
controlling, strategising, providing advice and counsel, and providing access to 
resources. However, many authors have noted the persistent challenge of allowing 
directors to make a meaningful contribution to company strategy, even though they 
have the power to do so (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; 
Westphal, 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). Others have noted the Strategic role is 
only relevant in cases of crisis (Mace, 1971; Stiles and Taylor, 2001).  
 
Another trend in the literature regarding archetypes of roles is based on labels 
developed by Demb and Neubauer (1992). Demb and Neubauer (1992) used 
archetypes of Watchdog, Pilot, and Counsellor. Lorsch and Carter (2004) used 





Demb and Neubauer (1992) describe the Watchdog role as keeping a sharp eye on 
all aspects of the company. Although it appears a passive role, it can play an active 
part creating functions for surveillance and by questioning management. However, 
the main role of the watchdog is to observe and evaluate how well the company is 
run. On the other hand, the Pilot role entails active involvement, where the board 
gathers large amounts of information to make decisions. The Counsellor is the 
stakeholders’ representative, and this role focuses on how the company identifies 
itself, and how well that spells out in action. The Counsellor role is a more 
stakeholder-orientated role than Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) Service role, as it has 
developed into a focused advisory role.  
 
Lorsch and Carter (2004) offer a slightly different definition for the Watchdog and 
the Pilot. If the board sees its role as observing events and only acts if it senses 
something amiss, it is acting as watchdog, and when the board sees its role as 
contributing to discussions and making decisions about the company’s direction, it 
is acting as pilot. More generally, Lorsch and Carter (2004) note all boards are 
involved in some combination of three distinct activities: monitoring company and 
management performance, making major decisions, and offering advice and counsel 
to management, especially the CEO. The watchdog is in essence a label for the 
Controlling role described by Zahra and Pearce (1989), and the pilot label, the 
Strategic role.  
 
Some researchers have used just two dimensions. Tricker (1994) uses the roles of 
Conformance and Performance. Berghe and Baelden (2004) define the Monitoring 
role and Directing role as the leading tasks of the board, categorising other roles 
under those two categories. In other words, the eight roles Hung (1998) describes 
are reduced to two. The dual board roles seem to be gaining popularity in research, 
although there is still ambiguity about the definition of the Directing role, that is 









Table 2.4.3:  The roles of boards as two functions. 
Studies Direction Monitoring 
Heuvel et al. (2006) Service role Control role 
Lorsch and Carter (2004) Pilot role Watchdog role 




Forbes & Milliken (1999) Service role Control role 
Westphal (1999) Advice and counsel Oversight and control 
Christensen and Westenholz (1999) Resource acquisition role 
Strategy role 
Control role 






Tricker (1994) Performance role Conformance role 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) Pilot role 
Trustee role 
Watchdog role 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) Service role 
Strategic role 
Control role 
  Adapted and expanded from Berghe and Baelden, 2004. 
 
Although different role labels have been introduced in the literature, the above 
categorisation emphasises there is no fundamental philosophical difference between 
those roles, which are more like competing metaphors. The ambiguity on the 
Direction side can be clarified better in terms of tasks of the board, as outlined in 
the next section. 
 
2.4.3 Roles as tasks 
The most popular way of describing the roles of the board is in terms of metaphors, 
as seen in the previous section. Those metaphors describe tasks, although the tasks 
themselves are usually only loosely described.  
 
Heuvel et al. (2006) select five studies to analyse tasks employed in recent literature 
reviews and research, Zahra and Pearce (1992), Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996), 
Johnson et al. (1996) Hillman et al. (2000), and Hillman and Dalziel (2003). They 
identify eleven tasks (Heuvel et al., 2006). The tasks and pertinent articles are found 









  Table 2.4.4: The tasks of the board. 





et al., 1996 
Hillman 





X  X  X 
Select new 
managers 
X  X  X 
Evaluate mgt. 
performance 
X X X X X 
Determine 
compensation 
 X X  X 
Max value for 
shareholders  
X  X  X 
Formulate/ 
ratify strategy 




X X X X X 
Access extra 
resources 
 X X  X 
Advising 
management 




 X X   
Networking and 
relations 
X X  X X 
   Adapted from Heuvel et al. (2006) 
 
This set of tasks compiled by Heuvel et al. (2006) covers tasks identified by other 
researchers. However, Korac-Kakabadse et al. (2001, p. 25) describe tasks within 
the control role, strategic role, and service role as follows: 
 
Control role:  
- safeguard interests of shareholders 
- select CEO 
- monitor CEO/management performance 
- review CEO analyses 
- rectify executive decisions, and 
- separate decision control from decision management. 
 
Strategic role: 
- guide corporate mission 
- develop, implement and monitor the firm’s strategy 
- allocate resources, and 









- co-opt corporation 
- control corporation 
-    enhance corporate reputation, and 
- formulate and implement decision-making. 
 
Most of those tasks are included in Heuvel et al. (2006), although the Strategic role 
is somewhat limited with only one task – formulate/ratify strategic decisions. 
Korac-Kakabadse et al. (2001) offer a bit broader perspective for the Strategic role, 
which includes ‘guides corporate mission.’ However, the Strategic role seems to be 
more of a Resource-based role, as ‘allocate resources’ and ‘span boundaries’ are 
theoretically closer to descriptions of that role. The work of Heuvel et al. (2006) 
shows, in the five studies they examined, the same tasks can exist under the heading 
of different roles, and are actually fairly randomly assigned. Heuvel et al. (2006), 
however, demonstrate the eleven tasks loaded on two different factors, Control 
(select new managers, determine management’s responsibility, determine 
compensation of management, direct succession problems, maximise shareholder 
value, and evaluate/control management performance) and Service (building 
reputation, networking and maintaining relations, advising management, 
formulate/ratify organisational strategy, and taking care of access to extra 
resources).   
 
Other studies, like Carpenter and Westphal (2001), emphasise strategic 
involvement, as well as building scales for the Control role and Advice role. Forbes 
and Milliken (1999), Stiles (2001), Judge and Zeithaml (1992), McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) hold yet another perspective on tasks of the board. To conclude, 
there is no general agreement on how to measure tasks of the board, or assign them 
to different roles (Heuvel et al., 2006).  
 
The fragmentation of research paradigms and board theory has led to confusion 
about what boards of directors are actually supposed to do (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). The nature of a board’s contribution depends on the theoretical perspective 
adopted.  As described above, at least eight theoretically inspired roles of the board 
can be found in the literature, and several additional themes. However, the 





Strategy, Control, and Service, has been widely accepted in the literature. The 
Service role may be described as a summary of the Resource and Advice role 
(Korac-Kakabadse et al., 2001; Heuvel et al., 2006). These four roles, Control, 
Strategy, Resource and Advice, as well as the role of Support are discussed in more 
detail in the following paragraphs.  
 
2.4.3.1 Control  
A review by Zahra and Pearce (1989) disclosed a wide gap between the normative 
literature’s recognition of board roles, and empirical documentation of performance. 
They point out although the control role of the board is well recognised in the 
normative literature, performance of the control role is often inadequate. Several 
studies have recognised the control role (Molz, 1985; Zahra, 1990; Rosenstein, 
1987), especially reviewing decisions and monitoring the chief executive. Several 
studies have focused on the proportion of inside directors compared to non-
executive directors, with regard to the monitoring role and indicators of financial 
performance (Vance, 1964; Cochran et al., 1985; Kesner, 1987).  
 
2.4.3.2 Advice  
Mace (1971; p. 38) found in his study “most presidents and outside board members 
agree that the role of directors is largely advisory and not of a decision-making 
nature.” Lorsch and MacIver (1989) interviewed 80 directors, performed 4 case 
studies and a mail questionnaire in the US, and found boards act mainly as advisers 
on strategy to the chief executive, by counselling and evaluating options.  
 
2.4.3.3 Access to resources 
Several authors have reviewed the resource role of directors (Galaskiewicz, 1985; 
Penning, 1980; Scott, 1991; Zahra and Pearce, 1989, Johnson et al., 1996). In a 
study that spanned over 27 years, Mizruchi and Stearns (1988) found the 
appointment of representatives of financial institutions depends on both 
organisational performance (declining profits and solvency) and general economic 
conditions (e.g. the contraction of the business cycle). Kaplan and Minton (1994) 
found poor stock performance was an important determinant of the appointment of 





and Pearce (1989) determined several factors influence board composition and size, 
including environmental uncertainty, firm strategy, and financial performance. 
Daily and Dalton’s (1992; 1993) research on small and entrepreneurial firms 
suggests the resource dependence role may be important for success in small and 
entrepreneurial firms.  
 
2.4.3.4 Support  
Mace (1972) found boards in most large and medium-sized companies did not 
establish the basic objectives, corporate strategies and broad policies of the 
company. Pahl and Winkler (1974), in research on nineteen companies using a 
variety of qualitative techniques, found boards collectively do not decide or discuss 
anything, with most proposals ‘going through on the nod,’ and concluded the board 
is a legitimating institution, rather than a decision-making one. Lorsch and 
MacIver’s (1989) study of eighty directors and four case companies also supported 
the managerial hegemony view.  
 
2.4.3.5 Strategy  
Zahra and Pearce (1989; p. 304) conclude in their literature survey: “Overall, 
empirical research on the strategic role of boards is in the infancy stage. Preliminary 
results show directors are not as actively involved in the strategic arena.” Although 
research has confirmed directors desire a more active strategic role, there is less 
support for them actually performing it. Demb and Neubauer’s (1992) study of 
seventy-one directors revealed over three-quarters of those interviewed saw the 
board’s main task as setting strategy and overall direction. Dulewicz and Herbert 
(1999) found determining the company vision and mission to guide and setting the 
pace for its operations and future development were the most important tasks of 
boards of UK-listed companies. Taylor (2001) proposed, “board members should 
focus more on the central task of the board which is ‘corporate entrepreneurship’.” 
Mace (1971), and Lorsch and MacIver (1989), conclude boards were willing to 
become involved in the strategic process, but were either constrained from doing so, 
or else were availed of the opportunity only in times of crisis. In a more recent 
study, Stiles and Taylor (2001) found boards were not involved to any great extent 





strategic discussion took place. However, they found support for the board 
becoming much more proactive in its activities in times of crisis. McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) interviewed 108 UK directors, and found boards were actively 
involved in strategic choice, change, and control. Hill’s (1995) study of forty-two 
UK directors in eleven companies confirmed strategic direction was what directors 
saw as their main purpose, with non-executive directors defining a wide role for 
themselves, including bringing breadth of vision, scanning the environment, and 
acting as a sounding board for the chief executive.  
 
The strategic literature has largely ignored the board as a participant in strategic 
formulation. This is evident when definitions of ‘strategist’ are examined. Some 
studies have focused solely on the CEO as the strategist (for example, Thomas et 
al., 1991; Norburn, 1989). However, most studies have focused on the ‘dominant 
coalition’ (for example, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989c; 
Sturdivant et al., 1985; Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996). The ‘dominant coalition’ 
is most commonly referred to as the top management team (Eisenhardt, 1989c; 
Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996), which Hambrick (1995, p. 111) defines as a 
relatively small group of the most influential executives at the apex of an 
organisation. The board as an institution seems not to have a role in strategic 
formulation, although it may be argued the boundaries between top management 
and the board are blurred when boards are dominated by executive insiders.  
 
Although researchers have been interested in the Strategic role of the board, the 
discussion of what the concept of strategy indicates is limited. Different strategic 
perspectives have been developed in strategic literature (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
There seems to be even less agreement about what strategy is, than agreement about 
the main issues in corporate governance. The following definitions of strategy 
illustrate the point: 
 
 A firm’s theory of how it can gain superior performance in the markets within 





 The determination of basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise and 
the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for 
carrying out these goals (Chandler, 1962; p. 13).  
 A commitment to undertake one set of actions rather than another (Oster, 
1999).  
 The creation of a unique and valuable position, involving a different set of 
activities (Porter, 1996; p. 68). 
 
Further discussion of different theoretical perspectives in strategic literature is 
outside the scope of this research. However, categorisation by Mintzberg et al. 
(1998) sheds some light on the issue. They favour the interpretation there are 
different schools within the strategy literature that represent fundamentally different 
processes. Minzberg and Lampel (1999, p. 28) propose a categorisation of ten 
schools in the space of two dimensions, one being the external world moving from 
‘comprehensible and controllable’ to ‘unpredictable and confusing,’ and the other 
being internal processes moving from ‘rational’ to ‘natural.’  
 
Figure 2.4.2: Categorisation of strategy formation.  
                Adapted from Mintzberg et al. (1998; p. 28). 
 
The strategic literature and the corporate governance literature seldom cross paths. 
As previously discussed, the strategic role of the board has largely been either 



































































role (Heuvel et al., 2006). Researchers in other disciplines, however, have focused 
more on strategy and the measurement of strategy. Kanji and Sá (2001) have, for 
example, developed a leadership excellence model, which measures values, vision, 
mission, and strategy with different and independent scales. The perspective of the 
planning school is clear and rational, as far as the categorisation of Mintzberg and 
Lampel (1999) is concerned. Furthermore, items in the leadership scale of Kanji 
and Sá (2001) cover most items suggested by corporate governance researchers (for 
example, Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001; Heuvel et al., 2006). Items used in the scale of Kanji and Sá (2001) cover a 
much broader and detailed view of strategy than used by corporate governance 
researchers. If the intention is to try to understand the Strategic role of the board, it 
is important to use a broad measure of strategy, validated in leadership literature, to 
test how boards score.  
 
2.4.4 The role of power 
Power is an important factor in corporate governance research, as agency theory 
focuses on the conflict between CEOs and the board. A CEO with all the power 
indicates the board exists as a formality, in essence to rubber-stamp management 
decisions. When the power of the relationship is explicitly on the side of the board, 
it can better choose what role it takes (Zahra and Pearce, 1991). However, this does 
not necessarily imply the board will embrace a strategic role, as powerful boards 
within the agency theory framework are there to monitor rather than set strategy 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1991). Power can help categorisation of boards (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1991). They measured both the power of CEOs and the power of boards 
with two identical sets of questions. They then identified four categories of board 
roles, related to the literature: Statutory, Caretaker, Participative, and Proactive. 
These roles offer another dimension to measurement of roles of the board, based on 
tasks.  
 
Power is the capability of one social actor to overcome resistance in achieving a 
desired objective or result (Pfeffer, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1991). Zahra and 
Pearce (1991) point out reform efforts on corporate boards suggest boards should 





assumption managerial domination is widespread and counterproductive (Geneen, 
1984; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Mizruchi, 1983; Nader, 1984). A healthy balance 
between CEO and board powers is required to ensure effective company 
performance (Vance, 1983; Pearce and Robinson, 1987).  
 
Powerful boards are considered beneficial. Zahra and Pearce (1991) argue powerful 
boards are important for organisational effectiveness for four reasons: (1) Powerful 
boards provide useful business contacts, thus strengthening the link between 
corporations and their environments (Bazerman and Schoorman, 1983; Castaldi and 
Wortman, 1984; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973; Provan, 1980; Zald, 1969). (2) Powerful 
boards actively contribute to the development of the organisational mission and 
goals (Pearce, 1982, Pearce and David, 1987) and evaluate CEO and company 
performance (Andrews, 1987). (3) Powerful boards are necessary for effective 
“checks and balances” in corporate governance (Dalton and Kesner, 1985). Such 
boards monitor and evaluate CEO and company performance, and take appropriate 
action to ensure organisational effectiveness. By performing this role, directors 
protect the interests of shareholders. (4) Powerful boards play a crucial role in 
creating corporate identity, and establish and monitor compliance with codes of 
ethics (Andrews, 1984; Nader, 1984; Purcell, 1978).  
 
Powerful boards function as the brain and soul of the organisation (Mueller, 1993). 
It is widely believed they enrich their firms, even though their contribution cannot 
be fully captured in financial terms (Mintzberg, 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Social network research has convincingly demonstrated the exercise of power can 
take place through either formal authority or informal influence (Tichy et al., 1979; 
Pearce and David, 1983).   
 
2.4.5 The concept of roles 
The concept of roles is important as they bridge the gap between attributes and 
organisational performance, and provide a different approach to measure the 
implications of the board on organisational performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Roles are most often described in terms of tasks, although Zahra and Pearce (1991) 





management hegemony theory, the Support role of the board involves the passive 
‘rubber-stamp’ of management decisions. However, four more active roles 
identified in the literature are Control or Monitoring, Advice, Resource, and 
Strategy roles.  
 
The last two sections of this chapter have focused on the concept of the board of 







2.5 Organisational performance 
[To] maximize the wealth-producing capacity of the enterprise. It is this 
objective that integrates short-term and long-term results and that ties the 
operational dimensions of business performance – market standing, 
innovation, productivity, and people and their development – with financial 
needs and financial results. It is also this objective on which all the 
constituencies – whether shareholder, customer, or employees – depend for 
the satisfaction of their expectations and objectives.    
 
Peter F. Drucker (1909- 2005) 
 
Performance is usually regarded as a simple concept, although, as emphasised by 
Peter Drucker (2003, p. 133) above, the perspectives of management thinkers can 
be considerably, if not fundamentally, different. The purpose of this section is to 
outline different perspectives on organisational performance besides pure 
accounting measures. The section opens the discussion of ways to conceptualise 
and operationalise performance. 
 
Figure 2.5.1: The outline of the performance section. 
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This section discusses performance from a broad perspective. The first part focuses 
on classification of different performance measures. The second part discusses the 
difference between subjective and objective measures. The third part discusses 
measures used in corporate governance research, and the section concludes with a 






2.5.1 Classification of organisational performance 
Organisational performance has been a major research topic for the last thirty years, 
with a surge in the interest in the last decade (Maltz et al., 2003). As noted in the 
quotation from Drucker (2003) at the start of this section, performance is a 
multidimensional phenomenon (Dess and Robinson, 1984; March and Sutton, 
1997). Some broader understanding based on categorisation is needed, as simple 
outcome-based indicators are insufficient to explain performance (Brett, 2000; 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Chakravarthy, 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd, 
1989). Several tools, as for instance the balanced scorecard and shareholder value 
analysis, have been developed in response to this need. In recent years, several 
researchers at Henley Management College have focused on the importance of 
exploring the implications of performance measures in management research (for 
example Brett, 2000; Lindgren, 2001; Sandbakken, 2003; Tanner, 2005; Larsen, 
2007). Therefore, organisational performance is still an important management 
research topic. 
 
Organisational performance can be categorized as: (1) financial performance, (2) 
operational performance, and (3) organisational effectiveness (Venkatraman and 
Ramanujam, 1986). A similar classification of performance measures but with 
different labels is: (1) financial measures, (2) market-based measures, and (3) 
qualitative measures (Parnell et al., 2006). Financial performance stands for 
accounting and financially-based indicators, usually simple outcome-measures. 
Operational performance stands for market-based indicators that emphasise market 
growth and share both present and future (Hart and Banbury, 1994). Market-based 
measures include measures like market value added (MVA), which aims to measure 
how well a firm creates shareholder wealth (Tully, 1994). Organisational 
effectiveness or qualitative measures stand for stakeholder-based indicators, 
measuring concepts like employee satisfaction and social responsibility 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986, Parnell et al., 2000). Qualitative measures 
include subjective areas of performance (Parnell et al., 2006). The quotation from 
Drucker (2003) which introduces this section, refers to the same three categories he 





operational performance to financial performance, as stakeholders depend on this in 
terms of organisational effectiveness. Therefore, the three categories may be 
integrated as a broad measure of organisational performance.  
 
Other categorisations of organisation performance emphasise different perspectives 
of the purpose of performance: (1) the economic return perspective, (2) the 
excellence perspective, and (3) the survival perspective (Brett, 2000). The 
indicators associated with the three perspectives are found in table 2.5.1. The 
economic return perspective of performance relates to classical outcome measures 
used in finance and accounting, although representing a broader category than 
Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) describe for financial performance. The 
excellence perspective rests on the work of Peters and Waterman (1982), and 
focuses on process rather than outcome (Larsen, 2007). The survival perspective is 
related to contingency theory, focusing on adaptability to the environment and the 
future (Brett, 2000). The classical economic return perspective has been criticised 
for having less rigour than usually assumed due to: (1) scope of accounting 
manipulation, (2) distortion due to valuation of assets, (3) distortion due to 
depreciation policies, inventory valuation, and treatment of certain revenue and 
expenditure items, (4) differences in methods of consolidating accounts, and (5) 
differences due to lack of standardisation in international accounting conventions 
(Chakravarthy, 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989; Larsen, 2007). Researchers 
focusing on corporate excellence argue excellence cannot be determined through 
the use of financial measures alone (Carroll, 1983). Similarly, researchers argue 
adaptation to the environment is essential for survival, and financial indicators 
cannot measure this effectively (Larsen, 2007). It is also argued organisational 
outcomes measured by financial indicators are influenced by a complex set of 
factors, including the management process and environmental conditions (Brett, 
2000). 
 
The discussion of classification of performance measures reveals a broader 
perspective than financial performance, or even wider indicators of the economic 
return perspective, might better approximate organisational performance. 





performance (for example Ramanujam and Venkatraman, 1988; Caruana et al., 
1995; Brett, 2000; Kanji, 2002, Larsen, 2007). To survey performance in several 
areas simultaneously, is important to enable efficient strategic decision-making 
(Laitinen, 2002). As the broader perspective of organisational performance is 
adapted, however, more subjective measures need to be applied. That is the focus of 
the next section. 
  
Table 2.5.1: Indicators associated with different performance perspectives. 
Economic returns perspective Survival perspective Excellence perspective 
Total Revenue Sales Growth Rate Size 
Earnings before Interest and Tax Market Share Growth Rate Innovative Capability 
Operating Profits Industry Growth Rate Bias for action 
Market Share Selling Intensity Customer Orientation 
Working Capital Advertising Intensity Autonomy 
Return on Revenue Asset Intensity People Productivity 
Asset Turnover Functional Dissimilarity Concentration 
Return on Assets Product Relatedness Simplicity of Form 
Return on Sales Firm Size Loose-tight Authority 
EBIT/Asset ratio Firm Liquidity Lean Staff 
Retained Earnings/Asset ratio Firm Diversity Value Orientation 
Return on Invested Capital Acquisitiveness People Orientation 
Return on Equity R&D Intensity Process Orientation 
Net Present Value Seller Concentration Facts Orientation 
Internal Interest Altman Z-score Variability Orientation 
Asset Growth Syspan PAS-score Responsibility 
Orientation 
Sales Growth Control Intensity Coping Capability 
Market Return Emergency Preparedness Commitment Capability 
Return on Capital Employed Brands Intensity Condition Capability 
Asset Valuation Behaviour Change Communication 
Capability 
Provisions Strategy Trust Capability 
Capitalisation of Costs Organisational Structures Stretch Capability 
Depreciation Techno-structure  
Goodwill Climate  
Added Value Interpersonal Style  
Working Capital / Asset ratio   
  Adapted from Brett (2000, p. 184).  
 
2.5.2 Objective vs. subjective performance  
The classical dualism of subjective/objective categorisation also applies to 
organisational performance. Measures can either be subjective or objective, 
although the dualism might not always be clear-cut. Indicators related to the 
economic return perspective are usually considered objective measures, as they are 





demonstrates (see for example the discussion in the last subsection and 
Chakravarthy, 1986; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989; Hillman and Keim, 2001), the 
indicators are at least partly based on the subjective decisions of accountants and 
managers. Therefore, it would be an overstatement to claim all financial and 
accounting indicators are truly objective. Corporate scandals further undermine the 
claim of objectivity of financial performance measures, for example Enron, 
WorldCom, Global Crossing, Lucent, Williams, Dynergy, K-Mart and HealthSouth 
(MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003; Coffee, 2006; O’Brien, 2006). Subjective measures, 
on the other hand, are usually described as indicators based on primary data and the 
perception of respondents (Dess and Robinson, 1984). Objective and subjective 
performance measures require different types of research approach. Some scholars 
argue objective measures of organisational performance are preferable to subjective 
measures (Beal, 2000; Dess and Robinson, 1984). Other researchers indicate self-
reported data might be more accurate with regard to actual performance than 
archival performance data (Lindgren, 2001). Furthermore, evidence shows objective 
and subjective measures are strongly correlated (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Hart 
and Banbury, 1994; Pearce et al., 1987; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990; Peng and 
Luo, 2000; Larsen, 2007). This strong correlation indicates the validity of 
subjective measures in relation to objective measures, implying either approach to 
measuring organisational performance is valid.  
 
The preference for objective measures can largely be explained by tradition and 
historical research approaches. Economists prefer secondary databases for their 
econometrics analyses to gather primary data. The argument for researchers 
adopting the excellence perspective and the survival perspective of performance is 
they provide a broader measure of organisational performance than other databases 
and basic financial indicators can provide (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; 
Brett, 2000). Subjective measures are therefore complementary rather than just an 
alternative. Hart and Banbury (1994) developed a measurement of performance 
relating variables to such stakeholders as employees, society, customers, and 
shareholders, and broadened the scope of interpretation. Indeed, researchers use 
both subjective and objective measures of organisational performance for 





Wiliford, 1997; Larsen, 2007). The traditional use of subjective measures is often 
described as an alternative, when objective measures are not available (Caruana et 
al., 1995). That view disregards the broad perspective subjective performance 
measures can provide, and which objective measures usually cannot.  
  
Objective and subjective measures of organisational performance can be used either 
as complementary or separately. The traditional approach, derived from the 
economical return perspective, is to use financial indicators. Increasingly, 
management research is using subjective measures to supplement objective 
measures, or as alternatives, as the correlation between the two types of measures is 
strong, and subjective measures can provide a broader picture of organisational 
performance. The focus in corporate governance literature has been on objective 
measures discussed in the next subsection. 
 
2.5.3 Performance in corporate governance research 
Performance can be defined as the ability of an object to produce results in a 
dimension determined a priori, in relation to a target (Laitinen, 2002). Interest 
within the field of corporate governance has focused mostly on organisational 
performance (Coles et al., 2001). Dalton et al. (1999), in a meta-analysis of 131 
samples, note researchers have relied primarily on accounting-based indicators, 
although some studies use market-based indicators, or both types combined. Tobins 
Q has been emphasised as the performance variable in corporate governance studies 
(for example McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003; 
Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003, Adams et al., 2003; Anderson and Reebb, 2003; 
Brunello et al., 2003, Brown and Caylor, 2004). Furthermore, economic value 
added has been used by Anderson and Reeb (2003; 2004) and MacAvoy and 
Millstein (1998; 2003), firm sales revenues, the firm’s growth, the ratio of sales per 
employee by Daily and Near (2000), growth in firm sales or in firm capital invested 
has been used by Gnan and Songini (2003), Gomez-Mejía et al. (2001), and Lausten 
(2002), the firm’s gross profit margin by Lee (2004), and productive efficiency by 






Pettigrew (1992, p. 171) states: “Great inferential leaps are made from input 
variables such as board composition to output variables such as board performance 
with no direct evidence on the processes and mechanisms which presumably link 
the inputs to the outputs.” This observation has been made time and again. Bøhren 
and Ødegaard (2003, p. 11) report the fundamental question in finance-based 
corporate governance research is whether economic value is driven by governance 
mechanisms: “Research on the interaction between governance and economic 
performance has been rather limited, however, and the empirical evidence is mixed 
and inconclusive.”  
 
Organisational performance is not the only ‘performance’ measure used in 
corporate governance research. The Henley model (Dulewicz et al., 1995), and the 
intellectual capital model (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004), indicate there is a trend in the 
literature towards multiple approaches to determining effectiveness (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004), for example, measures regarding task performance, and 
individual and group satisfaction.  
 
The link between the board of directors and corporate performance is still the main 
focus of corporate governance research. The problem has been the leap from 
attributes to financial measures of corporate performance. A recent review of the 
literature has shown this was not a rewarding pursuit for evidence (Dalton et al., 
1998; 1999). The need for a broader set of performance measures, or combination 
of measures, is therefore eminent in the field of corporate governance.  
 
2.5.4 The concept of performance 
The shortcomings of a single item measure of organisational performance, is 
obvious (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). Surveying several areas of 
performance simultaneously is a more rigorous approach (Laitinen, 2002). 
Agreement on which combination of measures is most appropriate has not yet 
emerged (Wiliford, 1997). It is important researchers acknowledge the 
shortcomings of performance measurements, whichever approach is chosen (Parnell 
et al., 2006). This definitely applies in the field of corporate governance. 





effectively with single-item measures. Multiple measurement instruments are 
required for corporate governance, as has increasingly been the case, for example, 








2.6 Implications of contextual contingencies 
Gravitation cannot be held responsible for people falling in love. How on 
earth can you explain in terms of chemistry and physics so important a 
biological phenomenon as first love? Put your hand on a stove for a minute 
and it seems like an hour. Sit with that special girl for an hour and it seems 
like a minute. That's relativity.  
 
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) 
 
There are ties between ‘relativity’ in the words of Einstein, and the prescriptions of 
contingency theory found in the first section of this chapter.  ‘Relativity’ indicates 
how an incident can be interpreted depends on the situation, and ‘contingency’ 
indicates the incident should depend on the situation. In other words, time and space 
could affect what the board is, and does, and why. Zahra and Pearce (1989) outline 
internal and external contingencies in their integrated model, indicating they affect 
boards, and their relationship to organisational performance. The purpose of this 
section is to discuss context.   
 
Figure 2.6.1: The outline of the context section. 
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Adapted from Huse (2005, p. 68). 
 
This section focuses on the concept of contingencies as used in corporate 
governance research. Three distinct but related contingencies are discussed in the 






2.6.1 International context 
The first major study focusing on corporate governance was arguably the Berle and 
Means (1932) thesis on American corporations. Most research on corporate 
governance has been done on American corporations, with limited attention to other 
national contexts (Huse, 2005). However, there is growing interest in different legal 
and cultural contexts of corporate governance (Heuvel et al., 2006). From an 
international perspective, the Anglo-Saxon dimension is unique in many ways 
compared with other cultural dimensions (Weimer and Pape, 1999). Weimer and 
Pape (1999) classify the Anglo-American dimension as being built on a market-
orientated system, while the Germanic, Latin, and Japanese dimensions are built on 
network-orientated systems (table 2.6.1). Rose and Mejer (2003) indicate countries 
are neither market nor network-oriented, but rather gradually different (figure 
2.6.2). According to Weimer and Pape (1999), Anglo-Saxon countries are 
considered different regarding the concept of the firm, where it is considered 
instrumental or shareholder-oriented, as opposed to being institutional-oriented in 
other international blocs. The board system is one-tier in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
whereas two-tier systems predominate elsewhere. In Anglo-Saxon countries the 
shareholder is the salient stakeholder, while oligarchic groups and banks have more 
power in network-oriented countries. Generally, ownership concentration is much 
lower in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Another important factor which differs 
between market-oriented and network-oriented enterprises is the active external 
market for corporate control.  
 
Corporate governance system differences seem to be diminishing as part of the 
introduction of governance codes (Albert-Roulhac and Breen, 2005). Most 
initiatives for governance reform have been initiated in the US and the UK, in the 
form of the Sarbanes-Oxley act and Cadbury code, respectively (Ali and Gregoriou, 
2006). The corporate governance reforms begun in the US and UK have spread all 
over the world, indicating a global convergence (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). 
According to the European Corporate Governance Institute, by 2003 at least 50 
countries had introduced a governance code for companies, countries as different as 












Country class Anglo-Saxon Germanic Latin Japan 












Concept of firm Instrumental, 
Shareholder- 
oriented 
Institutional Institutional Institutional 
Board system One-tier Two-tier Optional One-tier 









Importance of  
Stock market 
High Moderate/high Moderate High 
Active external 
Market for  
corporate control 
Yes No No No 
Ownership 
concentration 
Low Moderate/high High Low 
Performance 
compensation 
High Low Moderate Low 
Time horizon Short term Long term Long term Long term 
Adapted from Weimer and Pape (1999) 
 
 


























Although the initiatives of the Anglo-Saxon perspective have been well received, 
these approaches may not apply or may be less effective when, for example, legal 
traditions, cultures, institutional structures, and ownership structures differ (Weimer 
and Pape, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999). From the institutional perspective, there is a 
tendency to think globally, believing boards of directors have the same function all 
around the world. Contingency theory would argue differently (Huse, 2005). There 
are indications convergence between corporate governance systems on a global 
scale is less likely than generally thought, and the systems are in effect distinct 
(Khanna et al. 2006). The point is, if differences noted by Weimer and Pape (1999) 
constitute a fundamentally unique national governance system, the role of the board 
in that system is likely to change. Therefore it can be argued national context is 
important when a comparison is made of the functions of boards in different 
countries and on other continents.  
 
2.6.2 Ownership context 
The main thesis of Berle and Means (1932) was ownership had become so 
dispersed there was no real owner of organisations, which in turn empowered 
managerial control of organisations. Many researchers question whether this is as 
common a problem as indicated, because ownership is much more concentrated in 
most companies  (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002, Lubatkin, 2007). La 
Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) have studied ownership structure in 
several countries, and found corporate ownership is concentrated in most countries, 
although to a lesser degree in Anglo-Saxon countries, supporting the categorisation 
of Weimer and Pape (1999). Many researchers have questioned the claim of 
dispersed ownership, and how commonly corporations are management-controlled 
(Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Lubatkin 
(2007) argues the problem of dispersed ownership is non-existent in the majority of 
companies on a global scale.   
 
Ownership is a question of control over the organisation. Control has been defined 
as “the power to exercise discretion over major decision making, including, 
specifically the choice of directors.” (Leech and Leahy, 1991, p. 1418). Ultimately 





issue of control is usually more complicated than that, as control can be achieved 
with less than majority ownership, and ownership can be both vertical as well as 
horizontal (Prigge and Kehren, 2006). Vertical ownership implies control through 
pyramiding (La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Dispersed ownership, or 
widely-held companies, is based on voting rights of the largest owner, and the cut-
off point can vary from 10% to 50%, depending on the researcher (Prigge and 
Kehren, 2006) La Porta et al. (1999) used a 20% cut-off point between widely-held 
companies and dominant shareholders in their study. In fact, this is the same cut-off 
point used by Berle and Means (1932) to determine whether companies were 
owner-controlled or management-controlled.   
 
Ownership of organisations has been classified from different perspectives. Bøhren 
and Ødegaard (2006) for example, classify ownership as state, individual (persons), 
financial (institutions), nonfinancial, and international. The issue of ownership 
identity is relatively unexplored (Gugler, 2001). With individuals as dominant 
shareholders, family firms have received the most attention, as family-owned firms 
are estimated to be 1/3 of all firms (Sacristán-Navarro and Gómez-Ansón, 2006), 
and family business is considered to be the dominant form of ownership in small 
and medium-sized companies (Donckels and Fröhlick, 1991; Corbetta and 
Montemerlo, 1999; La Porta et al., 1999). As a group, however, family businesses 
are largely disregarded in research (Schulze et al., 2001; Dyer, 2003; Steier et al, 
2004). The focus has been mostly on large family firms, often publicly traded 
(Bukart et al., 2003; Heuvel et al., 2006). However, the majority of family firms fall 
into the small and medium-sized category (Handler, 1989; Johannisson and Huse, 
2000).  
 
The effect of ownership on corporate governance is exemplified to some extent in 
both agency theory and stewardship theory. Agency theorists argue ownership 
concentration should have a positive effect on the value of organisations because 
shareholders have greater incentive to monitor managers and reduce managerial 
opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The board is considered to be 
primarily a means for monitoring. However, in the stewardship perspective the 





matters. Both perspectives would indicate concentrated ownership should have a 
positive affect on organisational performance.  
 
2.6.3 Firm size context  
The majority of corporate governance research has focused on large companies 
(Charkham, 1995; Dyer, 2003), especially since Berle and Means (1932) thesis 
recognised management as the true guardians of corporate control. However, 
interest is growing in the function of boards in the governance structure of small 
and medium-sized companies (Heuvel et al., 2006). The assumption is well-
functioning boards in small and medium-sized companies can create value, 
strengthen the structure, improve results, and ensure continuity (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989, Borch and Huse, 1993; Johannison and Huse, 2000). The role of the board is 
considered to be more decisive in smaller firms than larger ones (Castaldi and 
Wortman, 1984; Nash, 1988; Ward and Handy, 1988; Ward, 1992). The research 
into SMEs, however, remains fragmented and is still in its infancy (Huse, 2000; 
Heuvel et al., 2006). Furthermore, various firm life-cycle phases still require further 
research (Lynall et al., 2003).  
 
2.6.4 Context 
Contingencies or contextual factors have not been well studied to date in corporate 
governance research (Gugler, 2001; Huse, 2005; Heuvel et al., 2006). The 
theoretical implications of contingencies are not yet well understood (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). However, increased research effort is now focusing on the 
implications of contingencies on boards of directors. Huse (2005, p. 68) notes 
contextual factors used primarily in corporate governance are: 
 
1. National, geographical and cultural differences; 
2. Industry and the industrial environment of the corporation; 
3. Ownership dispersion and types; 
4. Firm size; 
5. Life-cycle variations, including the importance of crisis and the configuration 
of corporate resources; 






The first three are external contingencies, and the last three internal contingencies, 
in the integrated model (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Three of these were discussed in 
this section: national, ownership and firm size. There is limited literature on the 
other variables in terms of theoretical implications and empirical results. The three 
variables discussed in this section were chosen because of their relevance to the 
context and sample of this study. The concepts of national context, ownership, and 
firm size are interconnected. Results from a study by La Porta et al. (1999), and 
Faccio and Lang (2002), indicate most countries outside the Anglo-Saxon orbit 
have concentrated ownership in small family-owned companies. Berle and Means 
(1932) thesis was based in the context of large organisations, where ownership was 







2.7 Criticism of Corporate Governance research  
 
The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, 
which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every 
corner of our minds.  
 
John Maynard Keynes (1883 - 1946) 
 
This section takes a more critical view of the literature on corporate governance.  
Many researchers have called for a shift in research focus, taking a broader view of 
the issues of the board than agency theory alone (Zahra and Pearce, 1989, Tricker, 
2000; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Roberts et al., 2005). Most research to date has been 
based on a structural view (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). This classic approach 
may have now become restrictive, and research may benefit from escaping the past 
and embracing new ideas, as suggested by these authors. 
  
Figure 2.7.1: Overview of the section for criticism.  
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             Adapted from Silverman (2005). 
 
Section 2.7 critiques past research to provide a fruitful start to this project. The 
framework for the section is adapted from Silverman (2005)6 (figure 2.7.1).  
 
                                                 






Research on corporate governance can seem a forest of contradictions, with little 
incremental influence of understanding how boards carry out their roles most 
effectively and efficiently (MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). In reality, research lags 
behind regulators and self-proclaimed theorists in exploring the effects and 
influence of their ideas, rather than having a strong role in the development of 
corporate governance and, more specifically, the board of directors (Noburn et al., 
2000). The literature review here reveals we are little nearer to an understanding of 
the issues of corporate governance now than we were in 1989, when Zahra and 
Pearce reviewed the literature. Lockhard (2005, p. 2) makes the argument:  
 
We know very little about governance. To be fair, establishing causality between 
governance and subsequent performance is fraught with difficulty. Between these two 
constructs lies the entire process of management, its performance and outcomes, all of the 
organisation's internal processes, core competencies and resources - while external to the 
organisation is the entire external environment, at both industry and societal levels, all of 
which impact to a greater or lesser degree on performance. 
 
Part of the problem in corporate governance research is researchers in the field have 
focused on the positivist paradigm of knowledge creation, armed with hypotheses to 
verify, seeking causality. The results have been inconclusive and misguiding 
(Dalton and Dalton, 2005). Researchers have mostly ignored “what” boards do, and 
“how” and “why” they do it. Research needs another approach (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989, Stiles and Taylor, 2001, Dalton and Dalton, 2005).  
 
The reason for this is no mystery. Doctoral students and scholars in tenure track 
positions have preferred research using easily available data and methods that can 
be evaluated by journal reviewers through well-established validity concepts (Huse, 
2005). The discussion on models in corporate governance emphasises the 
importance of a more descriptive model, rather than searching for predictive or even 
prescriptive models, where the end result is the performance of the company. The 
predominance of the positivist paradigm, the institutional perspective, and agency 





although the pragmatism of easily collected items of attributes has played its role 
too.  
 
There is room for improvement within the positivist paradigm (Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2003; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2004; Heuvel et al., 2006, 
Lubatkin et al., 2007). Concepts, measures, relationships, and methods of analysis 
of previous research can be improved. Furthermore, it is important to draw insight 
from other paradigms, different data collection methods, and interpretation 
techniques (Huse, 2005).  
 
2.7.2 Theories and concepts 
Corporate governance is a relatively young and ‘hot’ research field, and so has 
attracted scholars from a broad range of disciplines such as economics, finance, 
accounting, law, management, psychology, sociology, and organisational behaviour 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Mallin, 2004). Consequently, 
various challenging theories have been introduced into the field. Agency theory has 
become the theory of choice for most researchers and the most natural theoretical 
framework (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Mallin, 2004, Lubatkin, 2007). Most of these 
theories, however, are limited in scale and scope and lack grounding in descriptive 
empirical research (Stiles and Taylor, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, different methodological approaches and research perspectives have 
resulted in findings that are largely inconsistent and non-additive (Pettigrew, 1992). 
Therefore, there has been a call for a general theory of the board (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001) that does not lead to such confusion, and an appropriate conceptual 
framework that adequately reflects the reality of governance (Tricker, 2000). 
Differing perspectives and lively theoretical debate, with no dominant paradigm, is 
not unusual in a relatively young field like corporate governance, and may be 
considered a sign of vitality (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003; Ulhøi, 2007).  
 
Theories have been likened to a kaleidoscope, where the shapes and colours of the 
pictures change by inserting a different tube – “by shifting theoretical perspectives 





can explain a phenomenon from one point of view, while another sees it from a 
different point of view. The typologies of Zahra and Pearce (1989) and Hung 
(1998) demonstrate this, as well as the roles they construct. The hope is, however, 
that these different perspectives do not resemble the old joke of the blind men and 
the elephant, where they each hold and elegantly describe different parts of the 
animal, although none of them concludes that they are in fact embracing an 
elephant.  
 
A closer look at the theories has shown they differ in origin, development, and 
emphasis. Combined they portray the role of the board in a much more realistic 
fashion than any one of them alone. Stiles and Taylor (2001) argue for a multi-
theoretical perspective to analyse boards, to obtain a more complete picture.   
 
Although some theories are well established in the literature, most notably agency 
theory and resource dependency theory, they only partly explain the “how” and 
“why” of boards. On the basis of those theories, most researchers have explored 
causation between attributes of boards (mostly composition and characteristics) and 
performance of corporations, largely ignoring the “process” in the basic input-
process-output model. Without a more thorough examination of what happens in 
the ‘black box’ of the board, understanding of boards remains limited (Stiles et al., 
2005). 
  
2.7.3 Models and hypothesis 
Research has focused mainly on linking attributes to performance, more or less 
overlooking the role of the board. This is, in essence, what Zahra and Pearce (1989, 
p. 330) foresaw when they stated: “We believe the search for direct links among 
board attributes and company financial performance is misguided and will yield 
contradictory findings.” Dalton and Dalton (2005) demonstrated this truth with their 
meta analysis: 159 studies in the meta analysis showed no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between board composition and firm financial performance, 69 studies 
found firms with separate CEO and board chairperson positions did not outperform 





evidence of a relationship between CEO or board member equity holdings and 
organisational financial performance.  
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 330) go on to state: “A final concern is the tendency 
among scholars to search for universal association between board attributes, roles, 
and company performance. This tendency should be replaced by well crafted 
studies that aim to develop mid-range theories and test their predictions.”  This is 
what researchers have been trying to accomplish with their more recent versions of 
process models (for example, Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, 
Huse, 2005). Furthermore, there is now interest in understanding how processes and 
roles of boards influence the performance of organisations (Zahra, 2007).  
 
2.7.4 Variables and measures 
The main purpose of research models, as based in the positivist paradigm and 
related hypotheses within corporate governance research, has been to show 
causation between attributes of the board and performance of the firm. Bøhren and 
Ødegaard (2003) point out, however, empirical evidence on the interaction between 
governance and economic performance is as mixed and inconclusive as it is limited. 
Therefore “we cannot yet specify what the best governance system looks like, 
neither in a normative nor a positive sense” (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003, p. 2). One 
reason is comparison between studies is difficult, because different units of analysis 
are used. Some authors examine the added value of the board as a group (Castaldi 
and Wortman, 1984; Borch and Huse, 1993; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; 
Johannisson and Huse, 2000; George et al., 2001), while others study the 
contribution of individual board members as outside directors (Whisler, 1988; 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004) or venture capital representatives (Deakins et al., 
2000; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002). Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2004, p. 2) 
isolate seven features of research that make it difficult to draw substantive 
conclusions, as follows: 
 
1. Most studies use a small set of convenient (easy to collect) set of indicators 
for corporate governance, as opposed to developing a more comprehensive set 





2. Each study tends to use a different set of governance variables, which makes 
integration across studies extremely difficult. 
3. There is very little analysis regarding the measurement properties for the 
selected indicators of corporate governance. Moreover, there is no detailed 
insight into the number of dimensions (or constructs) that are necessary to 
provide a comprehensive assessment of corporate governance.  
4. Single indicators are used as measures for ill-defined and complex corporate 
governance constructs (e.g. percentage of external board members).  
5. The sample size and specific firms included in the sample vary considerably 
across studies depending on the dependent variable examined and the source 
of the governance variables.  
6. Most studies focus on the statistical significance, as opposed to the 
incremental explanatory power, of the governance indicators.  
7. The methodological approach used is typically restricted to some type of 
linear model where complex interactions among governance are not 
considered.  
 
The above features are in essence what Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 304) conclude 
from their literature review:  
 
The tentative nature of empirical evidence on performance of the three board roles may be 
partially explained by the shortcomings of past research. These research efforts have often 
been limited in scope, based on convenience samples, and inconsistent in operationalization 
of board variables. Moreover, the bulk of this research has focused on the direct 
associations between board attributes and company performance, thus ignoring the indirect 
path (through roles and strategic initiatives) discussed by the four theoretical perspectives. 
These limitations suggest that caution is advised in interpreting empirical findings on the 
relationship between board roles and company performance.  
 
An examination of roles, performance, and context can further clarify this issue.  
 
2.7.4.1 Roles 
As Zahra and Pearce (1989) emphasise above, better understanding of the roles of 





perspective can enhance our understanding of board effectiveness in modern 
corporations. Nicholson and Kiel (2004b, p. 18) come to a similar conclusion:  
 
By understanding how a board’s skills, resources and attributes allow it to discharge its 
roles, we believe that management researchers can further understand the hitherto elusive 
links between boards of directors and corporate performance. ... From a practitioner’s 
perspective, clarifying the attributes of a board that contribute to effective role execution 
has the potential to improve corporate performance significantly. 
 
Zahra and Pearce (1989, p.328) state: “We have presented a summary of the three 
roles of the board: service, strategy, and control. Future research is necessary to 
identify and document the important components of each set.” However, the issue 
of roles has been either disregarded, or only one role researched (Nicholson and 
Kiel, 2004). Nicholson and Kiel (2004), however, point out that boards perform 
several roles, although to different extents. As discussed previously, opinions vary 
on what the roles of the board are, although they can be roughly categorised as 
either a function of ‘monitoring’ or ‘directing’. According to Stiles and Taylor 
(2001, p. 7): “There is dearth of strong descriptive data on how boards of directors 
perceive their role and in what respects they can influence the performance of the 
firm.” Nicholson and Kiel (2004, p. 6) conclude: “to better understand how a board 
contributes to firm performance, we need to understand the various roles required of 
it” and how effective the boards are at fulfilling those roles.   
 
One of the main issues, as noted by Zahra and Pearce (1989) and others, is the 
problem of operationalisation of concepts, as no standard research measures have 
been adopted (Heuvel et al., 2006). Huse (1993), for example, uses eight questions 
to cover the control role, while Gabrielsson and Winlund (2000) use a 10-item scale 
to measure the same concept. Mustakallio et al. (2002), studying the monitoring 
role derived from agency theory, use a different five-item scale, and Carpenter and 
Westphal (2001) use three items. An important advancement for theory building 







Tobin’s Q has become the standard approximation for performance (McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003). 
Zarha and Pearce (1989, p. 327), however, argue “multiple perspectives are 
desirable to establish the efficacy of corporate boards for company performance.” 
  
The multiple perspective is evolving into measurement of task performance, and 
individual and group satisfaction (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Nicholson 
and Kiel (2004) argue for the concept of ‘fit,’ where the challenge in governance 
research is to understand the roles required of the board and the fit between 
individuals and systems in the organisation, as well as alignment with contextual 
contingencies. They argue (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004, p. 455) “the problem is not to 
find the ‘one best way’ of governing, but rather to understand how effective 




The lack of both control variables and focus on roles of the board is cause for 
concern in corporate governance research. Zahra and Pearce (1989, p. 325) argue 
the “impact of contextual forces on board variables has been widely ignored” and 
“few studies have intentionally controlled for inter-industry differences, company 
size, and organisational life cycles. … Because studies lacked controls, many 
published results are open to speculation and different interpretations.” The need to 
“explicitly incorporate a contingency perspective” (Heracleous, 2001, p. 170) has 
been called for in the literature (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Johnson et al., 1996). 
A model that accounts for contingency factors “enables researchers to identify 
necessary control variables and gaps in our understanding of how the board can 







2.7.5 Methodology and methods 
There is a shortage of research based on primary data (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005; 
Heuvel et al., 2006) that moves the corporate governance discussion away from the 
‘usual suspects’ paradigm (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003).  
 
According to Stiles and Taylor (2001), only a small body of primary research exists 
on boards of directors from which to draw any methodological insights. They define 
three methodological problems: (1) the problem of access, (2) the problem of 
defensive responses, and (3) the problem of ‘holding directors to the script.’ Stiles 
and Taylor point out, in response to this situation, researchers have adopted a multi-
method approach to research design, or triangulation model, where multiple 
methods converge on a single ‘answer.’ Some examples given were Demb and 
Neubauer (1992), who interviewed 71 directors from eleven multinational 
companies as well as using results from a questionnaire with a sample of 137 
students at board level courses at IMD; Judge and Zeithaml (1992) used a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, and took 114 semi-
structured interviews in forty-two organisations and analysed the responses with 
two seven-point scales; Lorsch and MacIver (1989) interviewed eighty directors, 
using a survey sample of 1,100 and four case studies; and Peck (1995) used 
observation of fifteen board meetings and a questionnaire to gain insight into the 
perception of directors of their work.  
 
In other words, several methodological approaches have been used in the few 
studies on corporate governance based on primary data, rather than the more 
common statistical analysis of secondary data. 
 
The next section sets the agenda for the research central to this thesis, where some 










2.8 Agenda for research 
In the interests of peace I am opposed to the so-called peace movement. 
 
Karl Popper (1902-1994) 
 
 
This section is about the research agenda. Several research paths were possible 
according to the literature review, which has focused on process studies rather than 
the more popular studies of composition of boards linked to performance. The 
argument was the board was an interesting organ to study, and the central question 
focused on whether the board as an entity had any influence on performance or 
value creation of the company, both in the short and long term.  
 
Figure 2.8.1: The overview of the section for research agenda.  
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This section focuses on the key issues of the definition and limitation of the study 
(figure 2.8.1). First, the choice of perspective is explained, then important issues 
defining the study are discussed: country and SME context, role of boards, 
attributes, and performance. These issues frame the main research question and the 






2.8.1 Chosen perspective 
The literature review gives a broad overview of the corporate governance field of 
research, particularly on that organ of the corporation called the ‘board of 
directors.’ The review reveals there is vitality within the field, where many theories 
try to explain what the board is, does, and why it does it. The main topic is the 
relationship between the board of directors and organisational performance, as it is 
in thesis. However, the difference is this study is based on the process-based view 
of the board, not the structural-based view. The research aims to falsify the claim 
that the board of directors should be abandoned and eliminated from the structure of 
the organisation because it has no potential value for the company. Therefore, the 
objective is to falsify managerial hegemony theory.   
 
The original plan was to do the study in more than one Nordic country but after cost 
and benefit considerations it was limited to Iceland. The reason was, first and 
foremost, based on the question of access, which was facilitated in Iceland (Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001).  However, although access was improved, the choice limited the 
research in other ways. First of all, the research was set in a country with its own 
legal and cultural context. This affected not only interpretation of the results with 
regard to contextual influences, but also the design of the study itself. These 
influences are discussed later in further detail. Second, Iceland is a small country, 
with a small market, and small companies. That alone shifted the focus of the study 
away from large corporations to SMEs. The choice of location for the research also 
impacted on the question of how to generalise from the results, as discussed in the 
concluding chapter.  
 
A multi-theoretical perspective was adopted, so this research does not focus on 
testing one theory, but rather explores propositions discussed within various 
theoretical contexts in previous research. Theories are then applied to explain the 
results and implications of the study. The claim is that one theory alone may not 
explain the complex relationship of board influence on corporate performance, and 






Although this researcher has adopted the realist perspective of science, the intent 
was to design the research with a positivist approach. Accordingly, three decisions 
were taken: (1) the propositions were to be developed from existing theories and 
previous research, (2) concepts used by other researchers would serve as variables, 
and (3) items and scales would be adopted from previous research. Furthermore, the 
research would observe the recommendations of Larcker, Richardson and Tuna 
(2004) and aim to (a) use a more comprehensive set of governance variables, (b) 
use variables that can be used for comparison with previous studies, (c) emphasise 
the measurement properties of scales and theorise about their dimensions or number 
of items, and (d) emphasise the use of scales instead of single indicators for 
complex governance constructs.   
 
The perspective taken for this research can therefore be described as a multi-
theoretical perspective with an SME focus and a positivist’s flair for action.   
 
2.8.2 SMEs and country context 
This research is focused on companies in Iceland, which are for the most part, 
SMEs. A review of the literature on small and medium-sized companies illustrates 
there is room for conceptual and methodological improvement (Huevel at al., 
2006). Empirical research in different contexts, legal systems, and contingencies to 
validate board roles identified in the literature is lacking (Heuvel et al., 2006). And 
according to Heuvel et al. (2006), none of the previous empirical studies has 
examined the importance of different board roles within the context of small and 
medium-sized family firms. In essence, there are very good reasons for doing 
research in Iceland on small and medium-sized companies.  
 
Very little research has been done in Iceland on corporate governance issues, 
however, a descriptive survey was performed in 2003 in Iceland in relation to 
development of a governance code. There is need in general for studies that explore 
corporate governance in legal settings other than Anglo-Saxon (Weimer and Pape, 






The Icelandic setting defines this research in other ways. Some important 
requirements of the Icelandic governance system affect boards of directors: 
1. One-tier boards with some two-tier characteristics,  
2. The position of CEO and chairman are separate by law, 
3. The CEO has no voting power on the board but sits in most meetings, 
4. All directors are non-executive by law, 
5. There are usually no employee representatives, 
6. Directors are either the biggest owners or representatives of owners. 
 
Another important aspect of the Icelandic governance system is that it is a mixture 
of one-tier and two-tier boards. It is one-tier in the sense there is no other board 
mechanism, but resembles the two-tier system in that all board members are non-
executive, a characteristic of supervisory boards (Chingula, 2006). Additionally, 
members are usually the biggest owners of the company and their representatives 
elected for one year at a time at a general meeting. Although all boards are non-
executive, there is no legal obligation or tradition of employee representation on the 
board. CEOs are not part of the board although they attend most, if not all, 
meetings. 
 
The implications of this context are an important factor affecting the interpretation 
of the results of the research. The context controls for issues such as joint 
CEO/chairman roles, and the debate about non-executive vs. executive directors.  
 
2.8.3 Role of boards 
The main theme of this research is the role of boards, and not as simple as it may 
seem. There are two main issues: (1) defining and labelling roles selected from the 
literature search, and (2) designing scales to measure these roles.  
 
Many researchers divide the discussion of roles of the board into two categories, 
directing and monitoring (Tricker, 1994; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Heuvel et 
al., 2006 etc.). There is little confusion about the monitoring role itself, and 
although the labels differ (for example, control, conformance, watchdog), in 





the directing role is the source of much confusion. Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
describe a service and a strategy role, and Nicholson and Kiel (2004) describe a 
resource role. These three roles are linked to different theories so they can be 
logically separated.  
 
The selection of measurement scales for the roles of the board turned out to be 
problematic. In accordance with guidelines set out above, scales were sought with 
sufficient information they could be duplicated, and which had been validated and 
published in major journals. Carpenter and Westphal (2001) use three scales, one 
for the “ability to contribute,” one for “monitoring,” and one for “advice 
interaction.” All have high Cronbach alphas, indicating high interim reliability. 
These three scales formed the basis of the measurement tool, supplemented by 
insight from Heuvel et al. (2006), who compiled tasks from five leading studies 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1992; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Johnson et al., 1996; 
Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Furthermore, the study by Heuvel 
et al. (2006) was directed at SMEs, although only focusing on the “control” and 
“service” roles. Merging the two studies formed a broader and richer measurement 
instrument. The strategic role was further expanded by integrating instruments from 
Kanji and Sá (2001), which measured values, vision, mission, and strategy with 
different and independent scales.  
 
Four main roles were conceptualised and operationalised in this study: monitoring, 
strategy, advice, and resource dependency.   
 
 The approach of Zahra and Pearce (1991), examining board roles in terms of power, 
was adopted as insurance, in case the ‘roles as tasks’ perspective adopted in this 
study did not materialise in the research. For practical purposes, it was decided to 
simplify the approach used by Zahra and Pearce (1991). This involved using one set 
of questions rather than two sets of questions, and changing the questions to 
measure the relative power of the CEO and the board. The change was minimal, as 
Zahra and Pearce (1991) had asked the same respondent the two sets of questions, 
and therefore one could expect a similar bias. The implication of this simplification 





one for the CEO and one for the board, this study used only one, a measure of 
relative power between the CEO and the board. If the board scored equal to or 
higher than the CEO on the power scale, this would indicate a participative or 




Zahra and Pearce (1989) identified four themes of attributes: composition, 
characteristics, structure, and process. The different attributes were described 
previously. As this study is interested in the tasks of boards, there is less focus on 
measuring the attributes themselves.  
 
Research linking composition of the board to corporate performance, has examined 
the size of boards, the mix of director types, female and minority participation, and 
the ratio of inside to outside directors. Iceland prohibits inside directors, so there is 
no need to test the ratio of inside to outside directors. However, it might be 
interesting to determine any implications of truly independent boards, with neither 
family nor financial ties to the company. The Icelandic culture is very 
homogeneous, so minority issues are not a concern. Female participation on boards 
was relevant to explore. Therefore, composition of the board evolved into three 
measures: size of board, female participation, and independent director 
participation.  
 
‘Characteristics of the board’ has two components (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). First is 
directors’ background: age, education, values, and experience. Second is the 
individual and collective personality of directors: as in interests and focus. The 
context of this research meant board members were expected to be large 
shareholders in the company, and therefore likely to have a vested interest in the 
performance of the corporation. However, the question of independence can be a 
test of broader stakeholder interests on the board. Forbes and Milliken (1999) used 
tenure of the chairman to stand for experience of the board. Their initiative was 
copied in this research. The study does not explore the character of the board in 






‘Structure of the board’ refers to the number and types of committees. There is little 
tradition for committees at board level in Iceland, and given the study focuses on 
SMEs, it may be assumed the number of board committees would be minimal. 
However, one factor often considered part of the structure of the board, although 
more to do with the process of the board, is information flow. This researcher has 
taken special interest in the issue of information flow at board level in the last few 
years (Jonsson, 2006; 2007). Very little research has focused on the attempt to 
identify factors that determine whether boards have adequate knowledge and 
information to make meaningful contributions to strategic decision-making 
(Carpenter and Westhpal, 2001). However, even when the board is staffed by a 
majority of outside directors, the board still functions with information provided by 
the CEO (Aram and Cowan, 1983). Some have questioned whether directors have 
suitable knowledge or information to contribute meaningfully to strategy (Carpenter 
and Westhpal, 2001). Therefore, information flow to the board is particularly 
interesting.  
 
‘Process’ signifies the approach the board takes to decision-making (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). Zahra and Pearce (1991) emphasise process in their study, using 
three different scales to measure aspects of the board decision process. As this is 
one of the most comprehensive approaches for measuring board process in the 
literature, these scales are adopted in this research. Furthermore, these scales form 
part of the power-roles study (Zahra and Pearce, 1991), also considered in this 
study, and therefore it opens up the possibility of validating previous results.  
 
Although some attribute variables have been selected for this study, this was 
predominantly to enable comparison with previous studies, because the focus on 
attributes has dominated research in corporate governance.  
 
2.8.5 Performance 
Few measures of corporate performance are to be found in governance literature, 
the most notable of which is the Tobins Q. In this study a different approach is 





However, this is not an alien approach, as Zahra and Pearce (1991) have used it, 
although in very limited scope. There are three reasons why this approach is taken 
in this study. (1) The initial investigation showed it would be difficult to find actual 
financial data for the survey companies because of a lack of comparable databases. 
(2) Previous research has shown requesting financial information can seriously 
reduce the response rate and can be problematic. (3) Previous research has found a 
high degree correlation between self-reported performance estimates and actual 
performance (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1987). Hart 
and Banbury (1994) found correlation between self-reported performance and 
objective data to be between .55 and .99, depending on the specificity of the 
industry and sub-industry.  
 
Furthermore, the perceived performance measure offers a broader measure of 
performance than traditional financial measures. The instrument developed by Hart 
and Banbury (1994) measures performance variables related to different 
stakeholders: employees, society, customers, and shareholders. This broader 
approach should be especially interesting in this research, and perhaps shed some 
light on how the board of directors contributes to corporate performance.  
 
2.8.6 Research question and hypotheses 
As noted in the beginning of this section, the focus of this study is the relationship 
between boards and corporate performance. The model itself is simple, although 
more complex when all items and concepts within each factor are included.  
 
The main research question is the following: There is a positive relationship 
between boards and organisational performance in SMEs.   
 
The main hypotheses are the following: 
H1. There is a positive relationship between the level of role importance and 
company performance. 






H3. There is a positive relationship between the composition of boards and 
company performance. 
Figure 2.8.2: The main hypotheses. 
 
      Adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1989). 
 
The hypotheses are expanded in the next chapter where the operationalisation of the 


















Summary of Chapter 2 – Literature review 
This chapter reviews the literature from a descriptive perspective, as well as 
offering some critique. It is an argument for the research question, focus, and 
agenda. The chapter brings together theory and research practice, with the focus on 
the role of the board. Some of the studies are discussed further in the next chapter, 
where operationalisation of the concepts is explained. Furthermore, some issues 
discussed in this chapter will resurface in the discussion of the results and analysis 
of the survey in Chapter 4.  
 
The main implications from this chapter are: 
 
 There are many theories in the field of corporate governance, some counter-
theories and some complementary. Researchers increasingly are focusing on a 
multi-theoretical perspective.  
 The board has many roles, understood according to different theoretical 
approaches, although the archetype includes the monitoring role, the strategy 
role, and the resource role.  
 Most models within the literature are input-process-output models, of which 
the best-known is the intergraded model of Zahra and Pearce (1989).  
 Research from the structural-based view of the board has been inconclusive, 
while research from the process-based view of the board is sparse.  
 There are several problems associated with previous research efforts in the 
field, especially regarding theoretical perspectives, definition of concepts, and 
measurement of variables.  
 Three propositions are tested in this research, the relationship of board 
composition, roles, and process to organisational performance.  
 The research is done in the context of SMEs in Iceland and emphasises the 
strategic role of the board. 
 
The next chapter focuses on research methodology and examines how the 








Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
This chapter provides an overview of what is generally described as methodology. 
The purpose of the chapter is to outline the basis for the research paradigm. The 
survey tool is the main focus of the chapter. First, an argument is presented for the 
operationalisation of concepts to be used in the research introduced in the last 
chapter, the literature review. Second, is a description of the survey approach is 
provided. The chapter leads into discussion of the empirical chapter of this thesis, 
Chapter 4, where results and analyses of the questionnaire are discussed.  
 
Figure 3.1: The outline of the methodology chapter.  
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Based on Silverman (2005) and Churchill (1995). 
 
This chapter outlines the background of the research model, the research process, 
and some philosophical considerations. It begins with a rather general discussion of 
research methodology to clarify some of the issues. Next, the research model and 
operationalisation of the concepts under investigation are presented. The third part 
describes the survey instrument. The sampling procedures are described last. The 





3.1 Methodology in a wider context 
 
By three methods we may learn wisdom: First, by reflection, which is 
noblest; Second, by imitation, which is easiest; and third by experience, 
which is the bitterest.  
 
Confucius (551 BC - 479 BC) 
 
 
Methodology has been defined (Leedy, 1989 quoted in Remenyi et al., 1998, p. 28) 
as “an operational framework within which the facts are placed so that their 
meaning may be more clearly exposed.” Silverman (2005, p. 99) states 
methodology “refers to the choices we make about cases to study, methods of data 
gathering, forms of data analysis, etc., in planning and executing a research study.” 
The purpose of this section is to clarify some of the issues regarding the research 
design.  
 
Figure 3.1.1: Methodology: From paradigm to method. 
  3.1.1 Paradigm
  3.1.2. Theory
  3.1.5. Method
  3.1.4. Model
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An overall framework
for looking at reality.
A set of concepts used to define
and/or explain phenomenon.
An idea deriving from a
given theory.
A set of testable propositions
within a framework.
A specific research technique.
 
   Based on Silverman (2005), Kuhn (1962) and Remenyi et al. (1998). 
 
Silverman (2005, p. 100) describes seven levels of analysis to link some of the most 
basic terms in scientific research. Although Silverman (2005, p.98) speaks of 
‘models,’ he explains they “roughly correspond to what are more grandly referred 
to as paradigms.” ‘Paradigm,’ following the interpretation of Kuhn (1962), is a 
more appropriate term for the first part of this chapter, which describes 
methodology in general terms. The second section focuses on what theories are. 
The third section discusses concepts and categorisation. The fourth clarifies models, 






A ‘paradigm’ can be described as two different but related things. First, it can mean 
a description of what reality is like and the basic elements it contains. In other 
words, ‘ontology,’ or what we believe about the nature of reality. Secondly, it can 
refer to the nature and status of knowledge in terms of ‘epistemology,’ or how we 
know what we know (Silverman, 2005, p. 98; Patton, 2002, p. 134). Ontology and 
epistemology are philosophical topics not usually directly discussed in doctoral 
theses (for example; Brett 2000; Gay, 2001; Tanner, 2005; Long, 2005).  However, 
‘what can I know?’ is regarded as one of the most fundamental questions pertaining 
to any field of study (Popper, 2002)7. Classical empiricism, or the British school, of 
Bacon, Locke, and Berkeley, associated with Hume and Mill, holds the view the 
ultimate source of knowledge is observation or induction. Classical rationalism, or 
the Continental school, associated with Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, on the 
other hand, holds intellectual intuition or deduction is the source of true knowledge 
(Popper, 2002, Stove, 1982). In most doctoral theses the empirical view is accepted, 
as it is often described as the true theory of scientific knowledge (Popper, 2002, 
McCloskey, 1998).  
 
Popper’s (2002) criticism of the authoritarian implication of the empiricists and the 
rationalists is interesting. He argues rationalists tend to think the source of 
knowledge and truth is God or nature. Furthermore, he argues empiricism relies on 
authority in its quest for sources of observation, and points out all observations 
involve interpretation, and there is no such thing as pure observation. Popper (2002, 
p. 33) proposed a different perspective on sources of knowledge: 
 
The question about the sources of our knowledge can be replaced in a similar way. It has always 
been asked in the sprit of: ‘What are the best sources of our knowledge ― the most reliable 
ones, those which will not lead us into error, and those to which we can and must turn, in case of 
doubt, as the last court of appeal?’ I propose to assume, instead, that no such ideal sources exist 
― no more than ideal rulers ― and that all ‘sources’ are liable to lead us into error at times. 
And I propose to replace, therefore, the question of the sources of our knowledge by the entirely 
different question: ‘How can we hope to detect and eliminate error?’ 
 
                                                 





Popper (2002) argues the process of criticism is a means of detecting and 
eliminating error. Through constructive criticism, theories or intuitions may be 
examined, and the field of knowledge advanced. This approach has been, at least in 
part, adopted in this thesis. Popper’s response to the epistemological question of 
‘how do we know?’ is summarised below (Popper, 2002, p. 35): 
 
So my answer to the question ‘How do you know? What is the source or the basis of your 
assertion? What observations have led you to it?’ would be: ‘I do not know: my assertion 
was merely a guess. Never mind the source, or the sources, from which it may spring ― 
there are many possible sources, and I may not be aware of half of them; and origins or 
pedigrees have in any case little bearing upon truth. But if you are interested in the problem 
which I tried to solve by my tentative assertion, you may help me by criticizing it as 
severely as you can; and if you can design some experimental test which you think might 
refute my assertion, I shall gladly, and to the best of my powers, help you to refute it.’ 
 
This critical view of Popper can be described as a special paradigm, although his 
views are often categorised as positivism or empiricism (for example in Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002) when he is clearly opposing their views. Indeed, Popper called 
himself ‘negativist’ rather than ‘positivist.’8   
 
The philosophical questions of ontology and epistemology, however, only partly 
describe different paradigms. Patton (2002, p. 134) categorises paradigms according 
to six questions: (1) What do we believe about the nature of reality? (ontology); (2) 
How do we know what we know? (epistemology); (3) How should we study the 
world? (methodology); (4) What is worth knowing? (philosophical debate about 
                                                 
8 Popper best explains the difference himself (Popper, 2002, p. 310): “Falsificationists (the group 
of fallibilists to which I belong) believe – as most irrationalists also believe – that they have 
discovered logical arguments which show that the programme of the first group [verificationists] 
cannot be carried out: that we can never give positive reasons which justify the belief that a theory 
is true. But, unlike irrationalists, we falsificationists believe that we have also discovered a way to 
realize the old ideal of distinguishing rational science from various forms of superstition, in spite of 
the breakdown of the original inductivist or justificationist programme. We hold that this ideal can 
be realized, very simply, by recognizing that the rationality of science lies not in its habit of 
appealing to empirical evidence in support of its dogmas – astrologers do so too – but solely in the 
critical approach: in an attitude which, of course, involves the critical use, among other arguments, 
of empirical evidence (especially in refutations). For us, therefore, science has nothing to do with 
the quest for certainty or probability or reliability. We are not interested in establishing scientific 
theories as secure, or certain, or probable. Conscious of our fallibility we are only interested in 
criticizing them and testing them, hoping to find out where we are mistaken; of learning from our 






what matters and why); (5) What questions should we ask? (disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary debate about the nature of inquiry); and (6) How do we personally 
engage in inquiry? (praxis debates about interjecting personal experience and values 
into the inquiry). ‘Paradigm’ in this study means a general perspective, or way of 
thinking, reflecting fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the nature of science 
(Kuhn, 1962). It is built on more philosophical exploration than a ‘crude mental 
model’ would emphasise (Phillips, 1996; Smith, 1997).    
 
There are many methods to classify paradigms. Foucault (1989)9 argues there is a 
problem with the epistemological configuration and placement of human sciences, 
in constant but ill-defined relationship to three other fields. These three are, 
according to Foucault (1989, pp. 389-390), biology, economics, and philology. 
Biology sees man as a creation of functions and norms; economics provides rules so 
man may deal with conflict; and for philology man’s behaviour is an attempt to find 
significance and systems having meaning. Burrell and Morgan (1979) suggest a 
two-dimensional perspective, e.g. subjective/objective and radical 
change/regulation, and describe four paradigms: radical humanist, radical 
structuralist, interpretivist, and functionalist. Crotty (1998) suggests five major 
perspectives: positivism (and post-positivism), interpretivism (including 
phenomenology, hermeneutics, and symbolic interactionism), critical inquiry, 
feminism, and post-modernism. Creswell (1998) settled on five traditions within the 
qualitative dimension: biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography 
and case study. Others have found more categories (e.g. Wolcott, 1992; Tesch, 
1990). Silverman (2005) describes four paradigms within social research: 
functionalism (which looks at the functions of social institutions), behaviourism 
(which defines all behaviour in terms of ‘stimulus’ and ‘response’), interactionism 
(which focuses on how we attach symbolic meanings to interpersonal relationships) 
and ethnomethodology (which focuses on facts rather than theories). Interactionism 
can be linked to the philological origin, and behaviourism to the biological origin 
identified by Foucault (1989). Although functionalism does not relate as clearly to 
economics in Foucault’s (1989) discussion, the link is there, as the functionalist 
paradigm has been described (Gioia and Pitre, 1990) as seeking to examine 
                                                 





regularities and relationships that lead to generalisations and universal principles. 
Functionalism has more commonly been labelled as positivism (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2002, Popper, 2002). Other paradigms are often labelled non-positivism in 
contrast, or social constructionism, (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), phenomenology 
(Remenyi et al., 1998), or interpretivist (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Crotty, 1998), 
although they may have a more narrow meaning when described by other 
researchers (see, for example, table 3.1.1, main research perspectives from Patton’s 
point of view). In other words, there is no agreement on a categorisation of research 
paradigms (Patton, 2002).  
 
The dual categorisation of methodology into both positivism and non-positivism 
has been the most popular approach in business research (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002; Remenyi et al., 1998). It is in essence an epistemological approach to the 
methodological distinction between quantitative and qualitative research.  
Gummerson (1991) proposes ‘hermeneutics’ as a paradigm bridge between 
positivism and phenomenology. However, hermeneutics has become better known 
as a subset of interpretivism (Crotty, 1998), focusing on the meaning of the 
conditions in which human acts take place, or products are produced (Patton, 2002, 
p. 113). The mixed-method style is sometimes labelled relativism (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 2002) or realism (Patton, 2002) although it is all too often not related too any 
paradigm (Green and Caracelli, 2003).  Realism is sometimes described as an 
evolution away from the positivist paradigm, where scientific credibility carries a 
premium (Patton, 2002), and it is important to test claims with a set of valid and 
verifiable methods to capturing social relationships and their causes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984).  
 
This exploration of paradigms, and the basis for their categorisation, demonstrates 
at least in part why there is such confusion associated with research paradigms. 
They are grounded upon very fundamentally different approaches to research and 
theory building in social sciences (Gioia and Pitre, 1990). While the paradigms 
“provide guidance and a basis for interaction among researchers operating within 





     
Table 3.1.1: Methodological traditions or paradigms. 
Perspective Disciplinary roots Central question 
Ethnography Anthropology What is the culture of this group of people? 
Autoethnography Literary arts How does my own experience of this culture 
connect with and offer insights about this  





Philosophy, social  
sciences and 
evaluation 
What is really going on in the real world? 
What can we establish with some degree of  
certainty? What are plausible explanations for 
verifiable patterns? What is the truth insofar 
as we can get at it? How can we study a  
phenomenon so that our findings correspond,  
as much as possible, to the real world? 
Constructionism/ 
constuctivism 
Sociology How have the people in this setting  
constructed reality? What are their reported  
perceptions, “truths,” explanations, beliefs, and 
world view?  
Phenomenology Philosophy What is the meaning, structure, and essence of 
the lived experience of this phenomenon 
for this person or group of people? 
Heuristic inquiry Humanistic 
psychology 
What is my experience of this phenomenon  
and the essential experience of others who also 
experience this phenomenon intensely? 
Ethnomethodology Sociology How do people make sense of their everyday 




Social psychology What common set of symbols give meaning to 
human  interaction? 
Semiotics Linguistics How do signs (words, symbols) carry and 





What are the conditions under which a  
human act took place or a product was 








What does this narrative or story reveal about  
the person and world from which it came? 
How can this narrative be interpreted to  
understand and illuminate the life and culture  





How do individuals attempt to accomplish 
their goals through specific behaviours in 
specific environments? 
Systems theory Interdisciplinary How and why does this system as a whole  






What is the underlying order, if any, of  
disorderly phenomenon? 
Grounded theory Social sciences,  
methodology 
What theory emerges from systematic  
comparative analysis and is grounded in  
field work so as to explain what has been 









How is X perspective manifested in this  
phenomenon? 






across and among different perspectives” (Patton, 2002, p. 134). There is, however, 
an argument for using a multi-perspective approach, to create fresh insight for the 
researcher. Different ontological and epistemological assumptions can tap different 
facets of organisational phenomena, and can produce markedly different and 
uniquely informative theoretical views of events under study (Gioia and Pitre, 
1990). 
 
The methodological approach to paradigms in this thesis is probably best described 
as a compromise among various perspectives. The ontological and epistemological 
basis rests in the empiricism of the British school of thought, chosen because of 
tradition and institutionalisation, as the thesis was written and defended at Henley 
Management College, the oldest management school in Britain. The background of 
the researcher is in economics and management, fields which see the world in terms 
of rules and conflict, as described by Foucault (1989). However, Popper’s (2002) 
argument for the critical approach to science has influenced this research, and some 
of his terms and methods are used in the thesis (as will become clearer in next 
section). There is little doubt the traditional perspectives of empiricism have had a 
stronger influence on this thesis. This traditional empirical approach supports a 
positivist paradigm, as described by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002). However, this 
thesis is conducted more in the spirit of realism as described by Patton (2002), 
where realism is related more to positivism than to non-positivism, as it was 
developed from logical positivism and post-positivism. The reason for this 
perspective is realism offers a more lenient view of non-positivist methods, which 
gives a richer picture of the phenomena under study, than a pure positivist approach 
(Remenyi et al., 1998).  
 
Realism emphasises empirical findings with solid description and analysis, and not 
a personal perspective or voice, although some subjectivity and judgment is 
permitted (Patton, 2002). Triangulation of data sources and analytical perspectives 
are used to increase the accuracy and credibility of findings (Patton, 2002). The 
criteria for quality include ‘truth values’ and plausibility of findings; credibility, 





dependability of data; and explainable inconsistencies of instabilities (Patton, 2002, 
p. 93). The realist perspective strives for rigour, but it also allows the flexibility to 
use other means for research. This flexibility would be inappropriate under the 
umbrella of positivism.  
 
In short, as emphasised by Easterby-Smith et al. (2002), the relativist position (or 
realist-orientated perspective), where multiple perspectives are adopted and 
validated with triangulation, can provide better insight into boards, where the 
starting point is supposition rather than hypotheses, the analysis consists of 
probability rather than verification,10 and the outcome is correlation rather than 
causality. Flexibility in the use of methodologies provided by the realist paradigm 
can better explain the “how” and “why” of board operations and their contribution 
to the organisation.  
 
3.1.2 Theory  
The word ‘theory’ has many different definitions. Gioia and Pitre (1990) define it as 
any coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced phenomena. 
Silverman (2005) describes theory as a set of concepts arranged to define and 
explain some phenomenon, while Strauss and Corbin (1998) define theory as a 
plausible relationship produced among concepts and sets of concepts. Another 
definition of ‘theory’ is an ordered set of assertions about a generic behaviour of 
structure assumed to hold throughout a significantly broad range of specific 
instances (Patton, 2002). More generally, theory has been described as the answer 
to the question “why” (Kaplan, 1964; Merton, 1968, Sutton and Staw, 1995). 
Theories are also regarded as solutions to problems (Popper, 1994).  
 
Although there seems to be a fairly coherent understanding among scientists of 
what theory is or is not, the spectrum for interpretation is wide (Sutton and Staw, 
1995; Weick, 1995). People talk of theories as of ideas, which explain the ‘why’ of 
their daily lives (Llewelyn, 2003).  Scientists tend to speak of theories as ‘grand 
theories,’ formulated in the world of ideas rather than practice (Van De Ven and 
                                                 
10 Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) used the term ‘falsification’ here. From the perspective of Popper 
(2002) who coined the concept of ‘falsification’ the term of ‘verification’ is, however, more 





Johnson, 2006; McKelvey, 2006). In other words, theories are contained in 
libraries, ideas established by thinking through issues and relationships in an 
abstract way and with a high level of generality (Llewelyn, 2003). This observation 
is interesting as it reflects the approach of rationalism rather than empiricism. 
Llewelyn (2003) actually categorises theories on a spectrum between empiricism 
and rationalism, although her approach is closest to the instrumentalist view. 
Llewelyn (2003) argues there are ‘levels’ of theories: (1) metaphor theories, (2) 
differentiation theories, (3) concepts theories, (4) theorising settings, and (5) grand 
theories. This typology helps explain the origin and purpose of theories and theory 
building. It could be a better description of the process of making theories, or 
theorising, rather than being an indication of a theory as a product (Weick, 1995). It 
emphasises, however, how freely researchers use the word ‘theory’ (Sutton and 
Staw, 1995). More importantly, this typology emphasises the importance of 
concepts, categorisation, and relationships in the process of theory-building.  
 
Metaphor theories are in essence a method of understanding and experiencing one 
kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Metaphors explain 
new and unfamiliar concepts through some prior acquaintance with familiar 
concepts, often from a more ‘basic’ context (Llewelyn, 2003). Gentner (1989) states 
metaphor has the power to establish a primary understanding of any phenomenon. 
Differentiation theories emphasise the importance of categorisation. Their aim is to 
create meaning and significance through contrast and categorisation of things 
(Llewelyn, 2003). Concepts are established and clarified through categorisation, 
dualism in its simplest form (for example, in-out, public-private, mind-body). A 
classic example is McGregor’s (1960) theory of X and Y management. Concept 
theories work through explicating practice, in other words, the creation of meaning 
and significance by linking the subjective and objective realms of experience 
(Llewelyn, 2003). New concepts, or re-working old concepts by repositioning them 
in a network of terms (Sayer, 1992), reflect different ways of thinking and acting in 
the world – ‘feminism’ being a good example. Theorising settings put theories in 
context and offer an understanding of the setting, in other words, they create 
meaning and significance by explaining relationships between phenomena 





takes place, or the conditions under which actors act. Finally, grand theories offer 
understanding of enduring structural aspects of experience (Llewelyn 2003). They 
focus on the structural conditions both essential and impersonal, explaining 
phenomenon with a high level of generality. Grand theories are scarce and “are 
unlikely to be challenged, modified or revised following an encounter with 
empirical reality” (Llewelyn, 2003, p. 677). It is important to note although this 
categorisation of theories is only a basic outline, and highly focused on philology 
within Foucault’s (1989) categorisation, it emphasises the point theories are usually 
neither overtly categorised nor questioned.    
 
Grand theories and higher-level theories, the preferred academic theories, form the 
basis of deductive research, where theories are developed before empirical evidence 
is sought. However, Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue for a more inductive hands-on 
approach to theory building. They argue it is the intimate connection with empirical 
reality that permits the development of a testable, relevant, and valid theory. 
Theories should be built from empirical evidence rather than out of thin blue air. It 
is not a question of qualitative or quantitative methodology, as sometimes is 
mistakenly assumed. As Glaser (2000, p. 7) points out: “Let me be clear. Grounded 
theory is a general method. It can be used on any data or combination of data. It was 
developed partially by me with quantitative data.” Their grounded theory approach 
is an inductive method of theory building, and offers a different perspective on 
knowledge creation.  
 
Some arguments emphasise theory building is both an inductive and deductive 
process. Eisenhardt (1989; p. 532) notes “traditionally, authors have developed 
theory by combining observations from previous literature, common sense, and 
experience.” Llewelyn (2003, p. 666) argues as “all social phenomena are concept-
dependent, theorizing for qualitative work in the social sciences cannot only ‘begin’ 
at the level of ‘grand theory,’ theorizing and conceptualising must be conjoined.” 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) see theory building as a loop of the inductive and 






It is interesting to combine both the deductive and the inductive approach of the 
rationalists and the empiricists, respectively, as Christensen and Raynor (2003) do 
in their model (see figure 3.1.2). This is a good description of how research is 
carried out within the positivist paradigm, where the starting point is existing theory 
and the goal is to confirm and further develop it. Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
however, would argue the starting point should be observation, not theory. Both 
methods of theory building, the library approach of grand theorists, and the hands-
on approach of grounded theorists, focus on confirming the theories once 
established. This confirmation approach is what makes theories ‘scientific,’ as the 
argument is the research has been done to confirm the theory, and it therefore must 
be true (Popper, 2002).   
 
Figure 3.1.2: The process of theory building. 
Theory
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  Adapted from Christensen and Raynor (2003). 
 
 
This is, however, what Popper (2002, p. 39) rejects as good science. “[The] false 
idea, is that we must justify our knowledge, or our theories, by positive reasons, that 
is, by reasons capable of establishing them, or at least of making them highly 
probable; at any rate, by better reasons than that they have so far withstood 
criticism.” Popper has a point, as it is difficult to tell what is scientific theory and 
what is not, something that scientist still struggle with (Sutton and Staw, 1995; 
McKelvey, 1995). Popper’s struggle was with Marx, Freud, and Adler, and the 





questions were: ‘When should a theory be ranked as scientific?’ or ‘Is there a 
criterion for the scientific character or status of a theory?’ Popper describes his 
conclusion in seven points (Popper, 2002, pp. 47-48): 
 
1. It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory – if 
we look for confirmation. 
  
2. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that 
is to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected 
an event which was incompatible with the theory – an event which would have 
refuted the theory. 
 
3. Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to 
happen, the more a theory forbids, the better it is. 
 
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. 
Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory but vice.  
 
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it. 
  
6. Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result of a genuine 
test of the theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but 
unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory. 
 
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by 
their admirers – for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, 
or by re-interpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. 
Such an approach can be described as the ‘conventionalist twist’ and rescues 
theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its 
scientific status.   
 
It is this critical approach, also mentioned in the last section, which is important for 
understanding theories as solutions to problems, and whether they are good or bad 
solutions. McCloskey (1998) has, however, claimed that falsificaiton is impractical.  
That claim is based on critique of empiricism. Popper was, however, arguing for 
falsification as part of ‘theorizing’, as Weick (1995) uses the term, where French 
rationalism and British empiricism are used with different emphasis, as to develop 
and test theories from the perspective of falsification rather than verification. In the 
words of Popper (2002, p. 67): 
 
The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering 





rationality. It makes far-reaching use of both verbal argument and observation – of 
observation in the interest of argument, however. 
 
Popper suggests this new way of thinking as a way to progress scientific 
knowledge. Kuhn (1977) argued that the scientist tries to force facts into the 
conformity of a theory and McCloskey (1998) pointed out that there is no 
falsification going on when scientists try to fit new facts into existing theories. 
Wacker (2004) uses Popper’s arguments to define good theory (table 3.1.2).  
 
Table 3.1.2: Elements of a good theory. 
Virtue Key feature 
Uniqueness Uniqueness means one theory must be differentiated from another. 
 
Conservatism A current theory cannot be replaced unless the new theory is superior. 
 
Generalisability The more the areas to which theory can be applied, the better the theory. 
Fecundity A theory which is more fertile in generating new models and hypotheses is 
better than a theory with fewer hypotheses. 




Internal consistency means the theory has identified all relationships and 
gives adequate explanation. 
Empirical 
riskiness 
Any empirical test of a theory should be risky. Refutation must be very 
possible if theory is to be considered a ’good’ theory. 
Abstraction Means it is independent in time and space. It achieves this independence by 
including more relationships. 
   Adapted from Wacker (2004, p. 644). 
 
As noted in Section 1.1, theory of corporate governance and the board of directors 
is incomplete and fragmented. A multi-theoretical perspective has been adopted 
here to address this (Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Huse, 2005), and because one single 
approach may be too narrow for understanding the role of the board. Indeed, if one 
were to test only one theoretical role of the board, the research would by definition 
disregard any other potential theoretical roles the board might have. A grounded 
research approach may have been adopted, but given the problem of access to 
boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), this approach is difficult to conduct in practice. 
The multi-theoretical perspective was somewhat limited in terms of 
conceptualisation and operationalisation by the scope of the research, as questioning 
subjects about all different theoretical roles predicted was not possible. This raises 





this subsection. The solution was a classical empiricist approach, to choose those 
most discussed and studied by other researchers (for example, Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1991; Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; 
Westphal and Carpenter, 2001; Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Heuvel et al., 2006). 
However, this solution does not effectively address the quality of those theories 
(Popper, 2002). Popper’s argument for a critical approach to judging theories and 
the concept of falsification are further examined in the following chapters.  
 
Four main theories are used to guide the process of operationalisation: agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and stakeholder theory. 
Agency theory is the obvious choice, as no other theory within the corporate 
governance literature has come as close to being considered synonymous with a 
‘corporate governance theory’ (Lubatkin, 2007). Stewardship is the counter theory, 
and focuses on the strategic role of the board (Donaldson, 1990). Resource 
dependency theory offers a different perspective of the role of the board, as a link 
between the internal and external environment (Kiel and Nicholson, 2004). 
Stakeholder theory offers a different perspective than the shareholder perspective 
(Hung, 1998). In the typology of Hung (1998), the multi-theoretical focus is on the 
contingency perspective part of the typology (figure 2.1.2). The core problem 
formulation of this thesis is to falsify the statement the board has no value or 
importance. It can be argued this is the claim of managerial hegemony theory, the 
institutional perspective, which holds the board is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ (Mace, 
1971). Showing a positive relationship or organisational performance either by 
means of agency, stewardship, resource dependency, or stakeholder theory would 
falsify the managerial hegemony perspective. Therefore, the underlying structure of 
problem formulation is not simply an empiricist approach to confirm or verify 
theories, as the study also includes Popper’s perspective featuring falsification.   
 
 
3.1.3 Concepts and categorisation 
The model of theory building proposed by Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
emphasises ‘concepts,’ and ‘relationships’ between concepts. This is how Strauss 





become the building blocks of theory (Remenyi et al., 1998). Llewelyn (2003) 
argues theorising and conceptualising need to go together. Silverman (2005, p. 24) 
defines ‘concepts’ as “clearly specified ideas deriving from a particular model 
[paradigm].” This can also be described as the perspective of ‘tradition’ (Foucault, 
2002). From a grounded theory perspective, it is rather the phenomena being 
studied, not the philosophical paradigm, which brings out concepts and 
relationships of concepts (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). That being said, there is an 
important implication for linking concepts with paradigms, which can become a 
basis for categorisation. Foucault’s (1989) function and norm, conflict and rule, 
signification and system are, for examples, a way to understand the origin and 
purpose of concepts.  
 
It was Glaser and Strauss (1967) who emphasised the importance of classification 
in theory building (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Classification improves the 
likelihood of accurate and reliable theory, in other words, a theory with a close fit to 
the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Christensen and Raynor (2003) have argued 
categorisation is, in fact, a very important step in theory building, and portray it as a 
method to give relationships of concepts meaning. Focault (2002) explained it as 
‘the order of things’, the inner law and hidden network of theories. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987, p. 116) emphasise categorisation is “fundamental” to the social 
scientist and the “principal building block.” The bases of categorisation vary. Glaser 
and Strauss (1967) define substantive categorisation (in other words attribute-based 
categorisation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003)) and formal categorisation (in other 
words circumstance-based categorisation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003)). 
Substantive categorisation is based on characteristics of the phenomenon, while 
formal categorisation refers to either the circumstances in which they are used or 
when they are used.  
 
Categorisation can be described as ‘taxonomies,’ which completely classify a 
phenomenon through mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, or as 
‘typologies,’ which are built on ideal types or illustrative endpoints, rather than a 
complete and discrete set of categories (Patton, 2002). Guba (1978) argues 





together, or more precisely on the basis of ‘internal homogeneity’ and ‘external 
heterogeneity.’ The former is how certain things are categorised together or hold 
together in a meaningful way, and the latter is how differences between categories 
are made bold and clear. Challenging categorisation is an important component of 
theoretical development, as “they can impede as well as enable new (and possibly 
more productive) ways of both thinking and doing” (Llewelyn, 2003, p. 671). In 
fact, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have argued the objective/subjective dualism has 
stalled debate on the epistemology of knowledge in the social sciences. 
Categorisation is a common approach to inductive theory-building. Usually 
categorisation can be found in ‘grand theories,’ developed by thinking through 
issues and relationships in an abstract way, and the basis of deductive research, 
which on many occasions aims to improve the categorisation proposed (Llewelyn, 
2003).  
 
In Section 1.3 the hypothesis was formulated as a question regarding the 
relationship between two main concepts, boards of directors and organisational 
performance. Both concepts were discussed in detail in the literature review. ‘Board 
of directors’ has various theoretical meanings and implications. Hung’s (1989) 
typology makes this point regarding conceptualisation and classification. As for 
concepts, the literature review focused on roles of the board in terms of tasks, and 
four main roles were identified: monitoring, strategy, resource, and advice. As 
noted in the literature review, and as emphasised by, for example, Heuvel et al. 
(2006), the concepts are far from clear. There is neither agreement about what they 
are, nor how they should be measured. Furthermore, theses roles cannot be 
categorised as taxonomies. Not even the monitoring and the strategy role of agency 
and stewardship theory can easily be conceptualised as two mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories. The review of these theories and concepts demonstrates how 
confusing this is (for example, Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001; Heuvel et al., 2006). This is problematic when it comes to 
designing a research model and operational definition of the concepts, because of 
potential multicollinearity. The decision process of Fama and Jensen (1983) used in 
the introduction for clarification, could be the basis for such a categorisation, but it 





example, resource dependency theory. Furthermore, it is not clear what ‘initiation,’ 
‘ratification,’ ‘implementation,’ and ‘monitoring’ actually are regarding tasks of the 
board, and where the line is drawn between these concepts. The perspective adopted 
in this thesis is that of an exploratory study, therefore, how different concepts relate 
remains to be tested in further research. Perhaps that could be a first step towards a 
new corporate governance theory. 
   
3.1.4 Model and propositions 
The term ‘model’ is hard to describe because of its wide usage. In the words of 
Remenyi et al. (1998, p. 285): 
 
A model may be described as a representation of an artefact, a construction, a system or an 
event or sequence of events. The representation may be abstracted into symbols, equations 
and numbers, i.e. mathematical expectations; it may consist of a picture or a drawing, or a 
fabricated likeness such as a model aeroplane, or it may be an expression of a situation or 
relationship in words. A complex model may contain several of these representations 
simultaneously.  
 
“Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary” defines ‘model’ as follows: 
 
The word model is used in various contexts meaning something (abstract or physical) that 
represents 'the real thing.' That entity may be anything from a single item or object (for 
example, a bolt) to a complete system of any size (for example, the Solar System). 
 
And “Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary” gives a similar definition: 
 
A model is a physical representation that shows what an object looks like or how it works. 
The model is often smaller than the object it represents. A model is a system that is being 
used and that people might want to copy in order to achieve similar results.   
 
The word ‘representation’ can be found in all three definitions, meaning a model is 
something that describes something in some form. Early exercises in model-
building more or less tended to disregard reality, and were purely theoretical 
(Leeflang, 1974). In the 70’s, model builders tried so hard to imitate reality the 





models should be emphasised (Leeflang, 1974). The mantra became models should 
be good representations of reality, but also easy to use. Little (1970) developed 
criteria which subsequently guided many in model building. The most important 
features were models should be simple, complete, robust, adaptive, evolutionary11, 
easy to control, and easy to communicate (Little, 1970).  
 
The term ‘theory’ is quite often used synonymously and simultaneously with the 
term ‘model.’ However, there is a quite valid distinction between these two terms. 
According to Hawking (1988, p. 25), “a theory is a good theory if it satisfies two 
requirements: It must accurately describe a large class of observations on the basis 
of a model that contains only a few arbitrary elements, and it must make definite 
predictions about the results of future observations.” As is evident in Hawkings 
quote, there is a distinct difference between the two terms. Theory provides a more 
general framework of connected statements used in the process of explanation, 
while a model is an idealised and structured representation of reality (Johnston et 
al., 1994) or an experimental design based on a theory (Harris, 1966). A model is in 
a sense a tool used to describe, explain, or test a theory, and it can be descriptive, 
predictive, and prescriptive (or normative) (Patton, 2002). Some models have all 
these purposes. 
 
The most obvious link between a theory and a model in the deductive process is the 
hypotheses, or propositions, in the relativist paradigm. Hypotheses are in effect 
statements, claims, or assumptions that can, and should be, tested by research 
(Silverman, 2005). They are assumptions derived from previous research, theory, or 
current business situation. They enable researchers to explain and test proposed 
facts or phenomenon (Hair et al., 2003). A model is a framework for testing the 
hypotheses. Hair et al. (2003) offer a guideline for evaluation of an empirical 
model: 
 
1. It is empirical – meaning that it is compared against reality. 
 
                                                 






2. It is replicable or objective – meaning the researcher’s opinion is independent 
of the results. Other researchers conducting the study would obtain the same 
results. 
 
3. It is analytical – meaning it follows the scientific method in breaking down and 
describing empirical facts. 
  
4. It is theory driven – meaning that it relies on the previous body of knowledge. 
  
5. It is logical – meaning conclusions are drawn from the results based on logic. 
  
6. It is rigorous – meaning every effort is made to minimise error.  
 
Models in the corporate governance literature are in many cases based on a multi-
theoretical perspective, as demonstrated in the literature review (for example, Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Huse, 2005). There is a problem 
associated with the multi-theoretical perspective, as noted in the discussion of 
concepts, because the above definitions of models imply models tend to represent 
only one theory. It is theory framed in few statements. The concern with a model 
based on a multi-theoretical perspective is that concepts are not mutually exclusive 
or collectively exhaustive. The model in this thesis is based on the work of Zahra 
and Pearce (1989), which is a conceptual model not yet operationalised. 
Furthermore, the concepts used are not clearly defined in the work of Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) and have been interpreted differently by various researchers (Heuvel 
et al., 2006).  
 
The objective of this thesis is to disprove the board is not valuable for the 
organisation by showing a positive relationship between the board of directors and 
organisational performance. Three propositions have been formulated to show this 
relationship: 
 
H1. There is a positive relationship between the level of role importance and 
company performance. 
H2. There is a positive relationship between the process of boards and company 
performance. 







The three independent variables are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively 
exhaustive. They are, however, theoretical propositions which could or should show 
a relationship with organisational performance. Zahra and Pearce (1989) propose 
the relationship between composition and organisational performance, as well as the 
relationship between board process and organisational performance, is both direct 
and indirect, through the roles of the board. Therefore, there is a relationship 
between the independent variables. Furthermore, Zahra and Pearce (1991) have 
theorised the relationship between the role of the board and its composition and 
processes is the reverse, meaning the role of board is the independent variable, 
while composition and process are dependent variables. In any case, the purpose of 
the research is to test the proposition as a single equation and take a more 
exploratory view of the research model in a multivariate context.  
 
Three perspectives helped guide the decision as to which methods and methodology 
to adopt in this research12 and they may be described as cost-effectiveness, 
parsimony, and rigour. The principle of cost-effectiveness of research is adapted 
from Remenyi et al. (1998), where research strategy is affected by the cost, time, 
and skill of the researcher, and not only by the research question or the problem. 
The Henley DBA degree is designed for part-time students and time is a very 
important factor. The Zahra and Pearce (1989) model calls for different research 
methods because only some of the variables it introduced had been operationalised. 
Grounded research, in the spirit of Glaser and Strauss (1967), was needed to 
develop the variables and propositions. This was time-consuming and costly. The 
principle of cost-effectiveness, therefore, indicated good reason for simplifying the 
research model from that developed in the theoretical discussion. The principle of 
parsimony states it is important to keep things as simple as possible (Little, 1970; 
Hair et al., 2003). Focus group discussions in Nitterdal, 2005, criticised some of the 
complexities of the Zahra and Pearce (1989) model. The principle of rigour is 
discussed in the following section. 
 
 
                                                 
12 These perspectives arose in discussions at focus groups chaired by Professor Pat Joynt  in 






Silverman (2005, p. 109) defines ‘methodology’ as “a general approach to studying 
research topics.”  Methodology shapes which methods are used, and how each 
method is used. More precisely, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002, p. 31) define 
methodology as a “combination of techniques used to enquire into a specific 
situation,” and method as “individual techniques for data collection, analysis, etc.”  
At the start of this section the paradigms were discussed, as well as the choice of 
realism, a more practical approach to positivism. A growing understanding is 
surfacing as to why positivism and non-positivism need not represent opposing 
positions. Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) argue it is not possible to identify any 
philosopher who subscribes to all aspects of one particular view, and many 
researchers, especially in the management field, deliberately combine methods 
originating from each tradition. There seems to be a growing interest in detangling 
qualitative and quantitative methods from positivist and non-positivist paradigms. 
This is often described as pragmatism, a practical approach to research (Patton, 
2002, p. 135).   
 
From the methodological point of view, Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) emphasise the 
differences between positivism, relativism, and social constructionism (table 3.2.3). 
However, the difference in practice is not always so clear-cut, as Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2002) have themselves pointed out, with the increased popularity of 
pragmatism.  
 
Table 3.1.3:  Methodological implications of different epistemologies. 
Elements of methods Positivism Relativism Social constructionism 
Aims Discovery Exposure Invention 
Starting points Hypotheses Suppositions Meanings 
Designs Experiments Triangulation Reflexivity 




Outcomes Causality Correlation Understanding 
 
Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (2002, p. 34). 
 
 
This thesis is set in the paradigm of realism, although most of the quantitative 





would preclude the more interpretive approach of realism. The choice of method is 
based on one hand on methodological-philosophical issues, and on the other hand 
the research question (Patton, 2002). It is not always clear which weighs heaviest. 
Galliers (1992) lists the most common research approaches. These are: action 
research, case studies, ethnographic, field experiments, focus groups, forecasting, 
future research, game or role playing, in-depth surveys, laboratory experiments, 
large-scale surveys, participant-observer, scenario discussions, and simulation.  
 
The three perspectives of cost-effectiveness, parsimony, and rigour helped decide 
the method and methodology. The principle of rigour probably had the greatest 
influence. Rigour is the effort to minimise errors (Popper, 2002; Hair et al., 2003) 
by using appropriate and sound research methodology (Remenyi et al., 1998). Two 
points were taken from the principle of rigour. First, a questionnaire for data 
gathering was chosen, because as a scientific method it is more rigorous than the 
open style interviews and case studies, which were also considered. Second, the aim 
was to use already operationalised concepts where possible to minimise designing 
new measurement scales. As Larcker et al. (2004) point out, there is no lack of 
measurement scales, although many are based on convenience and lack rigorous 
analysis.  
 































Rigour is at least partly a question of validity. Trochim (2001) provides a 
categorisation where validity is described as the relationship between research 
theory and research practice (figure 3.1.3). Three types of validity are discussed in 
this chapter. Construction validity is the subject of section 3.2, external validity is 
discussed in section 3.4 on sampling, and internal validity in section 3.3 about the 
survey method. Conclusion validity is discussed in Chapter 4. The importance of 
validity lies at the core of this thesis.  
 
The survey method as the quantitative approach, and interviews and focus groups as 
the qualitative approach, are the methods used in this research. This study utilises a 
mixed-method approach to research and it emphasises realism as the research 
paradigm (Phillips, 1996). This is a common approach used by researchers (Greene 
and Caracelli, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), as the problem, not the paradigm, 
determines which methods are most relevant for solving the problem (Patton, 2002; 
Newman et al., 2003). Both the qualitative and the quantitative approaches used in 
this study are discussed in more detail in the following subsections.  
 
3.1.5.1 The qualitative approach 
Using both a qualitative approach as well as a quantitative approach can enrich the 
problem definition as well as the solution, although mixing methods may lead to 
contradiction and confusion (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). In this study, the 
qualitative approaches are used for supporting the quantitative approach, as 
researchers within the realism paradigm often tend to do (Greene and Caracelli, 
2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Several authors note triangulation increases 
validity (for example Jick, 1979; Bickman and Rog, 1997; Smith, 1997; Scandura 
and Williams, 2000). Qualitative approaches are used for all four types of validity 
identified above: external, internal, construct, and conclusion validity. Furthermore, 
it may be argued the qualitative approach used in the early stages of this research 
may have affected the research process.  
 
Two types of qualitative technique were used in this study, interviews and focus 
groups. Interviews are considered acceptable in the positivist paradigm when the 





considered qualitative (Patton, 2002). Patton (2002, p. 324) categorises qualitative 
interviews into three types: the informal conversational interview, the general 
interview guide approach, and the standardised open-ended interview. In this 
research, the standardised open-ended interview was used, as this method had 
several qualities relevant to this study. Patton (2002, p. 346) gives four main 
reasons for using the standardised open-ended interview: 
 
1. The exact instrument used in the evaluation is available for inspection by those 
who will use the findings of the study. 
 
2. Variation among interviewers can be minimized where a number of different 
interviewers must be used. 
  
3. The interview is highly focused so that interviewee time is used efficiently. 
 
4. Analysis is facilitated by making responses easy to find and compare.  
 
From the realist perspective, the issue of a more structured analysis and the 
possibility of evaluation both play a big part in the choice of interview type. 
However, the question of interviewee time had the most influence on the choice in 
this study. It was difficult to get interview time with board members, and it was 
foreseen the researcher would have to work within a time frame of half an hour. 
Board members are hard to hold to the script (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), which 
implied a more structured interview would result in responses to the most questions. 
Guidelines offered by other researchers were followed to a large extent (Fontana 
and Frey, 2000; Huberman and Miles, 2002; Saunders et al., 2003). 
 
A focus group interview is an interview on a specific topic with a small group of 
people (Patton, 2002). It is a research technique that collects data through group 
interaction on a topic determined by the researcher (Morgan and Piercy, 1996). The 
topics are narrowly focused, usually seeking reactions to something (a product, 
program, or shared experience), rather than exploring complex life issues in depth 
and detail (Patton, 2002). Originating in marketing, the focus group has become an 
acceptable method used for various purposes in social science (Fontana and Frey, 
2002). Group interviews have a number of advantages, for instance, low cost, 





guidelines of other researchers were followed (Fontana and Frey, 2000; Madriz, 
2000).  
 
Qualitative methods were used (a) prior to the research design, (b) during the 
research design, and (c) in the aftermath, when the results from the survey had been 
analysed. The three steps are described briefly. 
 
First, although the research design is based on a literature survey, it must be 
acknowledged this researcher was influenced by other means. During the research 
process, several interviews with board members, mostly chairmen, were carried out 
to gain an understanding of the subject. Some of these have already been published 
as interviews without any special analysis in a semi-scientific magazine (Jonsson, 
2003; 2003b; 2004; 2005b; 2005c), and others have served as the basis for papers 
published in international journals (Jonsson, 2005; 2006; 2006b; 2007; Jonsson and 
Taman, 2006). Others, while transcribed, have not been used in any publication. 
The number of people interviewed is around thirty. It is possible or even probable 
these interviews have in some way shaped the views of the researcher and therefore 
the choice of research design. However, these interviews are not considered in any 
other way as part of this thesis. The reason is partly practical, as it would expand 
the thesis to an unreasonable length and complicate it. More importantly, the 
interviews were never considered as part of this thesis from a methodological 
perspective, but were conducted to gain a broader understanding of corporate 
governance and its implications. That being said, it would be wrong to conceal the 
fact these interviews had taken place, as they have added depth to the understanding 
of this researcher for the subject. These interviews will not be discussed in any 
detail in this thesis, although their contribution has been acknowledged.  
 
Secondly, and more importantly, focus groups were used on several occasions 
during the research design to help with the strategy and the structure, as well as to 
increase the validity of the content. The various focus groups emphasised different 
aspects of the validity of the research. Several researchers note focus groups can 
improve the content validity of surveys and their interpretation (Carmines and 





2000; Churchill and Iacobucci, 2002; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). All focus groups 
were steered by Professor Patrick Joynt. Other participants were professors, 
graduated DBA’s and students working towards their DBA degree. The following is 
a short description of the purpose and function of the focus groups. 
 
● August 2005 – Nitterdal, Norway – Focus: Internal validity. 
The focus of the discussion was research design, the research model, and the 
research question. There was also discussion about perceived measures for 
performance as a viable choice for this type of research. The conclusion was the 
research design and the research model were too complicated and needed to be 
simplified, for the purpose of operationalisation.   
 
● August 2006 – Nitterdal, Norway – Focus: External validity.  
The discussion was about the sample and sampling approach. The conclusion of the 
discussion was the target population of Icelandic SMEs was not a problem, as it 
would represent a major European study outside the UK and a contribution in itself. 
There were concerns about the sampling approach, as random sampling was not 
possible because of database problems. A comment was made ‘researchers need to 
do with what they can get’ and be pragmatic. It was argued the study should 
emphasise it was exploratory in nature.   
 
● September 2006 – Wisconsin, USA – Focus: Construct validity.  
The discussion was about operationalisation and measurement. The discussion 
concluded it was not clear whether some of the proposed instruments measured the 
concepts they were supposed to. Some instruments were criticised for not being 
rigorous enough. Furthermore, it was argued instruments outside the corporate 
governance literature, especially within the top management team and leadership 
literature, could be considered and adapted if they were better measuring tools. As a 









● February 2007 – Nitterdal, Norway – Focus: Conclusion validity. 
There was discussion of the preliminary findings from the questionnaire. The 
conclusion was the results were very promising and could make an interesting 
contribution to the corporate governance discussion.  
 
Furthermore, a group of individuals was used on two occasions for revision. During 
the development of the questionnaire, the draft of the questionnaire was sent to 
Professor Patrick Joynt at Henley Management College, Professor Bernard Taylor 
at Henley Management College, Doctor Caspar Rose at Copenhagen Business 
School, and Doctor Steven Tanner. The final revision of the questionnaire was sent 
to five Icelandic professionals, who are described in more detail in section 3.3.8. 
Furthermore, several professors and doctors (Professor Pat Joynt, Professor Bernard 
Taylor, Professor Thrainn Eggertsson, Professor Gudmundur Magnusson, Dr. Per 
Olaf Brett, Dr. Jonas Gabrielsson) were asked to revise and reflect on the final draft 
of the thesis.  
 
Thirdly, open-ended questions were sent to respondents, after the survey had been 
completed, so as to increase the validity of the results. Several authors note such 
triangulation enhances the conclusion validity (for example Jick, 1979; Curran and 
Downing, 1989; Bickman and Rog, 1997; Scandura and Williams, 2000). The result 
of this process is described in Chapter 4.  
 
Qualitative approaches, for example interviews and focus groups, were used 
throughout the research process to gain understanding and increase the validity of 
the research. These were used only for support, not as the main research method, for 
which a quantitative approach was used.  
 
3.1.5.2  The quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach of this study revolves around the survey method. 
Churchill (1995) emphasises research design should stem from the problem. The 
problem formulation, presented in Chapter 1, focused on the relationship between 
the board of directors and organisational performance. To include the process-based 





from those working with or within the board. As the study was based on the 
paradigm of realism, the survey method was used, which made it possible to 
address the thesis on a grander scale than any qualitative technique.  
 
There are three types of research design, according to the classification of Churchill 
(1995, p. 128): exploratory research, descriptive research, and causal research. The 
focus of exploratory research is the discovery of ideas and insights. Descriptive 
research is typically concerned with the frequency of which something occurs, or 
the relationship between two variables. Causal research tries to determine cause-
and-effect relationships. Churchill (1995) notes, moreover, any given study may 
serve several purposes. If problem formulation does indeed determine the research 
approach, this study would represent causal research, as the focus here is to show a 
positive relationship between the board of directors and organisational performance. 
The relationship between the three types of research design is important in the 
context of this study, and needs to be explored further. Churchill’s (1995, p. 129) 
depiction of the relationship between the three types of research design is shown in 
figure 3.1.4.  
 








Adapted from Churchill (1995, p. 129).  
 
Doctoral research is always exploratory in part, as the purpose of the literature 
review is to clarify concepts and identify relevant hypotheses for study (Churchill, 
1995). This is often seen as the initial step in research (Churchill, 1995). In this 





concepts in the literature (Heuvel et al., 2006, Lubatkin, 2007). On the other hand, 
the main emphasis of the study is to find a relationship between two variables, the 
goal of causal research. Causal research is a misnomer, as Churchill (1995) and 
Popper (2002) point out, as the scientific notion holds although causality may be 
inferred, it can never be demonstrated conclusively. The purpose of this study is to 
infer relationship between variables rather than causality (Churchill, 1995). This 
can be accomplished by three means: concomitant variation, time order of 
occurrence of variables, and elimination of other possible causal factors (Churchill, 
1995). As the purpose of this study is to find a relationship between the board of 
directors and organisational performance, this discussion is very important. The 
argument is for a time order of occurrence between the variables, as organisational 
performance is the effect of decisions taken by the board and management. 
However, the purpose of the study was not to trace the effects of specific decisions 
which could show the time order of occurrences. Rather, the purpose was to find 
concomitant variation through multivariate analysis, in order to show how the 
variables vary together (Churchill, 1995). Furthermore, some effort, with the use of 
control variables and partly controlled settings, was made to eliminate other factors 
which could influence the relationship. The rules for Icelandic boards eliminate the 
influences of joint CEO/chairmen and executive directors on the relationship 
between the two variables. Furthermore, the external variables of company size, 
industry, and ownership were used as control variables. It is hard to show causation 
by such means, except in a laboratory setting, which would decrease the external 
validity of the study. Such experiments in causation are usually related to the 
positivist paradigm (Churchill, 1995).  
 
The survey method is classified in research design as descriptive (Churchill, 1995). 
It is a method used for relativist or realist studies (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002), and 
often referred to as a ‘sample survey,’ because sample elements are typically 
selected to be representative of some known universe (Churchill, 1995). The ideal 
sampling procedure is random sampling of a wide population. However, this luxury 
is often not plausible, and the researcher may then need other sampling techniques, 
and often non-probability techniques, to do the job. This is the case in this study, as 




















Adapted from Churchill (1995, p. 69).  
 
A narrow target population, and a sampling approach based on convenience and 
judgment, makes generalisation of the study difficult, if not impossible. The results 
are, however, representative of the population. It is therefore hard to argue this 
study is purely causal or descriptive by design, although a rigorous approach to 
those designs was followed. This study is more exploratory by nature than causal or 
descriptive, according to the literature about theories, models and concepts, which 
is rather ambiguous. It is therefore argued this is an exploratory study, the initial 
step in a set of broader future studies, and to a great extent follows the research 
process outlined by Churchill (1995, p. 69) (figure 3.1.5).      
 
The first chapter of this thesis sets the stage and formulates the problem. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 and the first section of this chapter helped to 
determine the research design. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the data 
collection and sample method. Chapter 4 examines the results, analysing and 
interpreting the data. The main techniques for analysis were factor analysis and 
multivariate analysis, described in more detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The survey method is used as the quantitative approach in this study. It is a mixture 





exploratory by nature. The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the survey 
method. 
 
3.1.6 The methodological approach 
This section focuses on methodology in a wider context than usually discussed in a 
DBA thesis. It represents the background discussion to previous and later sections 
of this thesis, and argues from a methodological perspective for the research 
approach. The paradigm of choice is realism, based on positivism, and is 
exploratory in nature. The theoretical perspective is multi-theoretical with the focus 
on agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and stakeholder 
theory. The model is based on concepts related to the board of directors and 
organisational performance. The former was conceptualised from three different 
perspectives: composition, roles, and process of the board. Composition was based 
on a structural view of the board, while roles and process were described from a 
process-based view. There were four main variables: one dependent variable for 
organisational performance, and three independent variables for the board of 
directors. The research primarily uses the survey method, although with the aid of 







3.2 Operationalisation  
 
If there is some precision, there is some science. 
     
Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1903) 
 
 
Construct validity is discussed in this section. It concerns the operationalisation of 
concepts and the issue of how to quantify or measure them. It is about precision, or 
rather more about limiting error (Hair et al., 2003). This is a process mostly related 
to positivism, often called instrumentalism (Popper, 1994). The purpose is to decide 
how to measure the concepts under investigation (Churchill, 1991). It is a process of 
finding or designing appropriate instruments to measure quantitatively the reality or 
facts researched (Comte, 1853). The process is necessary to make the survey 
instrument.  
 
Figure 3.2.1: The outline of the operationalisation section. 
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This section presents a general discussion of the approach to operationalisation used 
in this thesis (figure 3.2.1). Operationalisation of the concepts related to the board 
of directors is discussed next, and then organisational performance. The section is 






3.2.1 Approach to operationalisation 
Popper (2002, p. 82) states the process of defining theoretical concepts in terms of 
measuring operations is often taken as a ‘given.’ Operationalisation is a concept 
most often used in association with positivism (Popper, 1994). As Popper (2002, p. 
82) notes, no ‘general theory’ of measurement exists which describes the function 
of operationalisation for testing scientific theory. However, the process can be 
described in a few simple steps, compiled here from various sources (Churchill, 
1991; Hair et al., 2006; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, Wacker, 2004). These are:  
- Identify predictors in the literature. 
- Evaluate the importance/feasibility of predictors. 
- Identify possible instruments capturing measuring predictors/constructs. 
- Modify instrument if necessary. 
- Alternatively: Develop new instrument following standard procedures. 
 
The concepts suitable as predictors were identified in the literature review. The 
following sections take this discussion a step further, and examine the importance 
or feasibility of these predictors. The implications of the structural-based view and 
the process-based view of the board were outlined in previous chapters. However, 
there is some truth to the claim the process of conceptualisation is not very robust in 
empirical research (Wacker, 2004). This has been acknowledged as being one of the 
most critical limitations of corporate governance research (Heuvel et al., 2006). The 
conceptualisation is a priori to operationalisation (Wacker, 2004). ‘Bad’ formal 
conceptual definition can cause logical inconsistency and lead to conceptual 
difficulties such as (a) unclear measures, (b) definitional overlap, and (c) loss of 
causality (Wacker, 2004, p. 633). It is acknowledged this is important, although the 
approach adopted in this study is to rely on previous conceptualisation in the 
literature. A more in-depth examination of conceptualisation is perhaps a topic for 
future research.  
 
An important part of operationalisation is to identify appropriate instruments to 
measure the concepts used in the hypothesis. The ideal instrument would need very 
little modification, have been widely used and tested, and have high internal 





for any measurement (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Kline, 1994). 
The development of a new instrument was beyond the scope of the thesis, and 
would increase methodological complications.  It is very complex and challenging 
to establish an instrument with enough construct validity to be useful (Cronbach 
and Meehl, 1955). Basing the questionnaire on previously-used measures can 
maximize reliability and validity (Churchill, 1991; Hair et al., 2006). Alternatively, 
if appropriate instruments were not found in corporate governance literature, top 
management team and leadership literature might also be explored, as boards of 
directors can fall within the realm of those fields as well (for example Eisenhardt, 
1989; Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996). Although this approach has been criticised 
on the grounds construct validity may not be transferable between different 
situations (Peter and Churchill, 1986), it is certainly more rigorous than developing 
new instruments from scratch.  
 
Special procedures apply when scales are borrowed. Engelland et al. (1999) identify 
four requirements: (1) domain definitions must be appropriate, (2) experts should be 
used to improve content validity, (3) scales developed before 1989 should be 
avoided due to validity and reliability concerns, and (4) scales should only be 
subject to ‘modest’ refinement.  This guideline is followed in this section. Scales 
that do not report validity and reliability should also be avoided (Churchill and 
Peter, 1984; Engelland et al., 1999). Most of these requirements were followed, as 
the domain definition of the top management team and leadership literature were 
considered to be appropriate. The focus group in Wisconsin 2006 did discuss 
adaptation of the measure to increase construct validity, and none of the scales was 
developed before 1989. Furthermore, only ‘modest’ refinements were necessary, 
and only scales reporting their validity and reliability were used. Adapting scales 
from other disciplines addresses criticism of previous research on corporate 
governance about the lack of tested and validated measurement tools (Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2003; Larcker et al., 2004). 
 
The basic research model proposed in Section 2.8 was developed from three 
different approaches (composition, process, and roles) to measuring the influence of 





is some concern associated with this model, as the classification of variables is not 
based on taxonomy, but rather on unclear typology. It can only be tested by 
exploratory research design. The concepts in the model are explored in the 
framework for operationalisation in the remainder of this section.   
 
3.2.2 The Board of directors 
The concept of board of directors can be conceptualised and measured from 
different perspectives. Three different but related perspectives were proposed for 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the board: composition, process, and 
roles. The roles of the board are the main focus of this study, as they have been used 
widely to conceptualise boards (for example Zahra and Pearce, 1989, Johnson et al., 
1996, Heuvel et al., 2006). Composition of the board has been used most frequently 
for convenience, with references to the structural-based view of the board (Bøhren 
and Ødegaard, 2003). There has been increased effort in the literature to look at 
processes of the board, not necessarily related to specific tasks, as in roles of the 
board (Kiel and Nicholson, 2004, Huse, 2005). It should be noted, however, there is 
no agreement on definition of the concepts or their measurement (Larcker et al., 
2004; Heuvel et al., 2006) as emphasised in the literature review. This implies the 
task of operationalisation must rely on the subjective judgment of the researcher, 
and the few instruments validated in the literature.  
 
The following subsections are divided into (1) tasks of the board – monitoring, 
resource, and advice role, (2) tasks of the board – strategy, (3) power of the board – 
authority, (4) processes of the board, and (5) composition of the board.  
 
3.2.2.1 Tasks of the board – monitoring, resource, and advice roles 
In terms of roles as tasks, boards have been conceptualised widely in the literature, 
although there is little agreement on either the tasks or the roles, as noted in the 
literature review. Several authors have discussed tasks of the board in conceptual 
terms (for example, Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). There is even less consensus about operationalisation of the roles of 
the board (Heuvel et al., 2006), as researchers develop measures based on their own 





based on single-item variables (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003; Larcker et al., 2004). 
However, there are some examples of multi-item instruments used to measure roles 
of the board in terms of tasks (table 3.2.1).  
 
Table 3.2.1: Examples of measures of board roles. 





2 factors, 14 items. 
7 point Likert scale. 
.72-.96 Judge and Zeithaml (1992). 
Strategic 
involvement 
3 factors, 10 items. 
5 point scale. 
.83-.92 Carpenter and Westphal (2001). 
Roles in SMEs 2 factors, 11 items. 
5 point scale. 
.78 – .83 Heuvel et al. (2006). 
Board power 1 factor, 15 items. 
6 point scale. 
.79-.86 Zahra and Pearce (1991). 
 
The operationalisation of Heuvel et al. (2006) was the most recent study found at 
the time this study was operationalised. Their eleven tasks are based on a series of 
studies (Zahra and Pearce, 1992; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Johnson et al., 
1996; Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Heuvel et al. (2006) was 
chosen as a starting point for the operationalisation of roles. The two factors in their 
study were the ‘control’ role, and ‘service’ role. Furthermore, operationalisation of 
the ‘monitoring role’ and ‘advice role’ from Carpenter and Westphal (2001) were 
considered to broaden the measurement, although there was some duplication 
between the scales. The measurements of Judge and Zeithaml (1992) were also 
considered, although they did not influence the final design of the instrument. The 
merged scale was considered to represent, at least partly, the monitoring role, 
resource role, and the advice role identified in the literature. As there were concerns 
about misrepresentation of the complexities of the strategic role, it was decided to 
adapt an instrument from another discipline to measure that role, as discussed in 
section 3.2.3.2. The items directly emphasising the active strategic role are included 
in the next subsection. The instrument used in this study consisted of 10 items to 






5.15  The board determines management’s responsibility.13  
5.16  The board monitors top management strategic decision-making.  
5.17  The board formally evaluates the CEO’s performance.  
5.18  The board defers to the CEO’s judgment on final strategic decisions.  
5.19  The board determines salary/compensation of CEO and top management 
 team. 
5.20  The CEO solicits board assistance in the formulation of corporate strategy.  
5.21  Directors are a “sounding board” on strategic issues.  
5.22  The board provides advice and counsel to the CEO on strategic issues.  
5.23  The board builds organisational reputation.  
5.24 The board focuses on networking and maintaining relations with 
stakeholders of the company. 
5.25  The board provides access to extra resources. 
 
 
The instrument for measuring the monitoring, resource, and advice roles of the 
board here, was based on two studies (Heuvel et al., 2006; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001), both of which developed their instruments from several qualitative and 
empirical studies. By combining them it was possible to include tasks in this study 
that represent three conceptually different roles of the board.  
 
 
3.2.3.2 Tasks of the board – Strategic role 
Several researchers have discussed the strategic role of the board (Andrews, 1984; 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Daily et al., 2003; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Shen, 2003). Most used a single 
item measure. This study intended to measure the complex concept of strategy, so a 
search for an appropriate measurement instrument was conducted in other 
disciplines, as recommended by the focus group in Wisconsin 2006. The search 
within top management team literature and leadership literature resulted in several 








                                                 





Table 3.2.2: Possible measures for the strategic role. 
  
Instrument Items Reliability/ 
alpha 
References 
EXCEL 8 attributes 16 items. 
7 point Likert scale. 
.89 Sharma et al. (1990) used by Caruana et 
al. (1995). 
PILOT 4 factors 60 items. 
5 point scale leads to a 1 
of 6 classification. 
Not given Prabhu and Robson (2000). 
Leadership 
excellence 
6 factors 18 items. 
10 point scale. 
.74 – .98 Kanji (2002) as used by Kanji and Sá 
(2001) and Sá and Kanji (2003). 
Leadership 1 factor covering 
leadership with 5 items. 
7 point scale. 





1 factor 1 item at ‘Core 
concept’ level. 
24 potential items at 
‘Areas to address’ level. 
Not used EFQM (1999). 
Adapted from Tanner (2005). 
 
The Kanji (2002) Leadership Excellence instrument was chosen, as it reflects 
strategic formulation from the perspective of the strategic planning school. It had 
been used in other doctoral research at Henley Management College (for example, 
Tanner, 2005). The instrument adapted from Kanji (2002) has 18 items and six 
factors. As the instrument was developed for leadership research, four items were 
dismissed, as they were questions about leadership excellence. Otherwise, there was 
only need of minor changes in the instrument, substituting the word ‘leader’ for the 
word ‘board,’ and changing the scale from 10 points to 7 points. These changes are 
discussed in detail in Section 3.3. The instrument covered items used by other 
researchers in the field of corporate governance. The adapted instrument was 
categorised into four factors: organisational values, vision, mission, and strategy. 
The instrument used in this study was based on the following items: 
5.1  The board develops shared meanings and interpretations of reality. 
5.2  The board uses the organisational values to guide decision-making. 
5.3  The board puts in place reinforcement systems consistent with organisational 
values and principles. 
5.4   The board creates a compelling vision of the future of the organisation.  





5.6   The board inspires confidence in the vision.  
5.7   The board identifies the organisation’s purpose.  
5.8   The board generates commitment among organisational members for the            
chosen purpose.  
5.9   The board keeps the mission current.  
5.10  The board develops policies and strategies consistent with the organisation’s 
mission, vision, and values.  
5.11   The board anticipates change.  
5.12   The board guides change.  
5.13   The board monitors resources and uses feedback to review strategies.  
5.14  The board monitors organisational performance and uses feedback to          
review strategies. 
 
The instrument for measuring the strategic role of the board used in this study was 
based on understanding a broad measure would give a richer picture of the 
relationship between boards of directors and organisational performance. The 
purpose of using a broad measure for the strategy role was to demonstrate greater 
construct validity in regard to the strategic role, as well as to learn more about this 
role of the board from an exploratory perspective. The instrument was adapted from 
Kanji (2002) and Kanji and Sá (2001).  
 
3.2.3.3 Power of the board – Authority 
One of the instruments considered as a measure of board roles, was the one used by 
Zahra and Pearce (1991). This instrument was developed to measure the authority 
or power of the board, compared to the CEO (Zahra and Pearce, 1991). The 
instrument is interesting nevertheless, as items on the scale are closely related to 
items of task measurement. The instrument of Zahra and Pearce (1991) was based 
on several descriptive studies of the board (e.g. Andrews, 1987; Boulton, 1978; 
Henke, 1986; Louden, 1975; Mace, 1971; Mintzberg, 1983; Mueller, 1979) and was 
a viable alternative to measuring roles as tasks. It was decided to include the 
instrument as a kind of contingency strategy if the roles as tasks measure did not 
prove valid. This approach was supported by the focus group in Wisconsin 2006. 
Furthermore, other scales were also adapted from the Zahra and Pearce (1991) 
study, as discussed below, making potential comparison with the original study 








3.1 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding changing 
company by-laws. 
3.2 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding approving 
changes in capital structure.  
3.3 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions about 
capital expenditures. 
3.4 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions about 
future divestments.  
3.5 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions about 
future acquisitions. 
3.6 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding establishing 
long-term goals. 
3.7 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding policy 
formation. 
3.8 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding planning for top 
leadership succession. 
3.9 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding selecting a new 
CEO. 
3.10 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding evaluating the 
performance of key executives (other than CEOs). 
3.11 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding selection of 
corporate strategy. 
3.12 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions to 
adopt new technologies. 
3.13  How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions 
regarding top executives’ compensation. 
3.14  How much formal authority or power has the board regarding decisions 
regarding charitable contribution. 
3.15  How much formal authority or power has the board regarding dealing with 
stakeholders.   
 
 
The instrument for measuring the authority of the board compared to the CEO was 
adapted as a contingency plan and for a wider understanding of the board from an 
exploratory perspective. The instrument was adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1991).  
 
3.2.3.4 Processes of the board 
Different perspectives and approaches have been used for what Zahra and Pearce 
(1989) called ‘board processes.’ As noted in the literature review, Dulewicz et al. 
(1995; 1995b) emphasise ‘organising and running the board,’ Nicholson and Kiel 
(2004) ‘board intellectual capital,’ and Forbes and Milliken (1999) ‘effort norms,’ 
‘cognitive conflict,’ and ‘use of knowledge and skills.’ The three models treat what 
can be described as board ‘processes’ from very different perspectives. If there was 





processes, other than specific tasks of the board. This made the process of 
operationalisation grim, and it was debated whether any effort to operationalise 
processes, in terms other than ‘tasks,’ should be abandoned. However, it was 
decided to include some items to measure processes of the board other than tasks to 
add richness to the study from an exploratory perspective. As the main conceptual 
and theoretical framework of this study was the intergraded model provided by 
Zahra and Pearce (1989), an argument could be made to use the framework to guide 
the operationalisation process. Indeed, Zahra and Pearce (1991) did operationalise 
some of the concepts they had emphasised in their 1989 literature review. The three 
instruments adapted for this study were board efficiency (Cronbach alpha of .78), 
board decision process (Cronbach alpha of .81) and board decision style (Cronbach 
alpha of .77). The items of the instruments were the following. 
 
Board efficiency 
2.1  Thoroughness of deliberation.  
2.2  Frequency and length of meetings.  
2.3  Board’s organisation.  
(The measurement is a seven-point scale from poor to excellent). 
 
Board decision process 
2.4  Board’s decision process is slow/quick.  
2.5  Board’s decision process is uninformed/informed.  
2.6  Board’s decision process is impulsive/deliberate. 
 
Board decision style 
2.7 In dealing with the CEO, the board is regressive/progressive.  
2.8 In dealing with the CEO, the board is timid/aggressive.  
2.9 In dealing with the CEO, the board is hostile/friendly.  
2.10  In dealing with the CEO, the board is discouraging/encouraging. 
2.11  In dealing with the CEO, the board is supportive/non-supportive. 
 
Furthermore, as noted in the literature review, there has been increased interest in 
the information flow to the board (Coffee, 2006). Although item 2.5 in the decision 
process does address information, it was decided to add another instrument to 
measure information flow to the board. The instrument chosen, which directly 
addressed information flow to the board, came from the study of Lervik et al. 





Norway, and consisted of five items constructed as one factor. Although the 
Cronbach alpha was not given for the scale, it was decided to use it anyway, as the 
items seemed logical and a good reflection of the discussion of information flow to 
the board (for example: Drucker, 1974; Coffee, 1977; Coffee, 2006; Jonsson, 2006; 
Jonsson, 2007). The items in the scale were: 
 
2.12  Information flows efficiently in due time to our board members via formal and 
informal channels. 
2.13  Our board members carefully scrutinize information prior to meetings.  
2.14  The board is usually active in finding their own information in addition to the 
reports from management.  
2.15  The board is often asking discerning questions in connection to suggestions 
initiated by management.  
2.16  The board often asks critical questions regarding information presented by the 
management.  
 
The instruments used in this study for measuring the processes of the board were 
based on two studies. Three instruments were adapted from Zahra and Pearce 
(1991) and one instrument from Lervik et al. (2005). The instruments chosen 
focused on the efficiency of the board, decision processes, board decision style, and 
information flow to the board.   
 
3.2.3.5 Composition of the board 
Several researchers have used composition of the board to measure the implications 
of the board on organisational performance. Dalton et al., (1998) found 159 studies 
in a 40-year timeframe. Composition has also been emphasised in studies focusing 
on the ‘process-based view’ of the board (for example Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Johnson et al., 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). 
Some indicators for composition are so familiar in corporate governance research 
they have been dubbed ‘the usual suspects’ (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 
2005). Huse (2005) lists the ‘usual suspects’ as: number of board members, the 
insider/outsider ratio, CEO duality, and directors’ shareholding. The ratio of 
minorities, especially women, could also be included, as several authors list the 
male: female ratio in their discussion of composition (for example, Zahra and 






The context of this study rules out CEO duality and insider/outsider ratio, as usually 
described as the ratio between executives and non-executives. However, four 
classical items were adapted for this study: number of board members, number of 
women on boards, number of independent directors, and the shareholding of the 
chairman. The independence of directors was determined according to the Icelandic 
corporate governance code, indicating an independent director has no financial, 
family, or business connection to the company.  
 
In short, composition of the board was operationalised in accordance with previous 
studies, where it is mainly an issue of counting people on the board. Three one-item 
scales were adapted to ascertain the number of people on the board, number of 
women on the board, and number of independent directors on the board.    
 
 
3.2.3 Company performance 
Research within the corporate governance field has focused mostly on financial 
measures based on secondary data for performance, like Tobin’s Q, for example 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003; Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2003). This approach was dismissed for this study, because of the 
context of the research, and narrow focus of these measures.  
 
Performance is a common dependent variable in research on strategy and structure 
(Dess and Robinson, 1984). The use of organisational performance raises a number 
of concerns, such as instability of performance advantage, oversimplification using 
simple models in a complex world, and retrospect recall (March and Sutton, 1997). 
Performance is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon (Dess and Robinson, 
1984; March and Sutton, 1997). As noted in the literature review, the mix of 
appropriate performance measures has been found to vary according to industry and 
size of business (Maltz et al., 2003).  Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) 
recognised different measures are required for different studies, and defined three 
domains: financial performance, financial and operational performance, and 
organisational effectiveness. Brett (2000) classifies organisational performance 
from a philosophical perspective: survival performance, excellence performance, 





performance have taken a broader view of performance measures than done in 
corporate governance research. For example, Fitzgerald et al. (1991) suggest a 
measurement framework with ‘results’ and ‘determinants.’  Results include 
financial performance and competitiveness, while determinants include quality, 
flexibility, resource utilisation, and innovation. Hart and Banbury (1994) and Kanji 
(2002) have also developed broad measures for organisational performance. The 
issue of organisational performance has received much interest from DBA students 
at Henley Management College, who have used and developed broad measures for 
measuring organisational performance (for example, Brett, 2000; Lindgren, 2001; 
Tanner, 2005; Larsen, 2007). Some of the most common instruments for measuring 
performance are found in table 3.2.3.  
 
The Hart and Banbury (1994) measure was used as a basis for the performance 
measure, as it has been widely used in research, and applied and developed by DBA 
students at Henley Management College (Lindgren, 2001; Tanner, 2005). The 
search continued for a broader measurement of performance, as it was not clear in 
what way boards of directors influence performance. Tanner (2005) merged three 
interesting measures for performance (e.g. Hart and Banbury, 1994; Kanji, 2002, 
Claver et al., 2003) in his study measuring performance of different stakeholders. 
His approach was largely followed, although a simpler version was constructed. 
 
The instrument for measuring organisational performance, developed by Hart and 
Banbury (1994) and used by Lindgren (2001) and Tanner (2005), is a five-factor 
instrument with 13 items. The factors are: current profit, growth/share, future 
position, quality, and social responsiveness. Kanji’s (2002) measure for 
performance is one factor with seven items. Furthermore, Claver et al. (2003) use a 
four-factor measure with 17 items. The factors are: customer satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction, social impact, and TQM performance. Tanner (2005) used all three 









Table 3.2.3: Instruments for measuring performance. 
Instrument Items Reliability/ alpha References 
Financial measures (for 
example, Profitability, 
Shareprice, Tobins Q, 
ROI, ROE, etc.) 
Ratio of total income to 
total assets 
 
Not applicable (not 
self-reported) 
McConnell and Servaes, 
1990; Yermack, 1996; 
Carter et al., 2003; 




5 factors 13 items 




Hart and Banbury (1994) 




Subjective and objective 
data taken at various 








1 factor 7 items 








5 dimensions: Financial, 
Market/ customer, 
Process, People 
development, and Future 
performance 




2 factor, 17 items 
7 point scale 
.82-.89 Bettis and Hitt (1995) as 
used by Lindgren (2001) 
Performance Performance by 
stakeholder 
.802-.91 Hart and Banbury 
(1994); Kanji (2002); 
Claver, Tari et al. (2003) 
as used by Tanner 
(2005) 
Adapted from Tanner (2005) 
 
 
The requirement for the performance measure for this study, other than using tested 
instruments, was that respondents could answer the questions. In the focus group in 
Wisconsin 2006, a concern was raised whether directors could answer questions on 
employee and customer satisfaction, especially considering companies in the 
sample were SMEs, which might not measure such things on a regular basis. 





instruments of Claver et al. (2003) and Tanner (2005). They are partly reflected in 
the instrument of Hart and Banbury (1994), although not emphasised as special 
factors. As Claver et al. (2003) focus on TQM, which is outside the scope of this 
research, the only items adapted from that instrument were items regarding social 
responsibility. Tanner (2005) expanded the focus on social responsibility to a factor 
of 8 items, which was adapted in this study. Social responsibility was emphasised to 
reflect stakeholder theory. Furthermore, to reflect on innovation, four items were 
adapted from Bettis and Hitt (1995). Lindgren (2001) and Tanner (2005) used this 
measure in a different fashion to reflect strategic responsiveness. It was estimated 
the four items from Bettis and Hitt (1995) could add dimension to the performance 
measure. And last, items duplicated in different instruments were deleted. The 
completed operationalisation of organisational performance is reflected in an 
instrument of 27 items based on Hart and Banbury (1994), Kanji (2002), Claver, 
Tari et al. (2003), Bettis and Hitt (1995) and Tanner (2005).  
 
The instrument used in this study included the following items: 
4.1 Develops policies to reduce and prevent health and safety risks. 
4.2 Develops policies to protect the environment. 
4.3 Is actively involved in the local community. 
4.4 Is well respected by the local community. 
4.5 Is environmentally responsible. 
4.6 Develops the local economy. 
4.7 Follows sustainability (corporate and social responsibility) policies.  
4.8 Has a diverse workforce. 
4.9 Has a strong financial performance. 
4.10 Achieves its goals. 
4.11 Has achieved the desired service and/or product outcomes. 
4.12 Has a high competitive position. 
4.13 Has high profitability. 
4.14 Has a positive cash flow. 
4.15 Will seek to diversify in the marketplace. 
4.16 Will change its existing products and services. 
4.17 Will introduce new services and/or products next year. 
4.18 Will have an active services and/or product development programme. 
4.20 Has a positive sales growth. 
4.21 Has an increasing market share. 
4.22 Has a high standard of quality in service and/or products. 
4.23 Has high employee satisfaction. 
4.24 Sense potential threats (legislative, political, technological, competitive, 
customer demands, etc.) 





4.26 Reconfigure resources and implement necessary changes to meet threats. 
4.27 Sense new business or technological opportunities. 
  
The instrument constructed to measure organisational performance used in this 
study was based on the position a broad measure would give a richer picture of the 
relationship between boards of directors and organisational performance. The 
instrument was based on the work of several researchers (Hart and Banbury, 1994; 
Kanji, 2002; Claver et al., 2003; Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Tanner, 2005). 
 
3.2.4 Construct validity 
The operationalisation process has in essence been about the construct validity of 
the research. The board of directors and organisational performance were 
operationalised from concepts and instruments found in the literature. The 
implications of the board of directors were measured from three different 
perspectives: (1) Roles as tasks (the monitoring role, resource role, and the advisory 
role) were measured using instruments developed by Heuvel et al. (2006) and 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001). Furthermore, an instrument for the strategic role 
was adapted from Kanji (2002). As an alternative, to measure the role of the board 
an instrument was adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1991). The instrument measured 
authority of the board compared to authority of the CEO. (2) The processes of the 
board were operationalised with instruments from Zahra and Pearce (1991) and 
Johannisson and Huse (2000). The concepts were: board efficiency, board decision 
process, board decision style, and information flow to the board. (3) The concept of 
composition was operationalised with board size, women on boards, and 
independence of directors, all single-item measures adapted from various sources 
(e.g. Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Carpenter and Westphal, 2001). Organisational performance, on the other hand, was 
operationalised by merging several instruments, following Tanner (2005) to a large 
extent. The instruments used to operationalise organisational performance were 
from Hart and Banbury (1994), Kanji (2002), Claver et al. (2003) and Bettis and 
Hitt (1995). By adapting instruments developed and validated by other researchers, 
and published in refereed journals, the construct validity of the survey tool was 







3.3 Survey instrument 
It is better to know some of the questions than all of the answers.  
 
James Thurber (1894 – 1961) 
 
 
This section discusses the questionnaire, or the survey instruments. It is about 
deciding questions to ask and the presentation of those questions. A questionnaire is 
a predetermined set of questions designed to capture data from respondents (Hair et 
al., 2003). It is a scientifically developed instrument to measure key characteristics 
under investigation (Hair et al., 2003).  
 
There are several approaches to designing a questionnaire (for example, Leedy, 
1989; Bell, 1993; Huber and Van de Ven, 1995; Bryman and Cramer, 1997).  
Churchill’s (1995, p. 360) nine-step procedure is one of the most recommended 
(figure 3.3.1). This section uses Churchill’s structure, keeping in mind the design of 
a questionnaire is still more of an art than a science, and guidelines should not be 
taken literally (Churchill, 1995, p. 359).  
 
Figure 3.3.1: The outline of the survey method section. 
  3.1. Methodology
in a wider context
  3.2.
Operationalisation
  3.3. Survey
instrument
  3.4. Sampling
and data gathering
3.3.1. Specify what information will be sought
3.3.2. Determine type of questionnaire
and method of administration
3.3.3. Determine content of individual questions
3.3.4. Determine the form of response to each
question
3.3.5. Determine the sequence of questions
3.3.6. Determine the wording of each question
3.3.7. Determine the physical characteristics of
questionnaire
3.3.8. Re-examine steps 1-7 and revise as
necessary
3.3.9. Pre-test questionnaire and revise if
necessary
 







3.3.1 Step 1: Specify what information will be sought  
Deciding what information will be sought is easy if researchers have been 
meticulous and precise early in the research process (Churchill, 1995). This means 
the right concepts have been established, and the process of operationalisation has 
chosen proper instrument to measure those concepts. This preparation makes 
information-gathering fairly simple.  
 
This study is about the relationship between boards of directors and organisational 
performance. The concept of performance, the dependent variable of the study, was 
operationalised using an instrument based on Hart and Banbury (1994), Kanji 
(2002) and Claver et al. (2003), in a fashion similar to Lindgren (2001), and Tanner 
(2005). A broad measure of performance was chosen, to explore which elements of 
organisational performance relate to boards. The result of this decision was a 27-
item performance measure.  
 
The board of directors was conceptualised from three perspectives: roles, 
composition, and process. The role of the board was conceptualised from two 
different perspectives: as tasks, and in terms of authority. The latter was proposed 
as a contingency plan if boards as tasks proved problematic or gave no results. The 
instrument to operationalise authority was adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1991). 
Conceptualising and operationalising the role of the board as tasks was more 
difficult. Most of the items were adapted from Heuvel et al. (2006) and Westphal 
and Carpenter (2001). The strategy section, however, was expanded considerably 
from most previous research on corporate governance, by borrowing an instrument 
from the leadership literature adapted from Kanji (2002). The result of this 
approach was a 15-item instrument for measuring the authority of the board, and a 
25-item instrument for measuring tasks of the board, including strategy.  There 
were four process features. Three (effectiveness, style, and decision) were adapted 
from Zahra and Pearce (1991), while the fourth, the concept of information, was 
adapted from Lervik et al. (2005). Composition was based on single-item 
instruments been used in several other studies (Zahra and Pearce, 1991; Carpenter 






1. Board roles as tasks 
- Strategic role 
- Monitoring role 
- Resource role 
- Advice role 





Other information was also gathered, although not considered part of this study, to 
conduct future research. This was done because of the difficulty gaining access to 
boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), and an opportunity to gather as much information 
as possible, without undermining the main research purpose. Only a few items were 
added, as the length of the questionnaire was an important issue and limited what 
information could be sought.   
 
3.3.2 Step 2: Type of questionnaire and method of administration 
While the first step in Churchill’s questionnaire process concerns what information 
is to be sought, the second step is about how it will be gathered. Churchill and 
Iacobucci (2002) describe this step as a question of structure and disguise on the 
one hand, and how it is to be administered on the other hand. The two hands are 
interrelated, as decisions about one approach guide the other.  
 
This research follows in the footsteps of prior research in this field, taking notice of 
the implications of doing research on the black box of boards of directors (Stiles 
and Taylor, 2001). Given the time constraints and level of secrecy at the top 
management level, a structured and undisguised questionnaire was designed. This a 
common recommendation in the research methodology literature for these situations 
(Bailey, 1982; Leedy, 1993) It is also the common approach in the field, as 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) note in their overview of empirical articles where 
primary data had been collected. As a result, the goal was to make the questionnaire 
as simple as possible to answer, following the advice of Hair et al., (2003). A ‘tick-
box’ format of closed questions was used where possible. This is in line with other 






Several approaches were considered regarding administration of the questionnnaire. 
Given the structured form of a questionnaire had been chosen due to time 
limitations and the cost of research, whether it should better be sent by mail or by e-
mail was the next decision. Several factors influenced the decision: structure, 
response rate, sample size, type of answers, time and cost. The structure of the 
questionnaire suited both methods of distribution, but was especially well suited for 
e-mail. Obtaining the maximum response rate was critical, and a focus group 
discussion of both methods was not conclusive. However, in light of the popularity 
of the internet and e-office in Iceland, the response rate might be expected to be 
higher using e-mail than regular mail. The size of the sample was also a major 
concern. The databases did not have a very comprehensive record of e-mails of 
CEOs and chairmen. On the other hand, company e-mail addresses were available. 
Some CEO e-mail addresses could be gathered from company websites, but very 
few gave e-mail addresses for chairmen. There was no guarantee any questionnaires 
would reach CEOs and chairmen through regular mail addressed to the companies. 
It was not clear whether a larger sample rate via regular mail would lead to more 
responses, although this route could certainly lead to fewer responses. Some 
consideration was given in the focus group as to whether the type of response 
would differ in an e-mail survey from responses to a mail survey. Some speculation 
arose as to whether more thought would be given to a mail survey than an e-mail 
survey. This point was debated, and it was argued general mail survey fatigue, and 
rush to get them “off the desk as soon as possible,” seriously undermined any 
advantage of a mail survey. Respondent time and survey costs turned out to be the 
deciding factors. Calculating all the costs of producing and distributing the surveys 
revealed in the end, the costs of a mail survey would be lower. On the other hand, 
the time saved by using an e-mail survey outweighed the cost.  
 
In conclusion, the e-mail approach was considered much better, as the researcher 
had some understanding of the process and the technology of website surveys. The 
software used was Outcome. Most of the work of typing the survey and 
administering the responses was outsourced to a research assistant. One of the 
issues of an e-mail survey was accountability of answers. The original idea was to 





with finding e-mail addresses for chairmen changed this plan. In an effort to obtain 
responses from chairmen, the CEOs were asked to forward the survey to them. 
However, it was subsequently decided a more simple solution would be to ask the 
respondents to name their company, emphasising the respondents would never be 
directly linked to any other answers. Furthermore, it was stressed if respondents felt 
uncomfortable using the name of their company, the name could be omitted. In an 
effort to increase respondents’ attention, they were also mailed a postcard about the 
survey, and provided a link to the survey. In short, the survey was sent out as an 
electronic survey via e-mail to the CEOs of the companies in the sample.  
 
3.3.3 Step 3: Determine content of individual questions 
In Churchill’s guideline, the first and second steps are about ‘what’ information is 
to be sought and ‘how’ to do so. The third step is to determine the content of the 
questions. In other words, to dig deeper into ‘what’ information is needed and 
‘how’ that information will be sought. The first two steps largely determine the 
third step (Churchill, 1995).  
 
The importance of using tested instruments guided this research, as some criticism 
of previous work in the field of corporate governance had been levelled on this 
account (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2003; Larcker et al., 2004; Heuvel et al., 2006). 
Established instruments to a large extent determine the content of individual 
questions. The principle was to follow the original instruments as closely as 
possible to ensure construct validity, so the process of determining the content of 
individual questions was facilitated. The changes to some of the wording are 
discussed in step five.  
 
Churchill (1995, pp.363-374) discusses four questions in this step: Is the question 
necessary? Are several questions needed instead of one? Do respondents have the 
necessary information? Will respondents give the information? The answer to the 
first question was addressed in the previous section. The instruments chosen were 
considered the best choices available to measure the concepts, which the literature 
suggested as viable, to measure the two main variables of the study: the board of 





would have resulted in different questions. The principle was to stick to the original 
instruments, although it could be argued some of the questions could be better 
constructed. The answer is therefore ‘yes,’ the questions were necessary because 
they were part of the adapted instruments.  
 
The second question asks whether several questions are needed instead of one. The 
principle advantage of tested instruments is they are suited to measure more 
complicated concepts (Hair et al., 2006). However, it is important to examine how 
many items should be in a scale. There is a tendency toward higher reliability and 
lower measurement error when the number of items is increased (Churchill, 1979). 
This is not a very strong relationship, and the greatest differences appear in scales 
between two and three items, and those with more than three. Instruments with 
more than ten items tend have very high coefficients (Peterson, 1994; Foreman and 
Money, 2004). The issue is if the coefficient is higher than .9 it might indicate 
redundancy between items in the scale (Boyle, 1991). In other words, some items 
measure the same thing and therefore could be reduced. Studies did not report on 
the impact of individual items, and therefore it was impossible to determine which 
items should be deleted without actual testing. To answer Churchill’s question, it 
was decided to stick to the number of items suggested in the original instrument if 
they applied to the research.  
 
The third question, whether respondents had the necessary information, is 
important. Both the literature and previous research suggest the best informants of 
board processes are the CEO and directors of the board (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Westphal and Carpenter, 2001; Heuvel et al., 2006). The 
instruments and questions were adapted with that in mind, so questions could be 
easily answered, meaning respondents could answer from the top of their head, and 
would not need to find information in files. In designing the questionnaire, it was 
estimated if both the CEO and chairman of each company answered the 
questionnaire, it would decrease the response bias of having one single informant. 
The revision process tested whether the respondent had the information to answer 







The last question, whether respondents were willing to answer the questions, 
addresses one of the main issues of this research. As noted, access was a problem, 
and the board was considered a black box about which it is hard to get information 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Therefore, it was vital to check whether any questions 
might be considered too delicate for the CEO and chairman to answer. The 
conclusion of an analysing the questions was non-responses would not present a 
problem. This was confirmed in the revision process. The only concern was 
whether some would think disclosing turnover to be an issue. As it was considered a 
delicate matter, the company turnover question was put at the end of the 
questionnaire (Churchill, 1995). The answer to the question of whether respondents 
were willing to answer the questions is therefore positive.   
 
In short, it was not necessary to change the content of individual questions at this 
point, because they had been adapted in the operationalisation process from 
validated instruments. The next step in the process was to consider the responses to 
the questions.  
 
3.3.4 Step 4: Determine form of response to each question 
The form of response was a choice between open-ended questions or fixed-
alternatives (Churchill, 1991). Fixed alternatives could be, for example, dichotomy, 
a multichotomy, or a scale. The main principle in designing this questionnaire was 
to follow the format proposed in the original instrument, and to ensure consistency 
(Hair et al., 2003). In the case of conflict between principles, the simplicity and 
consistency principles were weighted more heavily than retaining the original 
question format, as long as it was theoretically acceptable to change the form of the 
question.  
 
The questions at the beginning and end of the questionnaire about composition of 
the board and organisational context, were open questions, as in the original 
instruments (Zahra and Pearce, 1991; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Lervik et al., 
2005). All other questions were answered on a seven-point scale, which is a 





Lindgren, 2001; Brett, 2000; Tanner 2005). This did not decrease validity, as 
Peterson (1994) notes there is no significant difference between the 5-point and the 
7-point Likert scale. The process part, adapted from Zahra and Pearce (1991), was 
changed from 5 to 7 points. Furthermore, the answer form for authority (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1991) was changed from a 6-point scale to 7-point scale. The scale for the 
strategic role (Kanji, 2002) was originally a 10-point scale. Tanner (2005) modified 
it to a 7-point scale also used in this study.  
 
Another issue about the form of answers is reverse scales. Opinion on reverse scales 
is divided in methodology literature (Churchill and Peter, 1984). Tanner (2005), for 
example, decided to avoid reverse scales in his questionnaire. The original 
instruments used in this thesis did not report the use of any reverse scales. A closer 
look at Zahra and Pearce (1991) scales for decision and style showed one item in 
each of the scales might be based on a reverse scales. However, it was not discussed 
in their paper (Zahra and Pearce, 1991) and so it was decided to retain it in the 
original version, and deal with it at the stage of analysis.   
 
The result of this step in the survey design process was the answer format was fairly 
consistent with the original instruments. However, some of the scales from the 
original instruments were modified for the purpose of consistency and ease of use 
for respondents.  
 
3.3.5 Step 5: Determine wording of each question 
The fifth step of questionnaire design focuses on phrasing each question (Churchill, 
1995). As noted, the questionnaire was based on verified instruments with 
predetermined questions, and the goal was to change those instruments as little as 
possible. The wording was pre-tested and the results of that process are discussed in 
the last step. Two issues need to be discussed as part of this step. One is changing 
the wording to fit the survey to the purpose of this study, and the other is the issue 







Two instruments needed revision with regard to wording of questions. One was the 
adapted instrument for the strategy role (Kanji, 2002), which was originally directed 
toward leaders of companies. The change was minimal, as the only word that did 
not fit this research was the word ‘leader,’ which was substituted by the word 
‘board.’ The argument for so doing was the board can be considered part of the top 
management team and having leadership role (Eisenhardt, 1989; Thomas and 
Ramaswamy, 1996). Furthermore, this was the conclusion of the focus group in 
Wisconsin 2006. The other instrument needing revision was the measurement for 
authority (Zahra and Pearce, 1991). The problem with this instrument was discussed 
in the last section on operationalisation, and was to simplify the use of the 
instrument and ask CEOs and chairmen the same question. This meant the phrase 
‘Compared to the CEO’ needed to be added in the introduction to this section of 
questions. The reviewers of the questionnaire saw no confusion with this wording. 
As is discussed later, the use of ‘formal authority’ from the original instrument was 
questioned. The revision of the wording of the instruments was, therefore, 
considered minor. 
 
A bigger issue was the question of language. Two options were considered: either 
translate the questions into Icelandic, or leave them in English. The problem with 
the first choice was the danger of ‘lost in translation’ error. This would need to be 
addressed by the process of rigorous translation, forwards and backwards, with 
different translators. The problem with English was it was impossible to know 
whether respondents would truly understand the questions, although it may be 
argued respondents should be more or less fluent. This dilemma was solved in the 
focus group in Wisconsin 2006, as a third option emerged, to use both languages, 
with English as the primary language and Icelandic secondary. This solved the 
potential problem of ‘lost in translation,’ and there was no need for reverse 
translation. The comparability of the wording in both languages would be checked 
at the revision stage.  
 
The principle of keeping the original instruments as intact as possible was 





to the wording of questions, and the original language was retained, followed by 
translation into Icelandic.    
 
3.3.6 Step 6: Determine the sequence of questions 
The sequence of questions was not built on any hard-and-fast principles, but rather 
rules-of-thumb for guidance (Churchill, 1995). Some of those rules are (a) use 
simple, interesting opening questions, (b) use a funnel approach, (c) design 
branching questions with care, (d) ask for classification information last, and (e) 
place difficult or sensitive questions late in the questionnaire (Churchill, 1995). 
These rules-of-thumb guided this survey design. 
 
The first section of the questionnaire consisted of simple questions on the 
composition of the board easy enough for everyone to answer and at the same time 
emphasising the focus and the purpose of the study. The funnel approach was also 
considered, meaning to start with broad questions and then go into more detailed 
sections as constructed in the instruments. However, this questionnaire was 
organised into sections addressing different issues and concepts. There were no 
branching questions in the study so the funnel approach was not applied. The 
classification questions and sensitive questions about turnover were kept until the 
end of the questionnaire, as proposed by Churchill (1995).  
 
The rules-of-thumb Churchill (1995) proposed were used to determine the sequence 
of questions in this survey design. There were not many problems in the process as 
it was fairly logical.  
 
3.3.7 Step 7: Determine physical characteristics of questionnaire 
The physical characteristics of the questionnaire were important, as it was an 
electronic survey linked to e-mail, rather than a paper survey. The decision to do so 
was discussed in some detail in step two of the survey design process. 
Questionnaires are increasingly sent out in this format and there are cases of 
doctoral researchers using this approach (for example, Bowd, 2002). The format 
and appearance was identical to a paper survey, and respondents were asked to 





questionnaires used by Brett (2000), Lindgren (2001), Bowd (2002) and Tanner 
(2005) were followed to a large extent.  
 
Several steps were taken to increase the response rate. First, it was emphasised in 
the e-mail sent to the participants, as well as in the follow-up postcard, the research 
was done (a) in association with Henley Management College, (b) in partnership 
with the University of Iceland and Copenhagen Business School, and (c) was 
sponsored by the Icelandic Stock Exchange and the Icelandic Research Fund. 
Secondly, it was emphasised in the text the survey was anonymous, and was so 
guaranteed by the researcher. Thirdly, the first e-mail was followed up with a 
physical postcard and a second e-mail, further emphasising the importance of the 
research for Icelandic business. Fourthly, the respondents were promised a short 
report on the results of the study.  
 
The initial e-mail sent was designed to be as brief as possible, emphasising the 
institutions behind the study and what it was about. A link led the respondent to the 
survey, where a more detailed cover letter and instructions in Icelandic on how to 
respond to the survey was provided (see appendices). The cover letter was designed 
in a simple format to address the most important questions: For whom? About 
what? Time? Why in English and Icelandic? Security? How to answer? The 
postcard, sent by regular mail to the survey companies and addressed to the 
respondents, had almost the same text as the initial e-mail and cover letter. The 
second e-mail focused on the importance of the work and how many answers were 
needed to make the survey valid. Furthermore, additional information was provided 
about the researcher, as it was expected some respondents would recognise his 
name from various publications. It turned out this second e-mail made all the 
difference.  
 
The questionnaire was administered as an electronic mail survey. The respondents 
were notified with e-mails and a postcard. Otherwise, the characteristics were 






3.3.8 Steps 8 and 9: Pre-test questionnaire and revise if necessary 
Pre-testing a questionnaire is a real test of how it performs under actual conditions 
of data collection (Churchill, 1995). The problem is, no standard approach exists for 
pre-testing questionnaires (Dillman, 1978; Brett, 2000). Churchill (1995) notes the 
pre-test is done to assess the questions, and the sequence of questions. There is also 
an argument for using the pre-test to test the scales (Brett, 2000). However, this was 
not considered a viable approach here, as it would require a large number of 
respondents who would be eliminated from the whole sample by pre-testing, and 
there was already a problem of low response rate in the area of corporate 
governance (Forbes and Milliken, 2003).  
 
The approach taken in this research was to ask five hand-picked individuals to 
review and critique the questionnaire, as well as to answer the questions. They were 
chosen for their different background in research, and experience on boards. The 
five persons asked to do this were the following: 
 
1. Guðmundur Magnússon – professor of economics and former dean of the 
University of Iceland. He has had several positions on boards and committees.  
2. Benedikt Jóhannesson – doctor in mathematics and CEO of a survey and data 
analysis company. He is one of the most experienced directors in Iceland, as 
he has chaired boards of some of the biggest companies in the country. 
3. Sigurður Jóhannesson – doctor of economics and a researcher for the 
Economic Institute of Iceland. He is a chairman of one board and a respected 
researcher in Iceland. 
4. Eggert Claessen – a DBA student at Henley Management College and a serial 
entrepreneur. He has been a chairman for several small and medium-sized 
companies.  
5. Magnús Guðfinnsson – MSc. in management and a middle manager at Siminn 
– an Icelandic telephone company.    
 
The reviewers were asked to give feedback on the following issues in particular: 
1. Is the English version of the instructions and the questions clear? 
2. Is the Icelandic version of the instructions and the questions clear? 





4. The sample is Icelandic companies. Is it best to send: 
a. A version with English as the main language and Icelandic translation 
following. 
b. A version in English only with some difficult words translated into 
Icelandic. 
c. A version in Icelandic with an English translation. 
d. A version only in Icelandic 
5. Can you answer all the questions without any problems? 
6.  Are there questions which you think respondents would not like to answer? 
7.  Is the questionnaire too long (considering it takes 30 minutes to answer it)?  
 
Feedback results showed language was not a big issue, although they advised it 
would probably be best to send it in both languages as evidence of rigour. 
Therefore, the questionnaire was sent out with the English version first, and the 
translation into Icelandic following (see appendix). All respondents thought the 
English version was clear, and the Icelandic version a good translation of the 
former. One reviewer commented the Icelandic version followed the English 
version too closely, making the translation more mechanical than fluent. There were 
some comments on certain words which could be translated differently, or a clearer 
definition needed. The Icelandic version of items: 1.6, 3.16 and 4.6 were improved 
and double-checked with the respondents. All respondents noted they could answer 
the questions without any problems, and they did not think others would have 
difficulty answering them. Furthermore, they thought the questionnaire was not too 
long, although one commented it should not be any longer. One section, requesting 
additional information not to be used in this thesis, was omitted to make the 
questionnaire even shorter. Therefore, the final version consisted of approximately 
one hundred items. Pre-testing of the questionnaire showed little revision was 
required. Some words were changed, and one section omitted to shorten response 
time. The final version was nearly identical to the test version.  
 
3.3.9 Internal validity 
Nine steps adopted from Churchill (1995) were used to design the questionnaire. 
The aim of these steps is to increase internal validity of the study. In the first step, 
the information sought was discussed as a continuation of the operationalisation 
process. In the second step, the type of questionnaire was chosen to be an electronic 





emphasised the content of individual questions closely followed the original 
instruments. In the fourth step, the format of the responses was made uniform using 
a seven-point scale, as the goal was consistency throughout the questionnaire. The 
fifth step emphasises wording of each question should be changed as little as 
possible from the original instrument. Some minor changes were necessary here to 
adapt the questions to boards. In the sixth step, the sequence of questions was based 
on the advice of Churchill (1995). In the seventh step, the physical characteristics 
were discussed in terms of an electronic questionnaire, and what was done to secure 
a fair response rate. The last two steps were merged into one revision step, and that 
process showed there was need only for minor changes in the questionnaire. The 
process of designing the survey turned out to be surprisingly smooth.  
 
The next section focuses on the data gathering approach and the sampling 







3.4 Sampling and data gathering method 
Of the more highly educated sections of the community, the happiest in the 
present day are the men of science. Many of the most eminent of them are 
emotionally simple, and obtain from the work a satisfaction so profound that 
they can derive pleasure from eating and even marrying.  
 
      Bertrand Russell (1872 – 1970) 
 
To make such claims about a population as does Russell above, a researcher needs 
to be sure he has collected enough data to prove it. Usually sample data suffices, 
rather than collecting data from the whole population. The purpose of this section is 
to discuss the sampling procedure.  
 
A sampling procedure is a method for collecting information from part of a larger 
group, to infer something about that larger group, or population. This is different 
from a census, where information is sought from all members of the population 
(Churchill, 1995). For our purposes, a census would be too costly, if it were 
possible at all. Churchill (1995) recommends six steps in the sampling procedure 
(figure 3.4.1).  
 
Figure 3.4.1: The outline of the sampling procedure. 
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3.4.1 Step 1: Define the population 
The term ‘population’ can refer not only to people, but also to companies, 
institutions and even inanimate objects such as production parts (Churchill, 1995). 
Defining a population can be more complicated than often thought. Churchill (1995, 
p. 535) defines population as the totality of cases that conform to some designated 
specifications, and the specifications define the elements that belong to the target 
group and those that are to be excluded. Leedy (1993) calls this population 
‘research frame population,’ and Churchill (1995) calls it ‘target population.’ In 
effect, the target population is a smaller group than the whole population. This is 
important because it is relevant to what is possible to generalise from a study.  
 
The problem formulation of this thesis focuses on boards of directors and 
performance of organisations. This implies the target population is companies with 
boards of directors that have some kind of performance measure, which would 
include a vast amount of companies worldwide. Differences within that population 
are also so wide, any generalisation about the whole population from a small 
sample would be far-fetched, to say at least. Churchill’s (1995) ‘designated 
specification’ is up for interpretation. The rule-of-thumb Churchill (1995, p. 537) 
emphasises is the higher the incidence, the easier and less costly it is to define the 
sample, where ‘incidence’ refers to the percent of the population that qualifies for 
inclusion. The position taken in this research was practical, and on that basis, it is 
considered an exploratory study. Instead of a wide definition of population, it was 
considerably narrowed to SMEs in Iceland. The primary reason was the issue of 
access to boards (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The researcher estimated he would have 
some leverage to motivate respondents in this market area. Furthermore, data 
collection in one area would be less costly and time-consuming than casting a wider 
net. The third argument was problem formulation only required the claim to be 
falsified in a certain area to be falsified in general. Therefore, this study generalises 
only about SMEs in Iceland, the target population. However, it will be argued some 
inferences can be drawn from the sample to a wider population, which may be 






If the argument for carrying out the survey in Iceland was practical, the focus on 
SMEs is both theoretical and practical. Practical because there simply are not 
enough big Icelandic companies to form the basis for statistical analysis. A census 
would have been possible, although problematic, as the problem of access would 
become an issue (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). It was theoretical, as was noted in 
Chapter 2, because boards are more likely to be active in small organisations than 
big organisations. The standard definition of the European Union is SMEs are 
companies with more than ten employees and less than 250 employees. Other 
researchers have used a similar definition (Wiklund and Shephard, 2003). 
Information provided by Statistic Iceland indicates the target population is 2,033 or 
more companies.   
 
However, the unit of analysis is not the companies per se, but the boards of 
directors within those companies. The informants in previous corporate governance 
studies have primarily been the CEOs, chairmen, and other directors of boards (for 
example, Zahra and Pearce, 1991; Forbes and Milliken, 1999, Stiles and Taylor, 
2001; Westphal and Carpenter, 2001, Heuvel et al., 2006). Only relatively few 
studies have addressed more than one respondent from each board, examples are 
Zahra and Pearce (1991), and Carpenter and Westphal (2001), who questioned both 
the CEO and a director on the board. This approach was considered to increase the 
external validity of the study and offer the possibility of comparing answers from 
CEOs to those of directors. As already noted, CEOs attend most, if not all, board 
meetings, although not considered part of the board in Icelandic corporate law. 
Their obligation is first and foremost to provide information and argument, as they 
do not have voting power. Therefore, they are a good source for information about 
the board. The chairman by law cannot be CEO of the company, and is generally 
considered a non-executive. Therefore, it was concluded access to responses from 
both the CEO and chairman would add value to the survey.  
 
In short, the defined target population of this research was SMEs in Iceland, where 
the unit of analysis was the board of directors, and the informants were the CEO 
and the chairman of the company. This represents relevant preparation for the next 





3.4.2 Step 2: Identify the sampling frame 
The sampling frame refers to the selection process of the sample, the telephone 
book being the classical sampling frame in general surveys (Churchill, 1995). The 
telephone book is an example of an accessible sampling frame. However, sampling 
is not as straightforward when informants are not easily accessible. The sampling 
frame was problematic for this research.  
 
The research planned responses from CEOs and chairmen of SMEs in Iceland, and 
the questionnaire was to be sent electronically. This implied a list of SMEs in 
Iceland could be accessed, along with their addresses, the name of the CEO and 
chairman, and relevant e-mail addresses. The first problem was a list of the target 
companies, and although it is available at Statistic Iceland, it is costly to access. 
That database does not specify names or email addresses of the CEO or chairmen. 
This had been foreseen during the research design. The researcher had been granted 
access to two different databases, one from Lanstraust, a credit information 
company, and the other from Talnakonnun, a data analysis company. These two 
databases contained enough companies from the target population to conduct the 
survey. The addresses of the companies and most of the names of the CEOs were 
available in the combined database. There were very few names of chairmen and 
not many e-mail addresses. Therefore, a considerable time was spent filling in the 
gaps of the database, measured in days. Information came from company web pages 
and newspaper stories, but it proved impossible to find the names of all the 
chairmen and their e-mail addresses. However, the research took a considered risk 
and requested CEOs to forward the survey message and link to the questionnaire to 
their chairmen. The sampling frame, therefore, did result in some changes to the 
research design, and decreased the probability of obtaining the desired number of 
responses. The unification and refinement process left 560 companies in the 
database.  
 
In short, the sampling frame was a combination of two databases, which included 
names of CEOs and their e-mail addresses. However, the sampling frame made it 
difficult to reach the chairmen. The issue of sampling frames is highly related to the 





3.4.3 Step 3: Select sampling procedure 
The sampling procedure depends largely on what can be developed from the 
sampling frame (Churchill, 1995). Churchill (1995, p. 539) classifies sampling 
designs into non-probability samples and probability samples. Probability samples 
differ from non-probability samples because probability samples can calculate the 
likelihood any given population element will be included in the sample, when 
sample elements are selected objectively by a specific process. Although a sampling 
framework allowing for a probability sample would be ideal, researchers often use 
non-probability samples for practical purposes. Bryman and Cramer (1997) note 
less than 16% of correlation research they surveyed used probability samples. 
Leedy (1993) argues non-probability samples may be appropriate in some cases.  
 
In this research, the sampling framework determined the sampling procedure. As 
there was no possibility of choosing a random sample from the whole target 
population, or using some other probability sample approach, the sampling 
procedure can only be described as a non-probability sample approach. Churchill 
(1995) identifies three methods within the non-probability framework: convenience 
samples, judgment samples, and quota samples. Relying on two databases for the 
sampling framework makes the sampling procedure either convenient or accidental. 
The implication is there is no way of knowing whether those included are 
representative of the target population (Churchill, 1995). It can also be argued the 
sample framework is a judgment sample, as the databases were chosen because 
their sample elements are believed to be representative of the target population. A 
more detailed look at the two databases can provide a better picture of the 
companies in the sample. The database of Talnakonnun is part of a larger database 
that focuses on keeping track of the biggest companies in Iceland. Companies from 
that database are the largest medium-sized companies in Iceland. The purpose of the 
Lanstraust database is to keep track of credit information, and consists of a random 
set of companies. The databases were determined satisfactory because they included 
the elements of the sample necessary for the research. 
 
The sampling procedure was based on a convenience and judgment sample. The 





acceptable because of their sample elements. Non-probability samples are more 
common in research than probability samples, and a non-probability same was 
chosen here as no other sampling framework was accessible. This determined the 
sampling procedure, as it influenced sample size discussed in the next step. 
 
3.4.4 Step 4: Determine the sample size 
The question of sample size is complicated, as it depends on the type of sample, the 
statistics in question, the homogeneity of the population, and the time and money 
available for the study (Churchill, 1995). The limiting factor in this study was the 
sampling frame, which provided only 560 subjects, and studies in the corporate 
governance field typically suffer from low response rates (Forbes and Milliken, 
2003). Response rates for surveys for ‘executives in the upper echelons’ are in the 
range of 10-12% (Geletkanycz, 1998; Hambrick et al., 1993; Koch and McGrath, 
1996), which would mean 56 - 67 subjects for this research.  
 
There are no absolute numbers in regard to sample size or subjects needed for a 
study, although there are some guidelines (Hair et al., 2006). The main aim is 
sufficient size and quality to yield credible results in terms of accuracy and 
consistency (Hair et al, 2003). Churchill (1995) discusses sample size as a trade-off 
between sample size on the one hand, and precision and confidence on the other. 
The sample size grows with an increased need for precision and confidence level. 
The formula is the following (Churchill, 1995; Hair et al., 2003): 
 
Sample size =  [(degree of confidence x variability) / (desired precision)]2 
 
The formula for determining sample size calls for three decisions (Hair et al., 2003): 
(1) the degree of confidence level, (2) the level of precision, and (3) the amount of 
variability. The 95% confidence level (<.05 error) is usually applied in business 
studies, but a lower level can also be acceptable (Hair et al., 2003). The level of 
precision, the maximum acceptable difference between the estimated sample value 
and true population value, is a judgment call by the researcher (Hair et al., 2003). 
However, Churchill (1995) points out researchers pay dearly in terms of increased 





increases the sample size by factor c2. Hair et al. (2003) use 1/3 of a unit in their 
examples as a common measurement for precision. Furthermore, the variability or 
standard deviation, in other words the homogeneity of the sample, is based on 
research experience (Hair et al., 2003). When the scale is seven points, as in this 
study, it is common to use 1.5 for variability, as it divides the range of the scale (7-1 
= 6) with 4 (6/4 = 1.5), with regards to normal distribution. Using the above 
estimates, the minimum sample size would need to be 82.6 ( [(2 x 1.5) / (.33)]2 = 
82.6).  
 
Another approach to estimate the sample is to use rules-of-thumb provided by Hair 
et al. (2006) regarding number of observations per item in factor analysis. Hair et al. 
(2006) suggest five observations per variable or item should be the absolute 
minimum, and the ratio of ten for every item sufficient. The largest scale in this 
research, which is a compiled scale for performance, is 27 items. That implies the 
sample should be larger than 135 observations, and more like 270 observations. 
Hair et al. (2006) have similar rules-of-thumb for generalisability of the study, the 
minimum ratio five observations per variable, while 15 - 20 observations per 
variable would be more desirable. As there are approximately 100 items used in the 
study (a few more were added for further research), this latter ratio would take the 
sample to 1,500 – 2,000 observations.  
 
As the study is exploratory in nature, the issue of high end ratio was not a big 
concern. As evident from different calculations of sample size, the estimated 56-67 
observations would be very low for multivariate and factor analysis. More than 83 
observations, and up to 135 observations, would increase validity. This led to 
efforts to increase the response rate. 
 
3.4.5 Step 5: Select the sample elements 
The sample elements are the characteristics of the sample the researcher wants to 
include in the study (Churchill, 1995). The sample elements go hand in hand with 
the sample procedures, as they determine if and how the researcher can choose or 
control for the elements. In a convenience sample there is no assurance the sample 





chosen because it is believed the elements of the sample represent the elements of 
the target population (Churchill, 1995). In this study, the elements were the 
following: 
 
- Icelandic companies 
- Small and medium-sized companies  
- Shareholder companies 
- Board of directors with two or more people. 
 
The argument for using Icelandic companies is primarily a question of access to 
boards. Choosing one country eliminates problems with regulatory differences 
between countries. Some elements of Icelandic boards, such as the split role of CEO 
and chairman, and all directors being non-executive, make it possible to limit the 
structural influences of the board on the study. The pragmatism of the choice of 
sample is supported by the problem formulation, where falsification of the claim 
does not require generalisation to all companies. This can be emphasised with the 
old swan example from Popper (1994): the proposition ‘all swans are white’ can 
never be proven, although a single black swan can serve to falsify it.  
 
The choice of small and medium-sized companies is related to the location in which 
the study was carried out, as the number of large companies was insufficient to 
support a study based on regression analysis. However, there are some interesting 
elements supposedly related to boards of smaller companies. They are thought to be 
more active (Heuvel et al., 2006), focus more on the strategic role (Stiles and 
Taylor, 2001), and they are probably more accessible to a survey, as it is likely the 
larger the company, the less CEOs spend time on such requests.  
 
The focus on shareholder companies is tied to the problem formulation, as the 
purpose of the study is to find a positive relationship between boards of directors 
and organisational performance. It is likely this relationship would be more easily 







Whether other elements of the target population, for example, industry or 
ownership, are represented accurately in the sample, cannot be determined. Those 
elements are controlled for by specific questions in the survey. 
 
In short, the sample elements were based on judgment and convenience issues. The 
main elements can be described in one phrase: Icelandic shareholder SMEs with 
boards. These elements are the elements of the target population.  
 
3.4.6 Step 6: Collect the data from the designed elements 
The collection of data entails processing responses to the questionnaire (Churchill, 
1995). Churchill (1995) discusses data collection in terms of sampling and non-
sampling errors. Sampling errors have been discussed under sampling procedure, 
and refer to the possibility a sample other than the chosen one within the target 
population would give different results. In other words, the sample is not 
representative of the target population. When the sample is based on convenience 
and judgment, this error can be significant. When the sample is random, the way to 
minimise sampling error is to enlarge the sample (Churchill, 1995). Non-sampling 
errors reflect errors, which tend to bias the sample value away from the population 
parameter. Such errors occur, for example, in conception, logic, misinterpretation of 
responses, statistics, errors in tabulation or coding, or in reporting the results 
(Churchill, 1995, p. 608). An overview of non-sampling errors is provided in figure 
3.4.2.  
 









Office: Processing  
Adapted from Churchill (1995, p. 610).  
 
Non-observation errors occur because of non-coverage and non-response. Non-





is, for pragmatic reasons, the sampling frame directed the sampling procedure to a 
non-probability approach. The Talnakonnun database describes its companies as 
‘large’ medium-sized companies. Therefore, the bias could be ‘large’ medium-sized 
companies are over-represented, in contrast to ‘small’ medium-sized companies. 
The Lanstraust database somewhat decreases this bias, as smaller companies are 
covered. However, it is difficult to determine how large the bias is.  The non-
response error is the question of whether the respondents in the sample, 
representing the elements of the target population, did answer the questionnaire. 
The possibility of non-response error in regard to chairmen has already been 
mentioned in the survey design, as the e-mail addresses of the chairmen were not 
available, and the questionnaire was to be forwarded to them, which increased the 
possibility of a low response rate. This type of error is discussed in more detail in 
next chapter, with the results of the data gathering process.  
 
Observation errors are found in data collection (field errors) and processing (office 
errors) (Churchill, 1995). Field and office errors are also discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter, as this chapter reflects the situation prior to sending out the 
questionnaire and the next chapter the results. The electronic design of the 
questionnaire, however, helped to limit the field and office errors, as most of the 
process of distributing the questionnaire, and receiving, tabulating, and presenting 
the data, was automated. It can therefore be argued using electronic methods 
decreases observation errors.    
 
As emphasised in the survey design, the procedure for data collection was the 
following: 
1) E-mail sent to the e-mail addresses available, which included all of the CEOs 
and some of the chairmen. In the e-mail, the CEOs were asked to forward the 
e-mail to the relevant chairman. The e-mail emphasised the purpose of the 
study, the name of the sponsors and the researcher, and contained a link to the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was available on the web, and designed like 
a normal paper questionnaire. The respondents themselves returned the 





2) A second e-mail was sent out five days after the first one, very similar to the 
first, to remind participants to respond to the survey. 
3) A postcard was mailed roughly a week after the first e-mail, stating the 
purpose of the research, the name of sponsors, and the researcher. The 
postcard was sent to all respondents via their company, mostly by name, but 
in some cases only by title.  
4) The last e-mail was sent to the available e-mail addresses roughly two weeks 
after the first e-mail. This e-mail was more personal and emphasised the 
importance of research for Icelandic companies.  
 
The questionnaire was processed electronically and data processing was mostly 
automated. The coding procedure was relatively simple, as most of the questions 
were closed. The few open-ended questions were easily coded, as they focused on a 
number range. This is discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
In short, the data gathering process emphasised the importance of minimising error. 
Weaknesses regarding sample size were addressed by additional measures to 
increase the response rate. And although the sample was a non-probability sample, 
it did address the purpose of the study.  
 
3.4.7 External validity 
The sample procedure and data gathering approach was in essence about external 
validity. It was based on a six-step approach suggested by Churchill (1995). (1) The 
first step was to define the population. The target population chosen was SMEs in 
Iceland. (2) The second step was to identify the sampling frame, which then 
determined some of the other steps, as few databases were available for the 
research. The sampling frame consisted of 560 SMEs found in two different 
databases. (3) The third step was to select the sampling procedure. Because of a 
typically low response rate in similar studies, retention of all companies in the 
sampling frame was necessary, rendering the procedure non-probabilistic, based on 
convenience and judgment. (4) The fourth step was to determine the sample size. It 
was estimated more than 86 responses would be needed, which indicated the 





was to select the sample elements, which in this case were basically the same 
elements used to define the target population. (6) The last step was to discuss the 
data gathering process, which was estimated to be somewhat easier than past 
surveys, as it was electronically-based and therefore eliminated some possible 
processing errors.  
 
In conclusion, one may argue external validity is limited because of the non-
probability sample. However, non-probability samples are common in corporate 
research (for example, Brett, 2000; Tanner, 2005), as sampling procedures are not 
as easy as when the population consists of individuals. When probability samples 
are used, non-observation error tends to be large (for example, Lindgren, 2001). 
Therefore, it is questionable whether probability samples are better than non-
probability samples when it comes to estimating the total error. A sampling error is 
recognised in the design, but the bias is probably positive regarding the survey, as 
the over-representation of ‘large’ medium-sized companies might better fit the 
purpose of the study than other companies. The most important conclusion is all 
measures were followed in the sampling procedures, as far as the research situation 







Chapter 3 summary – Methodology  
 
This journey through the methodology of this study was necessary preparation for 
sending out the questionnaire and for the true empirical work of the thesis. The 
chapter provides the arguments for ‘how’ and ‘what’ has been done, and even 
‘why’ from a philosophical and methodological point of view. The main objective 
was to construct a questionnaire that could be used to gather information about 
boards and organisational performance.  
 
The main points from this chapter are: 
 
 The research paradigm adapted in this thesis is realism, although with clear 
references to positivism and theoretical criticism from Popper (2002). 
 A multi-theoretical perspective is adopted in this research, with focus on 
agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, and 
stakeholder theory. 
 The model applied in this study is based on three propositions linking the 
board of directors to organisational performance.  
 This study uses mixed methods, the survey method for the quantitative 
approach, and interviews and focus groups for a qualitative approach. 
 The research is framed as an exploratory study, although reflecting more 
causal and descriptive types of studies.   
 The construct validity is emphasised in the operationalisation of the concepts, 
as the instruments are adapted from sources that have validated and published 
them in peer-reviewed journals. 
 The internal validity of the study is emphasised in the design of the survey, 
which follows the recommendations of Churchill (1995). 
 The external validity of the study is emphasised in the sampling procedure, 
which is based on a sample defined by convenience and judgment.  
 The survey tool consists of approximately 100 items, sent to 560 SMEs in 
Iceland via e-mail, to CEOs and chairmen of these companies.  
 
The next chapter presents the conclusion validity of the research, and a detailed 





Chapter 4 – Results and analysis 
 
 
This chapter presents the original empirical work of the thesis. The purpose of the 
chapter is to analyse and discuss the results of the questionnaire. The chapter 
focuses on statistical techniques and discusses some of the criteria for using and 
interpreting the statistical analysis. The previous chapters planted the seeds for this 
chapter, the harvest of that work. It represents the core of the thesis and the climax 
of the research effort, as it brings primary data results into the discussion, so 
hypotheses developed in previous chapters can be tested and discussed.   
 
Figure 4.1: Stepwise analyses of results. 
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          Adapted from Hair et al. (2006). 
 
This chapter analyses the data and the results. The framework for analysis is 
adapted from Hair et al. (2006) for stepwise analysis of survey data. The first step is 
to examine the data for normality. The second step is to purify the instrument and 
test its reliability. The third step is to estimate the model by testing the propositions 
set forth in the previous chapter. The fourth step is to interpret the results and their 
implications, and the last step is to validate the results. These steps are presented in 






4.1 Examining the data 
 
Not everything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts 
can be counted.  
Albert Einstein  (1879 - 1955) 
 
 
Statistical analysis tends to focus on counting elements. The dilemma, to paraphrase 
Einstein from the above quotation, is whether what counts can really be counted. 
Examining the data helps researchers determine what can be counted, a step usually 
overlooked (Hair et al., 2006). Hair et al. (2006, p. 35) have argued that careful 
analysis of data leads to better prediction and more accurate assessment of 
dimensionality.  
 
Figure 4.1.1: Approach to examining data. 
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               Based on Hair et al. (2006). 
 
This section focuses on the descriptive aspects of the research, looking at the data to 
determine its relevance. The format of the section is based on Hair et al. (2006) and 
their approach to data examination (figure 4.1.1). The first step is to discuss and 
examine the response rate. The second step is to explore the descriptive data. The 
third step is to discuss missing data. The fourth step focuses on the treatment of 
missing data. The fifth step discusses implications of outliers, and the final step 







4.1.1 Response rate 
In the research design it was anticipated the data gathering process might prove to 
be difficult. It was also noted in the discussion of the sample, the response rate 
would have to be greater than comparable studies, to ensure enough responses were 
received for statistical analysis. The goal was a response rate of 15% or higher.  
 
The data collection was carried out late October to December 2006. The process 
turned out to be as difficult as anticipated. As was noted in section 4.3.6, the 
motivation process for respondents was planned as four rounds. The first e-mail 
sent to CEOs resulted in less than 30 responses. This was a major concern because 
it had been estimated roughly half the responses would be received in the first 
round. The second round, with another e-mail sent out, turned out to be equally 
disappointing, and it was estimated the process would probably not net more than 
50-60 responses. The last two rounds were done in the same week. People in the 
sample received a postcard on a Monday morning, and the last e-mail, a more 
personalized e-mail, was sent out on Wednesday morning. It was in this round the 
majority of responses were received. A week later a last e-mail message was added 
to the planned process, to set a deadline for answering the questionnaire. Only few 
answers were received in that round. The process started on the 15th of October, and 
the final date to answer the questionnaire was the 15th of December. It was 
estimated relatively few answers would be received after this period, as the busy 
holidays were approaching.  
 
The responses collected were 126 in total. Two turned out to be unusable because 
they were from public rather than private companies, and two were shown to be 
duplications, meaning respondents had answered the questionnaire twice. Therefore 
122 viable responses were collected. Twenty-four answers were from chairmen, and 
98 from CEO’s. This was a major concern, as it was evident the process of 
gathering responses from chairmen had failed, with only a 4.3% response rate, 
compared to a 17.5% response rate for CEOs.  
 
Only six companies could be identified as having both chairman and CEO 





number of employees, turnover, ownership, and size of board, as it was estimated 
responses of both CEO and chairman would be very similar on these points. From 
this comparison it was estimated 116 responses were collected from different 
companies. As the sample consisted of 560 companies, the overall company 
response rate was roughly 21%.  
 
Table 4.1.1: Response rates of the study. 





This response rate is comparable to other studies in the field, which also typically 
suffer from low response rates (Forbes and Milliken, 2003). Some have pointed out 
the expected response rate for executives in the upper echelons is much lower, 
typically in the range of 10-12% (Geletkanycz, 1998; Hambrick et al., 1993; Koch 
and McGrath, 1996). This is similar in research on SMEs (Schulze et al., 2001; 
MacDougall and Robinson, 1990; Heuvel et al., 2006). Given the company numbers 
involved here, the response rate is consistent with or higher than that experienced 
by other DBA students at Henley Management College (Lindgren, 2001; Brett, 
2000; Tanner, 2005). 
 
The response rate from CEOs was as expected, and exceeded the goal of a 15% 
response rate. Most surveys in the field of corporate governance rely on CEO 
answers (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2002). The response rate of chairmen was, 
however, very low, as might have been anticipated because of problems in 
execution of the data collection. The responses from chairmen were too few to 
make any meaningful comparison with the CEO responses.  
 
Table 4.1.2: Responses of CEOs and chairmen. 
Respondents Frequency Percent 
Chairman 24 19.7% 
CEO 98 80.3% 






It was estimated although some response bias could be anticipated from CEOs in 
comparison with chairmen, both were good informants for survey purposes. The 
argument was because the research unit was the board of directors, both types of 
respondents should equally be able to respond to the questions, which is supported 
with the findings of Huse (1993). The six responses, where both CEO and chairman 
had answered the questionnaire, were compared, and turned out to be very similar.  
 
The importance of the board tended to be slightly higher for chairmen than CEOs, 
as might be expected in a survey based on self-evaluation rather than peer 
evaluation (Huse, 1993). The responses of the CEOs and chairmen were therefore 
combined, using CEO responses where two were received for one company. The 
six cases where both respondents had replied were therefore eliminated, reducing 
the total number of responses to 116 cases. This final sample was used for further 
analysis.  
 
Descriptive statistics for company size and industries indicate that the respondents 
represent the target sample. Furthermore the descriptive elements of the sample 
were compared to other similar studies (Heuvel et al., 2006; Lervik et al., 2005), 
which indicated that the profile of the SMEs was similar to profiles in other studies 
(section 4.1.2).  
 
This subsection has focused on the response rate. The overall response rate was 
roughly 21%, similar to, if not higher than, comparable studies. The next section 
uses the 114 cases (two cases were eliminated in the data examination process, 
sections 4.1.4 and 4.1.5) to picture the data from a descriptive point of view.  
 
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics 
The first step in understanding the data is to look at it in descriptive terms (Hair et 
al., 2006). In other words, to count some of the basic variables which indicate 
elements of the sample. Using the literature as a guide, several descriptive 
categories were included in the questionnaire to establish the external context. The 





These variables are discussed again in the third section of this chapter, where the 
hypotheses are examined. 
 















In addition, for descriptive purposes, three elements describing the boards are 
discussed in this section: size of board, number of women on boards, and number of 
independent directors. The structure of this section, therefore, can be outlined in 
terms of company elements and board elements (figure 4.1.2).  
 
4.1.2.1 Company size in number of employees 
The question of company size was open in the questionnaire, but was recoded later 
into categories. The reason for making number of employees an open question was 
to match CEO and chairman responses. Five size-groups were used for 
categorization, the same as employed by Lervik et al. (2005) for Norwegian SMEs. 
Opinions differ as to what the cut-off size of SMEs should be. The European 
definition, standard in the European Union, uses a cut-off of less than 250 
employees, as followed, for example, by Wiklund and Shephard (2003). Others 
define SME size up to 500 employees (Warwood and Roberts, 2004). 
 
Seven companies had more than 500 employees, and could, therefore, either have 
been categorized as a special group (Lindgren, 2001), or eliminated. The argument 





However, the counter-arguments to include them were: (1) the research was 
exploratory, and because of the sampling procedures generalisation was not a high 
priority, (2) it was possible to test for the implication of company size in the study, 
and (3) it was important to keep the number of responses as high as possible to 
increase the effectiveness of the statistical analysis. Furthermore, it was estimated 
that if the responses were drastically different according to size, those cases would 
prove to be outliers. The responses were, therefore, included in the category of 
companies with 200 or more employees, as there were only seven in the group of 
200 – 499 employees. The categories were then congruent with Lervik et al. (2005). 
Moreover, it should be noted in Iceland companies with more than 200 employees 
are considered large companies, although perhaps not so in the international sphere. 
This discussion is revisited in the third section of this chapter. 
 
The results of frequency analysis showed most companies were in the size group of 
50-199 employees, 37%, or 42 cases. Other categories had considerably lower 
representation (table 4.1.3). Interestingly, the size groups could be split into two 
nearly equal-sized categories around the cut-off point of 50 employees, with 48% 
having less than 50 employees, and 52% with 50 or more employees.  
 








* The descriptive presentation has 114 cases as two misfit cases were removed from the 
sample (see later sections). 
  
 
The mean of the sample was 100 employees, a large number compared to Heuvel et 
al. (2006), where the mean was 33 employees from a sample of 199 companies. 
This indicated the sample consisted on average of rather large SMEs, compared to 
the Belgian sample of Heuvel et al. (2006).  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-10 11 9.6 9.8 9.8 
11-29 26 22.8 23.2 33.0 
30-49 17 14.9 15.2 48.2 
50-199 42 36.8 37.5 8.7 
200- 16 14.0 14.3 100.0 
Total 112 98.2 100.0  
Missing System 2 1.8   







Four industries were selected, reduced from eight or nine categories in comparable 
studies (Lervik et al., 2005; Tanner, 2005). The four categories were finance and 
property, service, manufacturing, and retail and wholesale. The frequencies are 
shown in table 4.1.4. Companies in the finance and property category constituted 
11% of the total responses, manufacturing 20%, retail 34%, and service 35%. The 
implication of industry categories is further discussed in the third section of this 
chapter. 
 
Table 4.1.4: Frequencies of industry categories. 
  
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Finance and property 12 10.5 10.5 10.5 
Service 40 35.1 35.1 45.6 
Manufacturing 23 20.2 20.2 65.8 
Retail 39 34.2 34.2 100.0 
Total 114 100.0 100.0  
 
 
These industry categories were similar to those used by Huse et al. (2007) in the 
Norwegian context. The distribution in that research was finance and property 
(10%), service (32%), manufacturing (35%) and other (23%). The higher proportion 
of manufacturing companies reflected the difference between the business sectors in 
Norway and Iceland, where Norway has a much stronger manufacturing base 
according to national statistics. 
 
4.1.2.3 Ownership 
The share of the largest owner was divided into three categories: 0-20%, 21-49% 
and >50%. There is debate in the literature as to how to categorize ownership. La 
Porta et al. (1999) use two categories, widely-held companies, and ultimate owners, 
with the cut-off point 20% of the shares. Schulze et al. (2001) reduce the cut-off 
point for family run companies to 15%. Franks et al. (2001), however, use 25%, 
50%, and 75% ownership in their classification. The position taken in this study 
was to follow La Porta et al. (1999) on the <20% barometer for widely-held 






Half the companies turned out to be majority-owned by one person. On the other 
hand, only 14% had such dispersed ownership the largest owner held less than 20% 
of the total shares (table 4.1.5). This was to be expected, as SMEs usually have 
concentrated ownership (Heuvel et al., 2006).  
 
Interestingly enough, although half the companies had one clear majority 
shareholder, only 37% of respondents designated their company a family firm (table 
4.1.6). 
  
Table 4.1.5:  Frequencies of ownership categories. 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0-20 15 13.2 14.0 14.0 
21-49 40 35.1 37.4 51.4 
>50 52 45.6 48.6 100.0 
Total 107 93.9 100.0  
Missing System 7* 6.1   
Total 114 100.0   
* Seven respondents did not answer this question.  
 
Table 4.1.6: The frequency of family firms. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 42 36.8 36.8 36.8 
no 72 63.2 63.2 100.0 
Total 114 100.0 100.0  
 
 
A definition of ‘family firm’ was not provided, as different definitions are used 
generally (Ward, 1998). However, the definition by Ward and Handy (1988, p. 290) 
is widely accepted in the Icelandic context14. Huse et al. (2007) posed a similar 
question in the Norwegian context and found 32% of the companies in their sample 
were considered family firms.  
 
                                                 
14 Based on a web search on mbl.is, a web site for leading newspaper in the country, for the concept 
“family firm” (Icel.: fjölskyldufyrirtæki). If more than 50% of the ownership is held by one family 





4.1.2.4 Size of boards 
Turning to the size of the boards, some interesting results emerged as the whole 
scale of board sizes was examined. By far the most frequent board size was 3 
persons, 38%, and 5 persons, 33% (table 4.1.7). Other sizes were much less 
common. The average board size was 4.03. As the companies were small, it was 
anticipated board sizes would also be small. The sample was equally split between 
1-3 directors, and >4 directors.   
  
The average size of the board, 4.03, was larger than Belgian firms in the study by 
Heuvel et al. (2006), in which it was 3.6. The average size of companies in this 
sample was larger, which could explain why the average size of the board was also 
larger.  
 
Table 4.1.7: Frequencies of board size. 
   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 6 5.3 5.3 5.3 
2 8 7.0 7.0 12.3 
3 43 37.7 37.7 5.0 
4 7 6.1 6.1 56.1 
5 38 3.3 33.3 89.5 
6 3 2.6 2.6 92.1 
7 5 4.4 4.4 96.5 
8 1 .9 .9 9.4 
9 1 .9 .9 98.2 
10 or more 2 1.8 1.8 100.0 
Total 114 100.0 100.0  
 
 
4.1.2.5 Women on boards 
Women had seats on boards in 41% of the companies (table 4.1.8). In 25% of cases 
only one woman was on the board. Some 14% of companies had more than one 
woman on the board. The sample could be split into two groups: boards without 
women (59%), and boards with women (41%).  
 
There were .74 women on boards of companies in the sample, or 18% of all board 





Norwegian boards, as Huse et al. (2007) report the average number of women on 
Norwegian boards as 1.59.  
 
Table 4.1.8: Frequencies of women on boards. 
   Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 67 58.8 58.8 58.8 
1 29 25.4 25.4 84.2 
2 8 7.0 7.0 91.2 
3 6 5.3 5.3 96.5 
4 1 .9 .9 97.4 
5 1 .9 .9 98.2 
6 2 1.8 1.8 100.0 




4.1.2.6 Independent directors 
As pointed out in the operationalisation process, independence according to the 
Icelandic corporate governance code is rather strict, as it does not allow any 
financial, business, or family ties. Although the code is directed at registered 
companies, 44% of the companies in this study considered themselves to have at 
least one independent board member (table 4.1.9). Some 22% of the boards had one 
independent director, and another 22% of boards had more than one independent 
director. The sample contained 56% of companies without independent directors, 
and 44% with independent directors.  
 
Table 4.1.9: Frequencies of independent directors. 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 0 64 56.1 56.1 56.1 
1 25 21.9 21.9 78.1 
2 13 11.4 11.4 89.5 
3 4 3.5 3.5 93.0 
4 2 1.8 1.8 94.7 
5 4 3.5 3.5 98.2 
7 1 .9 .9 99.1 
8 1 .9 .9 100.0 







4.1.2.7 Descriptive elements of boards and companies  
A first glance at the descriptive data, without indicating any relationships, gave a 
clearer picture of the sample. A comparison with two similar studies, one by Heuvel 
et al. (2006) in Belgium, and the other by Huse et al. (2007) in Norway, showed 
some similar characteristics in their samples. The average size of the companies and 
size of the boards was larger in the Icelandic context than the Belgian context. The 
industry distribution and number of family businesses in the Icelandic sample was 
similar to the Norwegian sample. This indicated the Icelandic SME sample was not 
that different from SME samples in other national contexts.  
 
4.1.3 Non-response bias 
Non-response bias is a subset of non-observation errors and non-sampling errors, as 
is described in section 3.4 and figure 3.4.2, based on the work of Churchill (1995). 
Non-response errors result from failure to obtain information from some of the 
sample group, as designed in the survey (Churchill, 1995). Such errors can result 
from the failure of respondents to fill out the questionnaire either in full or in part. 
As was noted in section 4.3.6, this type of error was discussed regarding response 
failure by chairmen. As it turned out concerns were justified, as their response rate 
was only 4.3%. This resulted in a different approach to analysis than originally 
planned, with the responses of CEOs and chairmen subsequently being merged. The 
merged sample is discussed below in regard to non-response error.  
 
As discussed in section 4.1.1, the response rate, measured as a percentage of total 
companies, was 21%. That left as much as 79% open for non-response errors. Non-
response bias can be significant in research studies, especially with a low response 
rate (Churchill, 1995). The question remains whether non-respondents differed from 
actual respondents. There are several routes available to try to estimate whether bias 
is cause for concern, for instance comparing early responses to late-arriving 
responses (Churchill, 1995). As this survey was distributed electronically over a 
relatively short period of time, this approach was considered of little value. 
Observation of other studies with low response rate in the corporate governance 
literature (Geletkanycz, 1998; Hambrick et al., 1993; Koch and McGrath, 1996; 





Management College (Tanner, 2005; Lindgren, 2001) concluded this issue was 
either generally disregarded, or noted as a limitation of the research.  
 
An examination of the distribution between company sectors on the one hand, and 
the distribution of company sizes in the total population and the sample on the 
other, could be argument for non-response bias. However, size distribution was as 
anticipated from the original sampling, and the industry groups large enough to test 
for differences.  
 
The non-response bias was noted as a limitation of this research. As the goal was 
not generalisation to the wider population, but rather to use sample results to make 
some observations about the target population, this was not of great concern in this 
research. 
 
4.1.4 Treatment of missing data 
Another problem of a non-response nature is the question of missing data, where 
respondents fail to answer all questions posed in the survey. Missing data can be a 
source of hidden non-response bias (Hair et al., 2006). However, missing data is 
quite common in questionnaires (Hair et al., 2006). If cases must be deleted because 
of missing data in some variables, this can cause a reduction in sample size 
available for analysis 
 
Missing data can result from data entry error when transcribing results from paper 
to computer (Churchill, 1995). As this survey was conducted electronically, and all 
entries were made first-hand by the respondents, this type of failure did not occur. 
The missing data was examined from both the variable perspective and the case 
perspective.  
 
Running analysis-frequencies on items from 2.1 to 5.25 showed only three variables 
were missing more than 2 responses: items 3.10 (4 missing), 5.13 (5 missing), 5.17 
(3 missing), and 5.25 (4 missing). The non-response answers were therefore only 
4.3% of the total on the worst item, 5.13. Different criteria exist to evaluate what 





variable or an item can be considered as too much missing data (Brett, 2000). 
Others argue for more flexibility in regard to missing data. Hair et al. (2006) argue 
up to 30% may not be too excessive. Bryman and Cramer (1994) suggest a variable 
could have data missing up to 50% and still be retained. The percentages of missing 
data in this research are much lower than any of these criteria, and therefore all are 
retained for the study.  
 
There is no cause for concern about missing data on the descriptive variables or 
composition variables either. Item 1.5, CEO years in office, missed 4 responses 
(3.5%), item 6.1, number of employees, missed 3 responses (2.6%), and items 6.4 to 
6.6 about ownership, missed 6 to 8 responses (5.2% – 7%). This was as anticipated, 
as information about ownership might have been considered too private to reveal. 
From a statistical perspective, data missing on these items did not exceed even the 
strictest criterion for missing data (Brett, 2000).  
 
Looking at the missing values from a case perspective, only three cases missed 
more than three responses on items 2.1 to 5.25. Those were case 104 with 5 missing 
responses (6%), case 25 with 7 missing responses (8.4%), and 12 with 29 missing 
responses (35%). A further look at the descriptive items showed case 12 had again 
missed the most responses (4), making the total missing answers 33. Case 104 
missed one more answer, but case 25 did not miss any more answers. Four other 
cases missed more than one item: cases 13, 52, 74, and 106 each missed three items. 
These were not cause for concern at this point, unlike case 12. A further look at 
case 12 showed all answers were alike, indicating the respondent did not seriously 
consider his responses. Therefore it was appropriate to exclude that case from 
further study and delete it from the sample. This brought the total study sample 
down to 115. This further lowered the missing values on items, and item 5.13 
subsequently had 4 missing values (3.5%), this being the worst case.  
 
There is no common guideline for what to do in the case of missing data, although it 
is stressed any decision should take into account both empirical and theoretical 
considerations (Hair et al., 2006; Bryman and Cramer, 1997). Pallant (2005) notes 





wise, and replacing with a mean. The list-wise approach excludes a case totally 
from the analysis, and the pair-wise approach excludes a case only if it is missing 
data required for a specific analysis. The third choice comes with the following 
notation: “This option should NEVER be used, as it can severely distort the results 
of your analysis, particularly if you have a lot of missing values” (Pallant, 2005, p. 
53). It could further be argued this option (replacing with a mean value) should be 
used cautiously when the sample is small, and missing values constitute a high 
percentage of the total sample.  
 
As pointed out earlier, this research had very few missing values, both in actual 
number and as a percentage of the total sample. Therefore, the third option of 
“mean substitution” was considered. The advantage of the third option was all 
variables could be used, as missing data is substituted by the mean of the total 
population. There are also other methods of substitution, for instance using “linear-
trend-at-point,” which is a mean substitution based on the mean of nearby points, 
with a specified number of valid values above and below the missing value (Hair et 
al., 2006). The latter approach is considered a better approximate (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
The argument for using the “mean substitution” approach is missing values can be 
considered random in the total dataset (Hair et al., 2006). There are several tests to 
for randomness in the missing data, for example, simply looking at the data 
graphically for systematic missing data (Brett, 2000), checking correlation between 
recorded dichotomous variables (Hair et al., 2006), and Chi-square testing in 
conjunction with a comparison of actual frequencies (Bryman and Cramer 1994). 
The simple test of looking at the data graphically was chosen in this research, given 
the low rate of missing data. The analysis indicated there was no systematic bias in 
the missing data, and it could be concluded data were missing randomly.  
 
As for treating the missing data, there was an argument for substitution with the 
means. Hair et al. (2006) note there are three disadvantages using this approach: (1) 
it invalidates the variance estimates derived from the standard variance formula by 
understating the true variance in the data, (2) the actual distribution of values is 





depresses the observed correlation, because all missing data in one and the same 
index/variable/scale/items set will have a single constant value. Given the missing 
number of values was low in this study, such concern is of less importance. The 
advantage of not having to delete more cases or items was overwhelming, and 
therefore it was decided to substitute missing values with the means in further data 
analysis.  
 
4.1.5 Treatment of outliers and extremes 
Outliers are another issue for consideration when dealing with data. Outliers are 
observations that distinctly differ from the majority of cases in the sample. In other 
words, they have values well above or well below the majority of the other cases 
(Pallant, 2005). There is considerable debate in the literature as to how to view 
outliers. Christiensen and Raynor (2003) argue outliers are an important element for 
theory building, as the differences are more interesting than the similarities. Hair et 
al. (2006) state outliers can influence and bias the results of statistical analysis, and 
therefore should be controlled for by the researcher. It is recognised here the 
purpose of analysing and controlling outliers was first and foremost for statistical 
purposes.  
 
Outliers can be characterised as either beneficial or problematic (Hair et al., 2006). 
It depends on the context in which they are viewed. Beneficial outliers may be 
indicative of characteristics of the population undiscovered without them included 
in the analysis. Therefore they should be retained for analysis. Another view is 
outliers can be so different they are not representative of the population and 
therefore work against the statistical purposes of the analysis. Such outliers should 
be considered harmful or problematic (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
Outliers may be categorized both as outliers and extremes (Pallant, 2005). The 
‘extremes,’ or rather ‘extreme outliers,’ are so called because their values fall either 
greatly below or above the majority of other cases. The values of extreme outliers 
are more than 3 box-lengths from the 25th percentile – a box indicating the range in 
which the central 50% of observations fall (SPSS, 2007). Outliers are treated 





the dataset (Pallant, 2005). Others, however, are more lenient, and suggest outliers 
be changed to less extreme values to retain these items within the sample for data 
analysis (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).  
 
The simplest method of detecting outliers is to look at graphic versions of the data, 
histograms and box-plots, and isolate cases sitting on their own on the edges, in the 
extremes (Pallant, 2005). If the same cases appear several times as outliers, they 
could be deemed harmful outliers (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
Table 4.1.10: Analysis of outliers and extremes. 
 
Item Outliers - cases Extremes Total 
2.6 18 41   2 
2.8  102 28   2 
2.9 110 86  93 3 
2.10 30 86  93 3 
2.12 79 58  28 3 
2.15 58 72  28 3 
3.4 28    1 
3.5 61 49  1 3 
4.4 48 84  34 3 
4.9 36 41   2 
4.10 22 4   2 
4.11 41    1 
4.12 41    1 
4.14 22    1 
4.15 4 78   2 
4.19 86    1 
4.20 69    1 
4.21 74 53  69 3 
4.22 86 47   2 
4.23 78    1 
4.24 100    1 
4.25 109    1 
4.27 78    1 
5.9 88 95 4  3 
5.18 21 10  53 3 
5.19 70    1 
5.20 85 93  31 3 
Total 27 16 1 9 53 
 
In graphic analysis of the data, several outliers were identified. Twenty-seven items 





extreme outliers were case 1 (item 3.5), case 31 (item 5.20), case 34 (item 4.4), case 
53 (item 5.18), case 69 (item 4.21), and cases 28 and 93 with two extreme values 
(case 28 on item 2.12 and 2.15, and case 93 on item 2.9 and 2.10).  
 
After careful consideration case 93 was deleted from the sample as the respondent 
had obviously answered all the questions with the same response. That brought the 
sample down to 114 cases. 
 
Although other approaches are possible to identify outliers, for example using 
univariate, bivariate, and multivariate perspectives (Hair et al., 2006), no other tests 
for outliers were carried out at this point. Outliers are considered again in section 
4.2, after factor analysis was carried out.  
 
4.1.6 Testing for normality 
The most fundamental premise of multivariate analysis is the distribution should be 
considered ‘normal’ (Hair et al., 2006). Normal distribution implies a bell-shaped 
curve, with the greatest frequency of cases in the center. Evaluations are based on 
the assumption if a variable is multivariate normal, it is also univariate normal, 
although the reverse need not be true (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
There are several ways to test normality (Hair et al., 2006). In this research it was 
decided to look at the distribution of each item: (a) looking at the histogram to 
visually estimate whether the distribution mimics normal distribution, (b) looking at 
the normal probability plot to see if the data follows a straight diagonal line and, (c) 
assessing kurtosis – the peakedness or flatness of the distribution – and the 
skewness – the uniformity or heavy-tail tendency of the distribution to one side or 
the other.  
 
This analysis for items 2.1 to 5.25, showed ten items of possible concern. Those 
items were: 2.5, 2.9, 3.4, 3.5, 4.4, 4.14, 4.15, 4.20, 5.18, and 5.19, and noted as 
possible ‘troublemakers’ in the analysis. They were, however, left untouched until 
further analysis had been completed on the sample. The distribution of all other 






4.1.7 Summary of data examination 
The analysis of descriptive statistics, missing data, and outliers and extremes, 
resulted in the following conclusions: 
 
 Missing data were missing completely at random. It is recommended such 
missing values be substituted with means (Hair et al., 2006). 
 Two cases were deleted because of multiple missing responses and 
homogenous answers.  
 The sample proved to be normally distributed, making it ideal for 
multivariate analysis (Hair et al., 2006). 
 There were several outliers and extremes. These cases were retained in the 
sample for further analysis. 
 
In this section, the focus has been on preliminary analysis of the data to check how 
appropriate the sample is for multivariate statistical analysis. In the next section, 






4.2 Purifying the data 
 
It seems to me that philosophical investigation, as far as I have experience 
of it, starts from that curious and unsatisfactory state of mind in which one 
feels complete certainty without being able to say what one is certain of. 
 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) 
 
 
Testing propositions and hypotheses is the scientific means to investigate 
philosophical certainty. It is a deductive approach to science. This thesis has been 
solely philosophical in nature until this chapter, although built upon sound 
empirical literature. This section takes the investigation a step further, so as to 
explore whether evidence in fact supports the proposed thesis.  
 
Figure 4.2.1: Overview of the purification process.  
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The second step in the approach of Hair et al. (2006) for analysing the data, is 
purifying the instruments. The approach to the purification process is discussed in 
the first section, then different scales are examined, and finally multicollinearity is 
discussed, before concluding comments are presented on the purification process 






4.2.1 Approach for purifying instruments 
The instruments or scales used in this study were all adopted from other research, as 
was noted in the operationalisation process. All scales have been tested previously 
in published research in respected journals, as well as derived from theory. This 
approach increased the probability of the scales being a good measurement of the 
phenomena in question, as is pointed out in Section 3.2. Therefore, it was expected 
most of the scales would present high alphas as in previous studies.  
 
The approach taken for purification of scales was twofold. First, the inter-item 
correlations and Cronbach alphas for the scales were tested. Second, factor analysis  
was used to examine the scales on a scale-to-scale basis.   
 
Coefficient alpha or Cronbach alpha is a technique for detecting measurement error 
due to lack of internal consistency in responses on a given scale. There are different 
perspectives in the literature of what represents an acceptable level of internal 
consistency. Cramer (1994) suggests a Cronbach alpha should be preferably above 
.80. Others have argued a Cronbach alpha above .70 is sufficient for any 
measurement (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Kline, 1994). Still 
others believe the minimum acceptable level for Cronbach alpha is .60 in some 
cases (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994; Caruana et al., 1994). There is less confusion 
about inter-item correlation. Hair et al. (2006) suggest the inter-item correlation 
should be above .3.  
 
The purification process consists of removing items if the Cronbach alpha is too 
low for the intended scale. A low value on a scale’s Cronbach alpha indicates the 
chosen items poorly represent the underlying factor (Bryman and Cramer, 1994). 
The aim of the purification process is to remove the item with the lowest 
correlation, as items with the highest average correlation are the most valuable 
(Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Some researchers suggest the starting point should 
be items with a lower correlation score than .50 (Caruana et al., 1994; Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994). The approach reduces the number of items on a scale, which in 
turn lowers the reliability, as the acceptable alpha is dependent upon the number of 





recommends a broad scale should be from 4 to 8 items. This study had a wide 
spectrum of scale sizes, from 3-item scales to 15-item scales.  
 
The factor analysis was used in this study for two purposes. First, it was used to 
check whether items belonging to certain scales designed to measure specific 
things, actually loaded on different factors. This was tested from the perspective of 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) as well as using elements of Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis (CFA). EFA is data driven and an inductive approach while CFA is 
theory driven and more related to positivism and deductive approaches (Hair et al, 
2006). As the factors were made out of already determined variables adapted from 
other studies the CFA approach would have been sufficient. The CFA approach is, 
however, usually used with Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) and the AMOS 
software, which was not used in this research. Some of the outcomes needed for 
rigorous CFA are very hard to come by without the AMOS software and therefore 
an approach more in terms with EFA was used in the factor analysis, although 
exploring the factors both from the theoretical perspective and the more inductive 
approach.  Secondly, the factor analysis was used to summarise information from a 
large number of variables into a smaller number of variables or factors (Hair et al., 
2003). This is sometimes called component analysis (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
Six points were used as guiding criteria for the analysis: (1) The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy should be larger than .5 (Hair et al., 
2006). (2) Factors were selected on the basis of Eigenvalues larger than 1. (3) The 
loading of items on the factors was expected to be higher than .40. Hair et al., 
(2003, p. 366) state their guideline for business research is +/ .30 considered 
acceptable, +/ .50 moderately important, and +/ .70 very important. (4) The 
variance explained by the factors was expected to be higher than 60%. Hair et al. 
(2003) note 60% as a rule of thumb, but not an absolute rule, as lower variance may 
be acceptable depending on research objectives. (5) The factors need to make sense 
from a theoretical or logical perspective, meaning labelling them should be fairly 
straightforward. (6) It is important to leave the original scales intact for the purpose 
of validating previous research and comparison with other studies. This concept 





(1995) noted this is a good reason for retaining original items if they were 
developed from theory.   
 
The following analysis was conducted on each questionnaire section, and the scales 
within those sections. The first was ‘process,’ second ‘authority,’ third 
‘performance,’ and the fourth ‘roles.’  
 
4.2.2 Purifying process scales 
All scales in this section were adopted without alteration from Zahra and Pearce 
(1992), except the last scale regarding information, which was adopted from 
(Lervik et al., 2005). Zahra and Pearce (1992) developed three scales to measure 
board processes: (1) a three-item scale of efficiency (Cronbach alpha of .78), (2) a 
three-item scale for decision (Cronbach alpha of .81), and (3) a five-item scale for 
style (Cronbach alpha of .77). The information scale had five items (Cronbach 
alpha not given).  
 
4.2.2.1 Efficiency 
The efficiency scale consisted of three items, measured on a seven-point scale from 
poor to excellent. Reliability of the scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .810 for 
the three items, with 111 cases included in the analysis (listwise deletion for 
missing values – no other possibility given in SPSS for this analysis). Factor 
analysis showed all items had inter-correlation above .3, a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy of .703, that is above .6 level, and the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant at .000 (should be .05 or smaller).  
 
Table 4.2.1: The importance of efficiency items. 
   
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 








if Item Deleted 
2.1 Deliberation 9.25 6.881 .629 .410 .777 
2.2 Meetings 9.63 5.308 .652 .438 .759 







All three items in the scale proved to be important, although the Cronbach alpha 
would have increased if items 2.1 or 2.2 were deleted (table 4.2.1). All items were 
kept in the scale.  
 
Only the first component had an Eigenvalue over 1, implying a one-factor solution 
(table 4.2.2). The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 2.190, explaining 73% of the 
variance. All items had factor loadings higher than .80 (table 4.2.3).   
 
Table 4.2.2: Factor analysis of efficiency scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Comp Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.190 72.983 72.983 2.190 72.983 72.983 
2 .473 15.777 88.761    
3 .337 11.239 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.2.3: Process - Efficiency scale. 
Process Efficiency - Items Factor 
loading 
2.1 Thoroughness of deliberations .833 
2.2 Frequency and length of meetings .845 
2.3 Board’s organisation .885 









The three items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The new variable 
was named Process - Efficiency. It proved to be of normal distribution, although 




The decision scale consisted of three items, measured on a seven-point scale. 
Measuring the reliability of the scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .363 for the 
three items, with 113 cases included in the analysis. That is far below the minimum 
level of reliability of .6 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). This indicated the three 
items did not form a scale. The third item (2.6 impulsive/deliberate) turned out to be 























2.4 decisions fast-slow 10.47 2.930 .224 .367 .247 
2.5 decisions informed 10.23 2.464 .537 .363 -.384(a) 
2.6 decisions impulsive 11.57 3.944 -.023 .103 .709 
a  The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items.  
 
As was outlined in the operationalisation process in chapter 3, the third item was 
tested as to whether it represented a reverse scale. This exercise did improve the 
Cronbach alpha to .393, however, it was well below the accepted level. Further 
analysis of outliers and extremes did not improve the item correlation. Item 2.6 was 
therefore eliminated from the scale. Cronbach alphas for the other two items were 
.709 for 113 cases. Therefore, further analysis was conducted with only two items 
in the scale.   
 
Factor analysis showed the items had inter-correlation above .3, but a KMO of .5, 
lower than the .6 level, and Bartlett’s significance at .000. Only the first component 
had an Eigenvalue over 1, implying a one-factor solution. The Eigenvalue for 
component 1 was 1.528, explaining 76% of the variance (table 4.2.5). Both items 
had factor loadings higher than .87.  Although the KMO rule of thumb was violated, 
it was decided to retain the factor for further analysis.  
 
Table 4.2.5: Factor analysis of decision scale. 
Comp. Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.528 76.399 76.399 1.528 76.399 76.399 
2 .472 23.601 100,000    
  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
The two items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The new variable was 
named Process - Decision. The distribution proved to be tailed to the left, with two 
possible outliers (cases 93 and 28). In accord with the more lenient approach to 
outliers (Pallant, 2005; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001), the values were made less 
extreme, and moved one point upwards. This approach considerably improved the 






Table 4.2.6: Process - Decision scale. 
ProcDecision - Items Factor 
loading 
2.4 The board’s decision process is slow/quick .874 
2.5 The board’s decision process is uninformed/informed .874 









4.2.2.3 Style of decision-making 
The style scale consisted of five items, measured on a seven-point scale between 
two extremes. Measuring the reliability of the scale showed a Cronbach alpha of 
.343 for the three items, with all 114 cases included in the analysis. That is far 
below the minimum level of reliability of .6 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). This 
indicated the five items did not form a scale. The fifth item (2.11 supportive/non-
supportive) turned out to be the problem, as the other four items did correlate (table 
4.2.7).  
 
Table 4.2.7: The importance of style items. 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 








Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
2.7 style regressive 19.52 5.544 .502 .468 -.022(a) 
2.8 style timid 19.94 6.501 .435 .298 .099 
2.9 style hostile 18.42 7.449 .246 .459 .245 
2.10 style discourage 19.05 5.077 .528 .578 -.087(a) 
2.11 style support 21.18 11.119 -.379 .232 .773 
a  The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items.  
 
Therefore, the fifth item was tested for reverse scale. The concerns about items 
being reverse coded were discussed in section 3.2. Recoding the item improved the 
Cronbach alpha to .758, which is above the accepted level. Item 2.11 was still the 
weakest link in the scale, although not as disturbing (table 4.2.8). 
 
 
Table 4.2.8: Importance of style items – with reversed coded item 2.11.  
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 














2.7 style regressive 21.48 8.482 .676 .477 .655 
2.8 style timid 21.90 10.637 .436 .304 .745 
2.9 style hostile 20,39 10.451 .496 .416 .726 
2.10 style discourage 21.02 7.911 .697 .577 .644 
2.11 style support 21.18 11.119 .343 .134 .773 
 
 
Factor analysis showed the items had inter-correlation above .3, although item 2.11 
was lower in three of four. The KMO was .701, higher than the .6 level, and 
Bartlett’s significance was .000. Only the first component had an Eigenvalue over 
1, implying a one-factor solution. The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 2.564, 
explaining 51% of the variance (table 4.2.9). This result indicated the scale was not 
very good, as it could only explain 51% of the variance. The problem item was still 
2.11.  Removing that item from the factor analysis provided a four-item factor 
explaining 60% of the variance, with the lowest factor loading above .6 (table 
4.2.10). 
 
Table 4.2.9: Factor analysis for the style scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Comp Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2,385 59,625 59,625 2,385 59,625 59,625 
2 ,900 22,512 82,137    
3 ,420 10,504 92,641    
4 ,294 7,359 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.2.10: Process - Style scale. 
Process-Style - Items  Factor 
loading 
2.7 In dealing with the CEO the board is regressive/progressive .840 
2.8 In dealing with the CEO the board is timid/aggressive .623 
2.9 In dealing with the CEO the board is hostile/friendly  .706 
2.10 In dealing with the CEO the board is discouraging/encouraging .890 









The four items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The new variable 
was named Process - Style. The distribution proved to be normal, with one possible 







The information scale consisted of five items, measured on a seven-point scale 
between disagree and agree. The reliability of the scale showed Cronbach alpha was 
.726 for the five items, with all 114 cases included in the analysis. This represented 
acceptable reliability (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994), and indicated the five items 
did form a scale (table 4.2.11).  
 
Table 4.2.11: The importance of information items. 
   












Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
2.12 info flow 17.04 20.556 .476 .328 .685 
2.13 info scrutinize 17.92 17.560 .636 .461 .618 
2.14 info finding 18.96 18.697 .458 .296 .694 
2.15 info questioning 17.12 18.870 .611 .454 .635 
2.16 info critique 18.57 21.238 .297 .133 .754 
 
Factor analysis showed the items had inter-correlation above .3, although item 2.16 
was lower in three out of four. The KMO was .706, higher than the .6 level, and 
Bartlett’s significance was .000. The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 2.477, 
explaining 50% of the variance (table 4.1.12). Four items had factor loadings higher 
than .6, and item 2.16 had factor-loading of .468. By excluding item 2.16 the more 
than 58% of the variance could be explained and all the factor-loadings were higher 
than .67. Item 2.16 was therefore deleted from the factor and a four item factor for 
information was constructed.  
 
Table 4.2.12: Factor analysis for the information scale. 
Comp Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2,335 58,365 58,365 2,335 58,365 58,365 
2 ,802 20,038 78,403    
3 ,503 12,571 90,974    
4 ,361 9,026 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
The four items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The new variable 
was named Process - Information. The distribution proved to be normal, with one 
possible outlier (case 28), which was smoothed to the next value above it. The scale 






Table 4.2.13: Process – Information scale. 
Process Information - Items Factor 
loading 
2.12 Information flows efficiently in due time to our board members via formal and 
informal channels 
.742 
2.13 Our board members carefully scrutinize information prior to meetings .836 
2.14 The board is usually active in finding their own information in addition to the 
reports from management  
.676 
2.15 The board is often asking discerning questions in connection with suggestions 
initiated by management 
.792 
Alpha Mean SD Skewness (CR) Kurtosis (CR) 








4.2.2.5 Discussion of process scales 
Four scales were examined as part of the process variable. The scale for efficiency 
turned out to be the only scale where everything went ‘by the book.’ The 
information scale was a concern as the factor only explained 50% of the variance, 
and not the 60% required by Hair et al (2003), and item 2.16 had less than .5 factor 
loading, although it did not violate the .40 rule of thumb (Hair et al., 2003). The 
problem with item 2.16 might have been the wording of the question, as ‘critical’ 
could mean both ‘judgmental’ as well as ‘important.’ A further study of the item 
might reveal ambiguity about the question, or some other factor weakening the item 
in the scale. The item was excluded from the scale. The scale for style was 
somewhat problematic, as it turned out item 2.11 had reverse coding, although this 
was not mentioned in the discussion of the original instrument constructed by Zahra 
and Pearce (1991). After the coding of the item had been reversed, although it fit 
better in the scale it was still the weakest link. Furthermore, the factor explained 
only 51% of the variance with item 2.11 included, but 60% without it. This implied 
the item should at the very least not be reverse coded in future, or perhaps could be 
eliminated from the scale, as it was in this research. The decision scale turned out to 
be the most problematic. Item 2.6 simply did not fit into the scale, reverse coded or 
not. The understanding of ‘impulsive’ vs. ‘deliberate’ could have been the issue, as 
‘impulsive’ could indicate either ‘doing things without planning’ or a more 
‘entrepreneurial’ type of decision style, while ‘deliberate’ could indicate either 





not possible to determine precisely what was wrong with the item, other than the 
reverse coding confusing respondents. All the scales were taken to the next step of 
the analysis, discussed in section 4.3.   
 
4.2.3 Purifying board roles  
All scales in this section were garnered from different sources. The strategy role 
portion used insight from top management research (Kanji and Sá, 2001; Kanji, 
2002), taking corporate governance research into consideration. The monitoring and 
service scales were adopted from Carpenter and Westphal (2001) and Heuvel et al. 
(2006). They presented recent insights from research on board tasks.  
 
A factor analysis on all board role items with Eigenvalue of 1 gave a five-factor 
solution, with a clear strategy role factor, service and resource factor, value factor, 
and two monitoring factors. The five factors explained 72% of the variance. A 
better three-factor solution resulted in a clear strategic role factor (with value, 
vision, mission and strategy included), a service and resource factor, and a three-
item monitoring factor. These three factors explained 63% of the variance. One 
item, 5.15 - The board determines management’s responsibility - loaded equally on 
the strategy factor and the monitoring factor, with under .5 factor loading in both 
cases (table 4.2.14).   
 
Therefore a clear distinction between the scales chosen for exploring the role of the 
board was established. The three factors were theoretically distinct as the strategy 
factor related to stewardship theory, monitoring factor to agency theory and the 
resource and advice factor to resource dependency theory as was discussed in 
Chapter 2, Sections 2.1 to 2.4. Each of the three-factors will be discussed in the next 
subsections.    
 
 
Table 4.2.14: Factor analysis for roles as tasks. 
   Factors 
 Items Strategy R&A Monitor 
5.4 vision future .832   





5.9 mission current .816   
5.8 mission commitment .805   
5.7 mission purpose .799   
5.5 vision communication .796   
5.10 strategy policies .774   
5.11 strategy change .728   
5.3 values systems .696   
5.12 strategy guide .679   
5.14 strategy perf monitor .636   
5.1 values meanings .600   
5.2 values decision .587   
5.13 strategy resource empl .486   
5.15 monitor responsibility .483   
5.22 advice on strategy  .771  
5.24 resources networking  .771  
5.20 advice ceo assistance  .745  
5.21 advice sounding board  .659  
5.23 resources reputation  .618  
5.25 resources access re  .593  
5.19 monitor compensation   .694 
5.17 monitor evaluates   .567 
5.16 monitor decisions   .564 
5.18 monitor ceo judgement   .460 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
4.2.3.1 Strategic role 
The strategic role consisted of 14 items, measured on a seven-point scale from very 
little to very much. Kanji’s and Sá (2001) and Kanji’s (2002) construct for 
leadership excellence has four components which theoretically can be separated. 
Table 4.2.15 shows Cronbach alphas reported by Kanji and Sá (2001) and those for 
this study.  
 
Table 4.2.15: Strategic role compared to the original scale. 
Construct Reported Alphas 
Kanji and Sá (2001) 
Cronbach Alpha 
This Study 
Values .844 .923 
Vision .736 .930 
Mission .790 .912 
Strategy .906 .921 
 
Measurement of the reliability of the scale showed Cronbach alpha .958 for the 
fourteen items, with 106 cases included in the analysis (listwise deletion for missing 






Table 4.2.16: Importance of strategic role items. 
   
Scale Mean 













5.1 values meanings 57.73 257.820 .721 .694 .956 
5.2 values decision 57.50 258.024 .720 .793 .956 
5.3 values systems 57.82 252.834 .798 .803 .954 
5.4 vision future 57,44 250.363 .851 .851 .953 
5.5 vision communication 58.00 255.505 .788 .810 .955 
5.6 vision confidence 57.82 251.196 .836 .833 .953 
5.7 mission purpose 57.49 253.395 .852 .778 .953 
5.8 mission commitment 58.24 253.972 .802 .770 .954 
5.9 mission current 57.69 257.435 .786 .734 .955 
5.10 strategy policies 57.97 253.342 .807 .737 .954 
5.11 strategy change 57.17 264.123 .704 .650 .957 
5.12 strategy guide 58.17 256.085 .734 .674 .956 
5.13 strategy resourc emp 58.04 260.837 .658 .591 .958 
5.14 strategy perfmonitor 57.01 262.752 .732 .659 .956 
 
 
Factor analysis showed all items had inter-correlation above .3. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was .919, above the .6 level, and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity significant at .000 (should be .05 or smaller). The 
Eigenvalue for the first component 1 was 9.104, explaining 65% of the variance 
(table 4.2.17). All items had factor loadings higher than .69 (table 4.2.18). 
 
The factor was named Strategic role. Fourteen items were reduced to one factor for 
further analysis. The distribution turned out to be normal. The scale and the 







Table 4.2.17: Factor analysis for strategic scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Comp. Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9.104 65.028 65.028 9.104 65.028 65.028 
2 1.005 7.182 72.210    





4 .604 4.312 82.421    
5 .496 3.544 85.964    
6 .403 2.878 88.842    
7 .346 2.473 91.315    
8 .308 2.200 93.515    
9 .221 1.578 95.093    
10 .198 1.415 96.508    
11 .169 1.209 97.717    
12 .130 .928 98.645    
13 .100 .715 99.360    
14 .090 .640 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.2.18. Strategic role scale. 
Strategic Role - Items Factor 
loading 
5.1 The board develops shared meaning and interpretation of reality. .756 
5.2 The board uses organisational values to guide decision making. .746 
5.3 The board puts in place reinforcement systems consistent with organisational 
values and principles. 
.805 
5.4 The board creates a compelling vision of the future of the organisation. .885 
5.5 The board communicates the vision effectively. .832 
5.6 The board inspires confidence in the vision. .872 
5.7 The board identifies the organisation’s purpose. .881 
5.8 The board generates commitment among all members for the chosen purpose. .833 
5.9 The board keeps the mission current. .833 
5.10 The board develops policies and strategies consistent with the organisation’s 
mission, vision, and values. 
.843 
5.11 The board anticipates change. .755 
5.12 The board guides change. .768 
5.13 The board monitors resources and uses feedback to review strategies. .692 
5.14 The board monitors organisational performance and uses feedback to review 
strategies. 
.762 









4.2.3.2 Monitoring role 
The monitoring role consisted of five items, measured on a seven-point scale from 
very little to very much. Measuring the reliability of the scale showed a Cronbach 
alpha of .724 for the five items, with 112 cases included in the analysis. Item 5.18 - 
The board defers to the CEO’s judgment on final strategic decisions - did, however, 
decrease the reliability. The Cronbach alpha would have been .782 had it not been 
included (table 4.2.19).  
 





   
Scale Mean 













5.15 monitor responsibility 19.65 20.697 .544 .419 .653 
5.16 monitor decisions 19.45 19.619 .714 .592 .590 
5.17 monitor evaluates 20.48 17.982 .582 .412 .636 
5.18 monitor ceo judgement 18.79 27.948 .132 .055 .782 
5.19 monitor compensation 18.73 21.189 .478 .286 .680 
 
 
Factor analysis showed all items with inter-correlation above .3, except item 5.18, 
which had a lower value in all cases. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy (KMO) was .704, that was above the .6 level, and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant at .000. The factor analysis gave a two-factor solution 
with item 5.18 as a stand-alone factor, explaining 20% of the variance. A one-factor 
solution had only a .217 loading. Item 5.18 was therefore deleted from the scale, 
and only four items remained in the new scale. Item 5.18 was one of the original 
items in the three-item scale of Carpenter and Westphal (2001). For the four item 
scale the Eigenvalue for the first component was 2.479, explaining 62% of the 
variance (table 4.2.20). All items had factor loadings higher than .72 (table 4.2.21).   
 
Table 4.2.20: Factor analysis for the monitoring scale. 
  Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Comp. Total % of Var. Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.479 61.970 61.970 2.479 61.970 61.970 
2 .655 16.385 78.355    
3 .587 14.680 93.035    
4 .279 6.965 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
The second factor, referring to roles as tasks, was named Monitoring role. Four 
items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The distribution turned out to 
be normal, with one possible outlier (case 93). The scale and the elements are found 
in table 4.2.21. 
 
Table 4.2.21: Monitoring role scale. 
Monitoring Role - Items Factor 
loading 





5.16 The board monitors top management strategic decision-making. .892 
5.17 The board formally evaluates the CEO’s performance. .756 
5.19 The board determines salary/compensation of CEO and top management team. .727 










4.2.3.3 Resource and Advice role 
The third factor in board role analysis from the preliminary factor analysis was what 
had originally counted as two scales, the advice scale, and the resource scale. This 
resource and advice scale was made up of six items, items 5.20 – 5.25, and was 
measured on a seven-point scale from very little to very much. The reliability of the 
scale showed a Cronbach alpha of .865 for the six items, with 110 cases included in 
the analysis (table 4.2.22).  
 
Table 4.2.22: Importance of resource and advice items. 














Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
5.20 advice ceo assistance 22.57 42.632 .691 .507 .842 
5.21 advice sounding board 23.25 40.595 .620 .455 .849 
5.22 advice on strategy 23.08 39.489 .645 .438 .845 
5.23 resources  reputation 23.58 38.411 .694 .532 .836 
5.24 resources networking 23.36 37.481 .741 .564 .827 
5.25 resources access 23.78 37.860 .613 .405 .854 
 
 
Factor analysis showed all items with inter-correlation above .3. The Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was .864, that was above the .6 level, 
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity significant at .000. Factor analysis gave a one-factor 
solution. The first component had an Eigenvalue of 3.628, explaining 60% of the 
variance (table 4.2.23). All items had factor loadings higher than .72 (table 4.2.24).   
 
Table 4.2.23: Factor analysis for resource and advice scale. 
 
Comp. Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.628 60.473 60.473 3.628 60.473 60.473 





3 .519 8.643 81.177    
4 .452 7.531 88.708    
5 .381 6.342 95.050    
6 .297 4.950 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
From the three-factor solution, the third factor was named Resource and Advice 
role. Six items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The distribution 
turned out to be normal, with one possible outlier (case 93). The scale and the 
elements are found in table 4.2.24. 
 
Table 4.2.24: The resource and advice role. 
Resource-Advice Role - Items  Factor 
loading 
5.20 The CEO solicits board assistance in the formulation of corporate strategy. .797 
5.21 Directors are a “sounding board” on strategic issues. .747 
5.22 The board provides advice and counsel to the CEO on strategic issues. .762 
5.23 The board builds organisational reputation. .799 
5.24 The board focuses on networking and company. .835 
5.25 The board provides access to extra resources. .720 











4.2.3.4 Discussion of role-task scales 
Factor analysis using all 25 items related to tasks resulted in a three-factor solution. 
The three factors were the strategic role, monitoring role, and resource and advice 
role. They were supported both in theory literature and also empirically in this 
study. The strategic role was based on a scale borrowed from leadership literature, a 
broader measure than previously used in research on corporate governance. The 
high alpha and factor analysis both proved the instrument adaptable to board 
studies. The monitoring role was based on two different instruments. One item 
(5.18) turned out to have little correlation with the other items in the scale and was 
eliminated. This item was one of the original items in the scale adapted from 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001), which was used as the basis for the monitoring 
instrument. The problem may have been with the wording of the question ‘The 





could indicate either just a passive approach by the board, or merely a rubber stamp 
function. Further analysis of the instrument might define the problem. The resource 
and advice role factor reflects two theoretical roles. High correlation between the 
items indicated they could be combined into one single factor. This single factor 
could be relabelled either ‘support’ or ‘service,’ as the items were of a supportive 
nature and served the CEO. However, the difficulty with these labels was their 
various meanings in the literature, so this approach might only have added to the 
confusion. Therefore, the resource and advice role was used for this factor. This 
analysis of board tasks in this study has developed three important factors for future 
investigation.  
 
4.2.4 Purifying authority  
Authority is another scale adopted from Zahra and Pearce (1992). It is a scale 
measuring power, consisting of 15 items (Cronbach alpha of .79-.86), measured on 
a seven-point scale from very little to very much.  Reliability measurement of the 
scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .907 for the 15 items, with 107 cases 
included in the analysis (listwise deletion for missing values). This indicated 
changes regarding how the scale was used, which required respondents to evaluate 
the power of board compared to the power of the CEO, were not problematic. All of 
the items showed high correlation (table 4.2.25).   
 
Factor analysis showed most items had inter-correlation above .3, however, items 
3.8 and 3.9 had scores lower than .3 in the inter-correlation matrix.  Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was .869, that is above the .6 level, 
and Bartlett’s test of significance was .000 (should be .05 or smaller). Three 
components had an Eigenvalue over 1, implying a three-factor solution. However, 
testing with a two-factor solution gave better results, as the distinction between 
factor loadings was more clear. The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 6.737, 
explaining 45% of the variance. The Eigenvalue for component 2 was 1.739, 
explaining 12% of the variance. The two-factor solution, therefore, explained 57% 
of the variance (table 4.2.26).  
 



















Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
3.1 authority by law 63.05 243.969 .636 .637 .900 
3.2 authority structure 62.42 252.472 .638 .673 .900 
3.3 authority expenditure 62.78 251.591 .637 .526 .900 
3.4 authority divestments 61.96 255.074 .654 .735 .900 
3.5 authority acquisitions 61.36 268.347 .464 .593 .905 
3.6 authority goals 62.05 253.385 .674 .622 .899 
3.7 authority policy 62.84 245.984 .709 .681 .897 
3.8 authority successors 63.73 242.822 .650 .616 .899 
3.9 authority new CEO 62.07 253.862 .453 .408 .907 
3.10 authority performance 64.11 247.648 .638 .622 .900 
3.11 authority strategy 63.11 247.063 .724 .592 .897 
3.12 authority technology 63.88 250.145 .618 .538 .900 
3.13 authority compensation 62.68 254.219 .500 .338 .905 
3.14 authority charity 64.38 249.654 .537 .509 .904 
3.15 authority stakeholders 63.72 254.373 .525 .474 .904 
 
 
The two-factor solution revealed four items loaded on both factors, with higher 
loadings than .4. These were 3.11, 3.7, 3.3, and 3.1. Furthermore, two items, 3.9 and 
3.13, had factor loadings lower than .5. These two items were deleted as they were 
not theoretically clear with regard to the distinction between the two factors. The 
two-factor solution indicated a theoretical distinction between the two factors, one 
to do with financial outcome issues, and the other with a more process orientated 
direction of the company (Brett, 2000). The first factor was named Authority - 
Finance. Six items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The distribution 
proved to be normal, with one possible outlier (case 28). The scale and the elements 






Table 4.2.26: Factor analysis for authority scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 




of Var. Cumul. % Total 
% 





1 6.737 44.912 44.912 6.737 44.912 44.912 4.469 29.796 29.796 
2 1.739 11.591 56.503 1.739 11.591 56.503 4.006 26.707 56.503 
3 1.009 6.723 63.227       
4 .976 6.506 69.733       
5 .749 4.995 74.728       
6 .690 4.601 79.329       
7 .626 4.175 83.503       
8 .540 3.599 87.103       
9 .378 2.518 89.621       
10 .361 2.407 92.028       
11 .306 2.039 94.067       
12 .286 1.904 95.971       
13 .241 1.609 97.580       
14 .199 1.330 98.910       
15 .164 1.090 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table 4.2.27: Financial Authority scale. 
Authority Finance - Items  Factor 
loading 
3.1 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding changing company 
by-laws 
.505 
3.2 … regarding approving changes in capital structure .830 
3.3 … regarding decisions about capital expenditures .506 
3.4 … regarding decisions about future divestments .876 
3.5 …  regarding decisions about future acquisitions .833 
3.6 … regarding establishing long-term goals .660 










From the two-factor solution, the second factor was named Authority - Direction. 
Seven items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The distribution proved 
to be normal, with one possible outlier (case 41). The scale and its elements are 









AuthDirection - Items  Factor 
loading 
3.7 How much formal authority or power has the board regarding policy formation .597 
3.8 … regarding planning for top leadership succession .751 
3.10 … regarding evaluating the performance of key executives (other than CEOs) .760 
3.11 … regarding selection of corporate strategy .598 
3.12 … regarding decisions to adopt new technologies .739 
3.14 … regarding decisions regarding charitable contribution .773 
3.15 … regarding dealing with stakeholders .637 









Furthermore, Authority was also kept intact as a scale and one factor, although it 
only explained 45% of the total variance (table 4.2.29).  
 
Table 4.2.29: The authority scale. 










The authority scale turned out to be a valid scale, despite changing its use in this 
study from the original study. High internal reliability indicated it was a good scale, 
although it only explained 45% of the variance in comparison with the 60% rule of 
thumb (Hair et al., 2003). Factor solutions with two and three factors were also 
possible. The two-factor solution was chosen because the factors could be explained 
in terms of distinct functions. The two-factor solution explained 57% of the 
variance and was therefore closer to the Hair et al. (2003) rule than the one- factor 
solution. Both the one- and the two- factor analysis were considered for the next 
step discussed in section 4.3.  
 
4.2.5 Performance 
The Performance instrument consisted of 27 items. In the design of the performance 
scale a logical distinction was indicated as follows: Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) (8 items), Responsiveness for innovation (4 items) and Total performance 
(15 items), as based on the work of Lindgren (2001) and Tanner (2005). Although 
there was a logical and theoretical argument for maintaining the distinction between 





distinction would hold. Running the factor analysis with factor creation on 
Eigenvalue over 1 gave a solution of seven factors, explaining 70% of variance. The 
seven-factor solution was not interesting because there were too many factors, 
although the distribution of items made logical sense.  
 
Table 4.2.30: Factor analysis of performance measures. 
 Factors 
  Responsive Sales & quality Development CSR Financial 
4.25 perf resp decisions .752     
4.24 perf resp threats .715     





4.12 perf competition .660     
4.26 perf resp resources .623     
4.15 perf diversity .542     
4.11 perf service .496     
4.22 perf quality  .692    
4.21 perf share  .661    
4.23 perf empl satisf  .550    
4.20 perf sales  .528    
4.17 perf new service   .830   
4.16 perf change   .739   
4.18 perf develope   .651   
4.2 csr env protection    .812  





4.7 csr sustainability    .748  
4.5 csr env responsible    .730  
4.4 csr respected    .697  
4.6 csr dev economy    .682  
4.1 csr workforce    .645  
4.8 csr health    .453  
4.9 perf financial     .862 
4.13 perf profitability     .855 
4.14 perf cash     .805 
4.10 perf goals     .753 
4.19 perf overall .410 .471   .488 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
The scree-plot indicated, however, a three- to five-factor solution might be better. 
The five- factor solution was chosen because (a) there were fewer factors, (b) the 
items had higher loadings, (c) there was a clearer distinction between the factors 






The solution turned out differently from original expectations, but actually was 
more logical and had better theoretical support. The CSR factor refers to 
stakeholder theory and is based on the operationalisation process (Tanner, 2005). 
All the financial outcome elements loaded on the second factor (Brett, 2000; 
Larsen, 2007). The other three factors were a clear summary of process elements 
(Brett, 2000) of the performance instrument. Items regarding response to 
competitors and market forces loaded on one factor, which was called 
Responsiveness. The four items adapted from Bettis and Hitt (1995). Three items 
regarding change and development, items 4.16 – 4.18, loaded on the same factor, 
which was called development. Four items regarding sales, market share, employee 
satisfaction and quality, items 4.20 – 4.23, loaded on one factor, which was called 
sales and quality. At last, one variable loaded on more than one factor above .4, 
which was the only variable loading on more than one factors with so large 
loadings, was overall performance. The variable was kept as a single variable 
indicatore called overall performance. This section explains in more detail the five 
different factors chosen for the analysis.   
 
 
4.2.5.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
The factor analysis with a three-factor solution resulted in a clear corporate social 
responsibility scale, with the original eight items intact. The corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) scale consisted of eight items measured on a seven-point scale 
from very little to very much.  
 
Measuring the reliability of the scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .851 for the 
eight items, with 112 cases included in the analysis (listwise deletion for missing 












   
Scale Mean 













4.1 csr health 33.71 57.939 .553 .447 .837 
4.2 csr env protection 34.26 53.131 .706 .631 .818 
4.3 csr community inv.  33.75 53.018 .683 .535 .821 
4.4 csr respected 32.84 59.794 .598 .481 .834 
4.5 csr env responsible 33.46 59.169 .638 .456 .830 
4.6 csr dev economy 33.23 56.594 .599 .504 .832 
4.7 csr sustainability 34.17 52.178 .670 .582 .823 
4.8 csr workforce 33.34 61.217 .334 .137 .865 
 
 
The factor analysis showed all items had inter-correlation above .3, except item 4.8 
with a constantly lower value. KMO measure of sampling adequacy was .828, 
above the .6 level, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant at .000 (should be 
.05 or smaller). Only the first component had an Eigenvalue over 1, implying a one-
factor solution. The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 4.027, explaining 50% of the 
variance (table 4.2.32). The two weakest items in terms of correlations, items 4.1 
and 4.8, were deleted from the factor.  The six remaining items explained 58% of 
the variance and all items had higher than .690 factor loadings.  
 
Table 4.2.32: Factor analysis of CSR scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Comp. Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3,479 57,989 57,989 3,479 57,989 57,989 
2 ,832 13,862 71,851    
3 ,620 10,327 82,178    
4 ,490 8,167 90,345    
5 ,329 5,477 95,822    
6 ,251 4,178 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
From the five-factor solution for performance, the first factor was named 
Performance-CSR. Six items were reduced to one factor for further analysis (table 










 Performance-CSR - Items Factor 
loading 
4.2 Develops policies to protect the environment. .790 
4.3 Is actively involved in the local community. .779 
4.4 Is well respected by the local community. .699 
4.5 Is environmentally responsible. .740 
4.6 Develops the local economy. .755 
4.7 Follows sustainability (corporate and social responsibility) policies.  .801 











The factor analysis, with a five-factor solution, resulted in a scale of responsiveness 
(Bettis and Hitt, 1995) with three items from the main performance scale (Hart and 
Banbury, 1994). Interestingly enough, all items could be grouped under 
‘responsiveness’. The responsiveness scale consisted of 7 items: all items from the 
responsiveness scale (4.24, 4.25, 4.26, and 4.27) and three items from the main 
performance scale (4.11, 4.12 and 4.15). All items were measured on a seven-point 
scale from very little to very much. Measuring the reliability of the scale showed 
the Cronbach alpha was .861 for the eight items, with 113 cases included in the 
analysis (table 4.2.34). 
 

















4.24 resp 1 threats 32,64 19,733 .621 .465 .843 
4.25 resp 2 decisions 32,73 18,786 .731 .613 .828 
4.26 resp 3 resources 32,98 18,375 .631 .454 .842 
4.27 resp 4 
opportunity 
32,44 18,820 .659 .458 .837 
4.11 perf 3 service 32,58 20,032 .538 .378 .853 
4.12 perf 4 
competition 
32,36 18,823 .649 .509 .838 










 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Comp. Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3,848 54,967 54,967 3,848 54,967 54,967 
2 ,824 11,772 66,739    
3 ,671 9,584 76,323    
4 ,551 7,867 84,189    
5 ,453 6,477 90,666    
6 ,396 5,663 96,329    
7 ,257 3,671 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Running a factor analysis showed the items had inter-correlation above .3. KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy was .844, is above the .6 level, and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant at .000. Running factor analysis with Eignevalue over 1 
gave a one-factor solution, explaining 55% of the variance and all items with factor-
loadings above .650.  
 
From the five-factor solution for performance, the second factor was named 
Performance Responsiveness. Seven items were reduced to one factor for further 
analysis. The distribution turned out to be normal. The scale and the elements are 
found in table 4.2.36. 
 
Table 4.2.36: Performance –Responsiveness scale. 
Performance Responsiveness - Items Factor 
loading 
4.11 Has achieved the desired service and/or product outcomes. .652 
4.12 Has a high competitive position. .747 
4.15 Will seek to diversify in the marketplace. .702 
4.24 Sense potential threats (legislative, political, technological, competitive, 
customer demands etc.) 
.740 
4.25 Conceptualise a response and make decisions and plans to meet threats. .825 
4.26 Reconfigure resources and implement necessary changes to meet threats. .745 
4.27 Sense new business or technological opportunities. .768 









4.2.5.3 Sales & Quality 
The factor analysis, with a five-factor solution, resulted in a scale of sales and 
quality with items from Hart and Banbury (1994). The Sales and Quality scale 
consisted of 4 items: 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23. All items were measured on a 





scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .723 for the eight items, awith 114 cases 
included in the analysis. There was high correlation between the items (table 
4.2.37). 
 

















4.20 perf 12 sales 16,68 5,867 ,597 ,635 ,607 
4.21 perf 13 m.share 16,94 5,704 ,641 ,647 ,575 
4.22 perf 14 quality 16,67 7,959 ,414 ,376 ,714 
4.23 perf 15 empl.satisf. 17,01 7,832 ,415 ,338 ,713 
 
Running a factor analysis showed that a two-factor solution was possible with the 
two sales items (4.20 and 4.21) loading on one factor and quality and employee-
satisfaction (4.22 and 4.23) on another. As the one-factor solution failed the KMO 
test it was decided to split the factor into two factors, explaining 81% of the 
variance (table 4.2.38). The items factor loadings on the sales growth factor were 
above .910 (table 4.2.39) and above .83 on the quality factor (4.2.40). 
 
Table 4.2.38: Factor analysis for sales & quality scale.  
 Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 















1 2,185 54,614 54,614 2,185 54,614 54,614 1,740 43,507 43,507 
2 1,042 26,046 80,660 1,042 26,046 80,660 1,486 37,153 80,660 
3 ,595 14,869 95,529             
4 ,179 4,471 100,000             
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Items 4.20 and 4.21 were related to sales growth and market share growth, the 
factor was therefore called Growth. The two items were reduced to one factor for 
further analysis. The distribution turned out to be normal, although one case (case 
68) was smoothed to the next value above, as it was an extreme outlier. The scale 
and the elements are found in table 4.2.39. 
 
 
Table 4.2.39: Performance – Growth scale. 






4.20 Has positive sales growth. .930 
4.21 Has an increasing market share. .911 









Items 4.22 and 4.23 were related to employee satisfaction and high standard of 
quality in service and products, the factor was therefore called Satisfaction. The two 
items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. The distribution turned out to 
be normal. The Cronbach’s Alpha was .644 indicating it was not a very good scale 
and it was a question if the items should be forced into a scale. The scale was, 
however, kept as the two items explained 74% of the variance. The scale and the 
elements are found in table 4.2.40. 
 
Table 4.2.40: Performance – Satisfaction scale. 
Performance Satisfaction - Items Factor 
loading 
4.22 Has a high standard of quality in service and/or products. .855 
4.23 Has high employee satisfaction. .836 










The factor analysis, with a five-factor solution, resulted in a scale of development 
with items from Hart and Banbury (1994). The Development scale consisted of 3 
items: 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18, all related to introduce and develop new products or 
services. All items were measured on a seven-point scale from very little to very 
much. Measuring the reliability of the scale showed the Cronbach alpha was .795 
for the three items, awith 114 cases included in the analysis. There was high 
correlation between the items (table 4.2.41). 
 
Running a factor analysis showed the items had inter-correlation above .3. KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy was .697, is above the .6 level, and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant at .000. Running factor analysis with Eignevalue over 1 
gave a one-factor solution, explaining 71% of the variance and all items with factor-
loadings above .81. The three items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. 
























4.16 perf 8 change 10,02 8,460 ,636 ,421 ,728 
4.17 perf 9 
newservice 
9,85 7,155 ,686 ,476 ,668 
4.18 perf 10 
develope 
10,38 7,777 ,600 ,363 ,763 
 
 
Table 4.2.42: Performance – Development scale. 
Performance Development - Items Factor 
loading 
4.16 Will change its existing products and services. .842 
4.17 Will introduce new services and/or products next year. .873 
4.18 Will have an active services and/or product development programme. .815 









4.2.5.5 Financial performance 
Factor analysis with a three-factor solution resulted in a clear financial scale. The 
underlying items could be grouped under financial performance. The financial 
performance scale consisted of four items, all items from the main performance 
scale (4.9, 4.10, 4.13, and 4.14). All items were measured on a seven-point scale 
from very little to very much. Measuring the reliability of the scale showed a 
Cronbach alpha of .883 for the four items, with 114 cases included in the analysis 
(table 4.2.43).  
 
Running a factor analysis showed all items had inter-correlation above .3. KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy was .785, that is above the .6 level, and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity was significant at .000. The Eigenvalue for component 1 was 
3.008, explaining 75% of the variance (table 4.2.42). All items had factor loadings 
higher than .70 (table 4.2.44).  
 
Table 4.2.43: The importance of financial performance items. 
  
Scale Mean 











Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
4.13 perf profitability 16.32 10.203 .809 .714 .833 
4.14 perf cash 15.70 13.432 .655 .432 .882 





4.10 perf goals 16.07 14.314 .720 .572 .866 
 
 
Table 4.2.44: Factor analysis for financial performance scale. 
 Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Comp. Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.008 75.190 75.190 3.008 75.190 75.190 
2 .486 12.160 87.350    
3 .359 8.986 96.337    
4 .147 3.663 100.000    
     Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
From the five-factor solution for performance, the third factor was named 
Performance Finance. Four items were reduced to one factor for further analysis. 
The distribution turned out to be normal, although with two potential outliers (case 
4 and case 53). The scale and the elements are found in table 4.2.45. 
 
Table 4.2.45: Financial performance scale. 
Performance Finance - Items Factor 
loading 
4.9 Has a strong financial performance. .927 
4.10 Achieves its goals. .845 
4.13 Has high profitability. .900 
4.14 Has a positive cash flow. .790 











4.2.5.6 Overall Performance 
One item, 4.19 - Overall performance, was eliminated from the factors, as it loaded 
equally on Competitiveness performance and Financial performance at the .50 
level. It can therefore be labelled an overall performance measure. The variable is 
normally distributed. The mean and the standard deviation of the variable are shown 
in table 4.2.40.  
 
Table 4.2.46: Overall performance – one item. 












The six performance factors, Responsive performance, Growth performance, 
Satisfaction performance, Development performance, Financial performance, and 
CSR performance, are, however, the best measures of overall performance. They 
indicate different aspects of performance as financial outcome measures, process 
measures, and stakeholder measures. They meet the requirement of the survey to 
develop a broad measure for performance to understand how the board of directors 
can relate to performance.  
 
4.2.6 Multicollinearity 
The final step in the examination of the data before hypothesis testing was to look at 
the collinearity. This approach is critical to multivariate analysis, as it explains how 
independent variable effects can be accounted for by other independent variables in 
the analysis (Palludan, 2005). Collinearity is a technique to measure the relationship 
between two independent variables. Multicollinearity is a way to explore whether a 
singe independent variable is highly correlated to a set of other independent 
variables.  
 
The criteria for the test were that two independent variables have complete 
collinearity if their correlation coefficient is 1, and complete lack of collinearity if 
the correlation coefficient is 0 (Hair et al., 2006). Collinearity is said to occur 
already at a correlation level of .30, although substantial collinearity is generally 
indicated at .90 and above (Hair et al., 2006). Tabacnhick and Fidell (2001) suggest 
if the correlation is above .70 between two independent variables, consideration 
should be given to removing one. The higher the collinearity, the harder it becomes 
to separate the effects of each variable. Therefore, the ideal situation is independent 
variables with little correlation between them, but instead high correlation to the 
dependent variables. It is important to check for collinearity and its impact on the 
results (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
Three approaches are generally used by researchers to check for collinearity (Hair 
et al., 2006). These are (1) a graphic approach looking at the scatterplot, (2) an 





measure of tolerance, or the degree of variability of the chosen independent variable 
not explained by other independent variables (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
Running linear regression on SPSS showed collinearity was not a problem, as no 
bivariate correlation was above 650. There was, however, one exception, and that 
was between the Monitoring role and the Strategic role, where the correlation was 
.732, which is above the standard of .70 of Tabacnhick and Fidell (2001). Looking 
more closely at factor analysis, it was clear item 5.15 - Determining the manager’s 
responsibility - loaded highly on both the Strategic role factor and the Monitoring 
role factor. When the item was deleted from the Monitoring role factor, the 
correlation between the Strategic role factor and the Monitoring role factor was 
lowered to .662, but at the same time correlation was .966 with the old Monitoring 
role factor with item 5.15 included. The new three-item factor had a Cronbach alpha 
of .752, compared to .782 on the four-item scale. It was decided to keep two 
versions of the Monitoring role factor. The argument for keeping the old one for 
further analysis was item 5.15 was from the original scale (Churchill, 1995).  
 
Further exploration of multicollinearity uses the VIF and the tolerance values. If the 
tolerance value is very small (less than .10) it indicates the variable’s correlation 
with other variables is high, while a high VIF (there is an inverse relationship, 1-R2, 
between VIF and tolerance) in excess of 10 would express the same (Pallant, 2005). 
Here all variables had tolerance higher than .27 and VIF below 3.60, except one 
variable, the Monitoring role variable. The tolerance was .05, while the VIF value 
was 20.58, indicating high multicollinearity. The modified Monitoring role factor 
with three items also showed high multicollinearity, although to a lesser extreme (t 
= .06 and VIF = 16.55).  
 
The problem with multicollinearity was therefore noted, and it was accepted this 
would limit the use of the Monitoring role factor in multivariate analysis. The 
multicollinearity of the Monitoring role factor makes perfect sense from a 
theoretical perspective, as monitoring is considered the main role of the board, and 
a fundamental role by law (Drucker, 1954; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Lubatkin, 





of the board, as opposed to their other roles and functions. The design of the study 
did in fact consider this effect, and therefore there would still be use for the 
Monitoring role factor in further analysis of the data.  
 
The scatter-plot and the normal probability plot were used for a preliminary check 
for outliers within the multicollinearity analysis, and furthermore Cook’s distance 
was looked at as recommend by Pallant (2005). According to Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2001), a case is a potential problem if Cook’s distance is larger than one. Neither 
the graphic analysis nor Cook’s distance indicated any problems with outliers. In 
other words, no outliers that could significantly influence the results were found at 
this point.  
 
4.2.7 The purification process 
Noting Bertrand Russell’s quote at the beginning of this section, the purification 
process has increased the certainty of elements previously conceptualized but which 
suffered from lack of empirical support. The roles of the board are a good example. 
The purification process has established items related to a certain concept do in fact 
load on the same factor. This is an important step, not least in regard to the strategic 
role, which was based on an instrument adapted from different sources in the 
literature. This instrument has now been validated in the corporate governance 
context.   
 
Otherwise, the emphasis of this section was to check the reliability of scales 
adopted from previously published research, and modify these scales according to 
their results as factors. A summary of the factors is in table 4.2.47. Furthermore, a 
check of normality in distribution and collinearity was carried out to assess whether 
the data was acceptable for multivariate analysis. The results turned out to be 
positive.  
 
Table 4.2.47: Summary of factors in the study. 
Factor Alpha Items Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Strategic role .958 14 4.440 .119 -.300/.235 -.665/.465 
Monitoring role .782 4 4.699 .125 -.291/.228 -.558/.453 
Resource & Advice role .782 6 4.655 .118 -.484/.230 .058/.457 





Authority - Direction .907 7 4.496 .126 -.127/.234 .362/.463 
Process - Efficiency .810 3 4.730 .111 -.375/.229 -.131/.455 
Process - Decision .709 2 5.800 .088 -.647/.227 .173/.451 
Process - Style .773 4 5.322 .071 -.208/.226 -.501/.449 
Process - Information .754 4 4.689 .099 .027/.226 -.354/.449 
Performance - CSR .854 6 4.775 .108 -.145/.228 -.620/.453 
Performance - Responsiveness .861 7 5.427 .068 -.304/.227 -.293/.451 
Performance - Development .795 3 5.041 .125 -.502/.226 -.412/.449 
Performance - Growth .857 2 5.649 .103 -658/.226 .132/.449 
Performance - Satisfaction .644 2 5.592 .079 -.444/.227 -.564/.451 
Performance - Finance .883 4 5.421 .098 -.667/.226 -.105/.449 
 
 
The next section examines the actual testing of propositions, using correlation, 






4.3 Testing hypotheses 
 
A thinker sees his own actions as experiments and questions - as attempts to 
find out something. Success and failure are for him answers above all.  
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 - 1900) 
 
 
Research in the paradigms of realism and positivism concerns experiments to test 
beliefs or relevant theories (Popper, 2002). No matter the outcome, something 
needed to be understood and explained. If the outcome agrees with the theory and 
the related proposition, it helps to verify the theory in a positivist sense (Popper, 
2002). If it does not, it needs to be explained. However, clear explanations are hard 
to find, so often it becomes a matter of proposing some relevant explanation that 
may require further research. The purpose of this section is to test the hypotheses.    
 
Figure 4.3.1: Overview of the testing process.  
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In this section the relationships between variables are tested as they are set forth in 
the hypotheses. The approach used is correlation analysis and regression analysis, 
which is discussed in the first part of this section. The following subsections will 
focus on the actual testing of the main hypotheses. The last part is a summarisation 






4.3.1 Approach to testing  
Two main approaches are used for testing the hypotheses of this thesis, correlation 
analysis, and regression analysis. This is approach is similar to the one used in other 
doctorate work (for example Lindgren, 2001; Tanner, 2005).  
 
Correlation analysis simply assesses the relationship between two variables, without 
controlling for the effects of other variables. It is particularly useful in exploring 
relationships between variables that were not hypothesised, and when comparing 
and relating the results to previous research, where other sets of variables were 
employed (Hair et al., 2003). This approach was used here as a first step in 
checking the relationships between independent board variables, and the dependent 
organisational performance variables. However, the bivariate correlation analysis 
was only used for an overview, as the proposition guided the testing, and a more 
focused approach of single regressions tested the propositions. The correlation 
analysis can be found in the appendix.  
 
Multiple regression analysis is a more sophisticated technique to evaluate the 
impact of several independent variables on a given dependent variable. When 
examining the relationship between one of the independent variables and the 
dependent variables, all other variables in the model are controlled for (Hair et al., 
2003). In this research stepwise regression is used for testing the research model 
from an exploratory perspective. A stepwise multiple regression is a sequential 
approach in which the strongest correlation forms the basis of the model, and a set 
of independent variables are added or deleted from the model with the aim of 
strengthening the relationship with the dependent variable (Hair et al., 2003). In the 
automated approach, the computer selects the variables based on the strongest 
relationship. It is also possible to choose the sequence manually based on theory 
(Pallant, 2005). A mixture of both the manual and automated approach was used in 
the following analysis, as the manual choices were based on theory where the 
strongest relationship was likely to exist (for example Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Johnson et al., 1996). Therefore, the stepwise approach begins with roles and 
organisational performance. The other basic concepts are then added, starting with 





variables. The process is automated for each concept. The SPSS program calculates 
the role with the strongest relationship to organisational performance as the first 
model, and then adds the other roles if they can strengthen the relationship between 
the independent and the dependent sides of the equation. As this approach only 
allowed one dependent variable, the process was repeated for all four dependent 
variables.  
 
The strength of the relationships can be interpreted with the help of rules of thumb 
developed by Hair et al. (2003, p. 282). A very strong relationship is between .91-
1.00 (negative or positive), high relationship is between .71-.90, moderate 
relationship is between .41-.70, small but definite relationship is between .21-.40 
and a correlation coefficient size between .01-.20 can be interpritated as slight, 
almost negligible. The interpretation is, however, relative as it depends on the 
nature of the relationship how strong it can expected to be (Pallant, 2005).  
 
The following discussion begins with simple single regression equations run against 
the four dependent variables, and finally uses stepwise regression to find the 
strongest relationship and minimise the effect of multicollinearity.  
 
4.3.2 Testing tasks as roles and performance 
The first test for relationships between variables is based on the first main 
hypothesis of this thesis. The hypothesis simply states: 
 
H1. There is a positive relationship between the level of role importance and 
company performance. 
 
In other words, the hypothesis indicates a relationship between the task function of 
the board and the performance of the organisation (figure 4.3.2) 
 













As a result of the factor analysis, the concepts of board tasks were operationalised 
into three roles: strategic role, monitoring role, and resource and advice role (R&A 
role). The results of the factor analysis were similar to the results of the 
conceptualisation process, the only difference was the resource role and advice role 
were combined into one factor. The initial proposition can therefore be restated in 




(a) There is a positive relationship between the level of strategic role and 
performance. 
(b) There is a positive relationship between the level of monitoring role and 
performance. 
(c) There is a positive relationship between the level of resource and advice role 
and performance. 
 









Furthermore, a fourth hypothesis can be stated which implies of the three board 
roles, the strategic role has the strongest relationship to performance (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). 
 
(d) There is a relatively stronger relationship between the level of strategic role 
and performance, than between the other two roles and performance.  
 
The first step in the approach for testing relationships between variables used in this 
thesis was to run a single linear regression. Items for measuring organisational 
performance were reduced to six factors in the data reduction process: Financial 
performance, Responsive performance, Development performance, Growth 
performance, Satisfaction performance and CSR performance. Furthermore, a 





different runs were done for each role factor. The following subsection discusses 
the test for each role factor.  
 
4.3.2.1 Resource and advice role - Performance 
The resource and advice role was tested against seven measures of performance. 
Figure 4.3.4 describes the proposed relationships being tested and table 4.3.1 
provides an overview of the results.15   
 
















Table 4.3.1: Relationship between Resource and advice role and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .035* .050 .144 .187 .050 
Financial performance .014 .224 .110 .117 .224 
Responsive performance .132** .000 .212 .363 .000 
Development performance .100** .001 .342 .316 .001 
Growth performance .097** .001 .277 .311 .001 
Satisfaction performance .029 .073 .117 .172 .073 
CSR performance .073* .004 .253 .270 .004 
        *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
 
                                                 





The results indicate the null hypothesis can be rejected in all cases, except between 
the Resource and advice role and Financial and Satisfaction performance. The 
results are significant at the .01 level for all other relationships except in the case of 
Overall performance, which is significant at the .05 level.  However, the effect (R2) 
is only marginal. The relatively strongest is Responsive performance and the 
weakest Overall performance.  
 
4.3.2.2 Monitoring role - Performance 
The Monitoring role was tested against seven measures of performance. Figure 
4.3.5 describes the proposed relationships tested, and table 4.3.2 provides an 
overview of the results. 
 

















Table 4.3.2: Relationship between the Monitoring role and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .047* .021 .156 .218 .021 
Financial performance .058* .011 .210 .240 .011 
Responsive performance .171** .000 .221 .414 .000 
Development performance .089** .001 .296 .299 .001 
Growth performance .051* .016 .189 .227 .016 
Satisfaction performance .033 .056 .114 .181 .073 
CSR performance .055* .013 .204 .235 .013 






In the case of the Monitoring role, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the .01 
significance level for Responsive and Development performance, and the .05 level 
for the other measures, except Satisfaction which cannot be rejected. However, the 
effect (R2) is weak. It is relatively the strongest for Responsive performance, and 
almost negligible in the other cases. Even so, the proposition there is a relationship 
between the Monitoring role and Organisational performance is supported.  
 
4.3.2.3 Strategic role and Performance 
From the theoretical discussion it can be argued of the three roles, the strategic role 
should have the strongest correlation with performance. The Strategic role was 
tested against seven measures of performance. Figure 4.3.6 describes the proposed 
relationships tested, and table 4.3.3 provides an overview of the results. 
 
Figure 4.3.6: Strategic role and performance measures. 
 
Table 4.3.3: Relationship between the Strategic role and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .084** .003 .229 .290 .000 
Financial performance .102** .001 .308 .320 .001 
Responsive performance .226** .000 .276 .475 .000 
Development performance .096** .001 .337 .310 .001 
Growth performance .093** .001 .278 .305 .001 
Satisfaction performance .131** .000 .247 .361 .000 
CSR performance .152** .000 .363 .390 .000 



















The null hypothesis could be rejected at the .01 significance level in all cases, when 
the relationships between the Strategic role and the seven performance measures 
were tested. Furthermore, they were notably stronger relationships than when the 
other two roles were tested. In agreement with Hair et al. (2003), there is a small but 
definite relationship between the Strategic role and Responsiveness. The other 
relationships were minimal. This result supports proposition P1, there is a positive 
relationship between the strategic role of the board and performance.  
 
4.3.2.4 Stepwise analysis of board roles and performance 
Stepwise regression, to test the relationship between board roles and performance, 
including all roles simultaneously, is a more sophisticated method to explore the 
relationship between roles and performance. As indicated when the 
multicollinearity between the roles was discussed, a simple regression with multiple 
independent variables was not appropriate. With stepwise regression this problem 
was solved, as the process itself chooses variables with the strongest relationship. 
From an explorative perspective it is a method to model the relationship. 
  
Table 4.3.4: Stepwise model of roles and Competitive performance. 
Best model R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Strategic role Overall performance .094* .002 .229 .290 .002 
Strategic role Financial performance .118** .000 .302 .344 .000 
Strategic role  Responsive performance .224** .000 .277 .473 .000 
Strategic role Development performance .114** .000 .368 .338 .000 
Strategic role Growth performance .112** .001 .305 .335 .001 
Strategic role Competitive performance .131** .000 .250 .362 .000 
Strategic role CSR performance .155** .000 .371 .394 .000 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
The multiple stepwise regressions clearly showed the strongest relationship was 
between the strategic role and all the seven performance measures. The other two 
roles, monitoring, and resource and advice, neither strengthened nor added to the 
relationships. The Fama and Jensen (1983) model helps to explain this, as the 





exemplifies initiation and implementation. Furthermore, this relates to the 
distinction between monitoring and directing in the definition of corporate 
governance (Cadbury, 2002), and the distinction between conformance and 
performance (Tricker, 1994). The distinction between the Resource and advice role 
and the Strategic role can be argued theoretically, although it might not be as simple 
to distinguish between the two roles in practice. The approach of some researchers 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Heuvel et al., 2006), to cluster both roles under 
‘service,’ and to pay only limited attention to strategy, emphasises the problem of 
multicollinearity in regards to conceptualisation. The first step of this analysis 
shows, however, that the Strategic role is the most important of the three roles in 
relationship with performane. 
 
4.3.2.5 Conclusions about roles  
The conclusion from testing the relationship between roles as tasks and 
Organisational performance showed simple single regression supports the 
propositions proposed earlier.  
 
H1. 
(a) There is a positive relationship between the level of strategic role and 
performance. 
(b) There is a positive relationship between the level of monitoring role and 
performance. 
(c) There is a positive relationship between the level of support role and 
competitive performance and CSR performance.  
(d) There is a relatively stronger positive relationship between the level of 
strategic role and performance than between the monitoring and support 
roles and performance. 
 
Stepwise multivariate regression, including only the three role factors, showed the 
Strategic role had the strongest relationship with the performance measures, and 
because of multicollinearity the other factors were excluded from the model. 
Therefore propositions H1a and H1d can be supported, with stepwise analysis 
controlling for the other two roles.  
 
4.3.3 Testing Authority and Performance 
The authority (or power) of the board was measured with the 15-item scale tested 





an alternative method to measure the involvement of the board. Figure 4.3.7 
describes the proposed relationships tested, and table 4.3.5 provides an overview of 
the results. 
 
















Table 4.3.5: Authority of the board and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .000 .834 .017 .021 .834 
Financial performance .001 .802 .023 .025 .802 
Responsive performance .057* .013 .151 .239 .013 
Development performance .006 .411 .095 .080 .411 
Growth performance .000 .983 -.002 -.002 .983 
Satisfaction performance .011 .248 .079 .104 .284 
CSR performance .015 .210 .116 .123 .210 
        *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
The results show the null proposition cannot be rejected in any of the seven cases at 
the .05 significance level, except in the case of Responsive performance although 
the relationship is marginal. The Authority of the board was also run with the two-
factor solution with the same result. This gave a somewhat puzzling result, as more 
powerful boards indicated more active boards, both in regard to monitoring and 





were powerful in regards to Financial Authority (mean = 5.187) and Authority to 
Direct (mean = 4.496). Agency theory would support the proposition powerful 
boards would have a relationship, although stewardship theory might not, as 
interference by the board could reflect on the work of the CEO (Donaldson, 1990). 
Furthermore, this could indicate when the board and the CEO share power, 
organisational performance improves (Herman, 1981; Vance, 1983; Wood, 1983; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1991).  
 
In conclusion, from testing the relationship of Authority of the board on 
performance, there is no support for hypothesis H4.  
 
H4. The proposition there is a positive relationship between the level of board 
authority and organisational performance is not supported.  
 
Including the authority effect in stepwise regression had only a marginal effect. As 
the Authority instrument had been included in the study primarily for contingency 
purposes, it was then excluded from further analysis in this study.  
 
 
4.3.4 Testing process and performance 
The test for relationships between processes and performance was based on the 
second main proposition of this thesis. The proposition states: 
 




The board process was operationalised with four different concepts, determined 
through factor analysis. The four factors were: Efficiency of the board, Decision, 
Style, and Information. The propositions to be tested were (figure 4.3.8): 
 
H2.  
(a) There is a positive relationship between the level of efficiency of the board 
and organisational performance. 
(b) There is a positive relationship between the decision process and 
organisational performance. 






(d) There is a positive relationship between the level of information and 
organisational performance. 
 









To test the nature of the relationship, the method of linear regression was used in 
seven runs, with different dependent variables for the company performance 
variable.  
 
4.3.4.1 Efficiency of boards - Performance 
The Efficiency of the board was tested against four measures of Organisational 
performance. Figure 4.3.9 describes the proposed relationships being tested, and 
table 4.3.6 gives an overview of the results. 
 
























Table 4.3.6: The relationship between Process Efficiency and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .161** .000 .329 .401 .000 
Financial performance .110** .000 .300 .332 .000 
Responsive performance .215** .000 .280 .464 .000 
Development performance .088* .002 .334 .297 .002 
Growth performance .032 .059 .169 .189 .059 
Satisfaction performance .099** .001 .224 .314 .001 
CSR performance .050* .019 .222 .225 .019 
         *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
 
In the case of Efficiency of the board, the null hypothesis can be rejected in all 
cases of performance, except Growth performance. All the others can be rejected at 
the .01 level, and CSR performance at the .05 significance level. That indicates 
there is support for proposition H2 (a) there is a positive relationship between the 
efficiency of the board and performance. The Efficiency of the board shows the 
relatively strongest correlation with Responsive performance, and the least with 
CSR performance. 
 
This result supports the general theoretical view of agency theory, stewardship 
theory, and most other theories, except managerial hegemony theory, in that a well 
functioning board should have value for the corporation (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Donaldson, 1990). Boards need to use their limited time 
well to have any ramification on performance (Lorsch and Carter, 2004).   
 
4.3.4.2 Decision-Making on boards and Performance 
The Decision factor within the Process concept was tested against four measures of 
Organisational performance. Figure 4.3.10 describes the proposed relationships 






In the case of Decision making on the board, the null hypothesis could be rejected 
at the .01 significance level for Overall and Responsive, Development and 
Satisfaction performance, and at the .05 level for Financial performance. In the case 
of Growth and CSR performance, the null proposition could not be rejected at the 
.05 level. Decision-process at board shows the strongest correlation with 
Responsive performance, although only a very limited relationship. 
 

















Table 4.3.7: Decision process on boards and Performance. 
 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .098** .001 .318 .312 .001 
Financial performance .044* .026 .234 .210 .026 
Responsive performance .174** .000 .323 .417 .000 
Development performance .058* .010 .344 .241 .010 
Growth performance .026 .087 .190 .162 .087 
Satisfaction performance .159** .000 .359 .398 .000 
CSR performance .018 .163 .163 .133 .164 
         *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
The result supports the stewardship theory mantra the board and the CEO should 
collaborate for the best results for the organisation (Donaldson, 1990). The lack of 
support for the relationship with CSR performance is puzzling, as one would 





effect on other stakeholders. On the other hand, it could indicate the more 
shareholder-focused perspective of stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990).  
 
 
4.3.4.3 Style of boards and Performance 
The Style factor within the Process concept was tested against four measures of 
Organisational performance. Figure 4.3.11 describes the proposed relationships 
tested, and table 4.3.8 gives an overview of the results. 
 
















Table 4.3.8: Style of boards and Organisational performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .072* .004 .342 .268 .004 
Financial performance .036* .043 .266 .190 .043 
Responsive performance .189** .000 .419 .435 .000 
Development performance .095** .001 .551 .308 .001 
Growth performance .036* .042 .282 .190 .042 
Satisfaction performance .077* .003 .314 .277 .003 
CSR performance .016 .178 .197 .128 .178 
         *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
In the case of Style of the board, the null hypothesis could be rejected in all cases of 
performance at the .01 significance level, except Growth and Financial performance 





in the case of CSR performance. Style of board decisions showed the strongest 
correlation with Responsive performance, a small but definite relationship (Hair et 
al., 2003). 
 
The result is similar to that of Decision, and the interpretation is basically the same 
in that it reflects the shareholder perspective of stewardship theory rather than a 
more stakeholder-oriented view.  
 
4.3.4.4 Information flow to boards and Performance 
The Information factor was tested against the four measures of Organisational 
performance. Figure 4.3.12 describes the proposed relationships tested and table 
4.3.9 gives an overview of the results. 
 

















Table 4.3.9: The relationship between Information and Performance. 
Performance R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 
Overall performance .039* .036 .176 .197 .036 
Financial performance .020 .138 .138 .140 .138 
Responsive performance .140** .000 .255 .375 .000 
Development performance .086* .002 .367 .293 .002 
Growth performance .032 .058 .184 .178 .058 
Satisfaction performance .103** .001 .254 .320 .001 
CSR performance .062* .008 .270 .249 .008 





In the case of Information to the board, the null hypothesis could be rejected in the 
cases of Responsive, Development, Satisfaction and CSR performance at the .01 
significance level, and at the .05 level for Overall performance. It could not be 
rejected in the cases of Growth and Financial performance. The correlation with 
Responsive and Satisfaction performance were relatively strongest, although very 
small (Hair et al., 2003).  
 
The result is rather puzzling, as one would expect a better-informed board to lead to 
better financial performance, as the better the board is at scrutinizing financial 
figures, the better it is able to tackle finance related issues. The relationship with 
Responsiveness may be reflected back to Porter (1998), who claims better-informed 
companies will be more competitive. Furthermore, it may be assumed a well-
informed board could better consider stakeholder issues than less well-informed 
boards.  
 
4.3.4.5 Conclusions about processes 
The conclusion from testing the relationship of process variables to performance in 
single regression indicated there was support for hypothesis H2, although not in the 
case of performance measures.  
 
H2. 
(a) There is a positive relationship between the level of efficiency of the board 
and performance. 
(b) There is a positive relationship between the level of decision-making on the 
board and overall performance, financial performance and competitive 
performance. 
(c) There is a positive relationship between the level of the style of board 
decisions and overall performance, financial performance and competitive 
performance.  
(d) There is a positive relationship between the level of information to the board 
and competitive performance and CSR performance.  
 
 
A stepwise multivariate regression, including only the role factors and the process 
factors, showed, however, only Efficiency and Decision influenced the relationship 
with the performance measures. The effects of the other relationship were excluded 





with the stepwise analysis controlling for the roles and processes (more about the 
stepwise regression in section 4.3.7).  
 
4.3.5 Composition and Performance 
The main research effort in research on boards of directors has been to test the 
relationship between composition of boards and performance (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Huse, 2005; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). These attributes have been 
dubbed the ‘usual suspects’ (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). In this study there 
were three independent variables related to composition: board size, women on 
boards, and independence (see figure 4.3.13). The propositions regarding these 
three variables are discussed in Section 2.8.  
 








Table 4.3.10:  The relationship between composition and Performance. 
Performance Size of boards Women Independent 
Corr. Sig t Corr. Sig t Corr. Sig t 
Overall performance .043 .653 -.061 .518 .145 .123 
Financial performance .085 .368 -.081 .392 .205* .029 
Responsive performance -.061 .518 -.103 .280 .002 .981 
Development performance .011 .912 -.024 .802 .071 .452 
Growth performance -.135 .152 .000 .999 -.041 .661 
Satisfaction performance -.099 .293 -.054 .571 -.117 .214 
CSR performance .054 .572 -.033 .728 .173 .068 
       *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
The correlation between the three composition variables and the performance 
variables were tested with bivariate correlation. The results, presented in table 
4.3.10, show the composition variables did not correlate with any of the 





performance. This was further tested with composition variables as categorical 
variables, with the same results.  
 
In conclusion, through testing the relationship of composition of the board with 
performance, it can be stated the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, except in the 
case of independence and financial performance. Therefore, there was only very 
limited support for hypothesis H3.  
 
H3. 
(a) There is a positive relationship between the size of board and performance is 
not supported.  
(b) There is a positive relationship between number of women on boards and 
performance is not supported. 
(c) There is positive relationship between number of independent directors on 
boards and financial performance is supported. There is no support for a 
positive relationship with competitive performance, CSR performance, and 
overall performance.  
 
The results did support the conclusion of Dalton and Dalton (2005), who state 
results regarding composition of the board tend to be inconclusive and misguiding. 
The question is perhaps how much the structure of the board relates to the process 
and the role of board, as its direct relationship on performance leads down a very 
winding road (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
A special stepwise regression was not run at this point, as the relationship between 
composition variables and performance variables was limited or non-existent. 
 
4.3.6 Testing context and Performance 
In this study there were three context variables used as control variables: company 
size, industries, and ownership (figure 4.3.14).  
 











The correlation between the three context variables and the performance variables 
was tested with bivariate correlation. The results, presented in table 4.3.11, showed 
no significant relationships.  
 
Table 4.3.11: The relationship between context variables and Performance.  
Performance Size of comp. Industries Ownership 
Corr. Sig t Corr. Sig t Corr. Sig t 
Overall performance 0.127 0.182 0.005 0.959 -0.150 0124 
Financial performance 0.120 0.208 -0.141 0.134 -0.099 0.311 
Responsive performance .059 .537 -.052 .586 .134 .172 
Development performance .030 .755 -.165 .080 -.010 .915 
Growth performance .115 .227 -.072 .446 .035 .720 
Satisfaction performance .039 .680 .028 .764 .080 .415 
CSR performance .116 .226 -.138 .146 -.029 .766 
        *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
Several researchers have found size of companies has a positive relationship with 
performance (Thomas et al., 1991; Thomas and Ramaswamy, 1996). It can also be 
argued larger companies have more leverage for corporate social responsibility than 
smaller firms, especially when the smallest firms have ten or less employees. There 
was, however, no significant relationship found between context variables and 
performance variables in this study.  
 
4.3.7 Stepwise regression with all independent variables 
The use of stepwise multivariate regression using all the independent variables, and 
testing the relationship with each of the dependent variables, was the final test of 
the propositions.16 This step was controlled for composition and context variables, 
in addition to the role and process factors. Generally the influence of composition 
and context variables on the model was marginal, as none of the variables 
strengthened the relationship with the performance measures (table 4.3.12).  
 
The Strategic role was shown to be the most important independent variable as it 
was included in five out of seven runs with different performance measures. The 
                                                 





Strategic role was the only independent variable to be included in the case of 
Financial performance, Growth performance and CSR performance as the other 
variables did not strengthen the relationship in the stepwise regression. In the case 
of Satisfaction performance as dependent variable the strongest model turned out to 
be the Decision-process and the Strategic role together. In the case of Responsive 
performance the strongest model was made of Efficiency and Decision as well as 
the Strategic role. The relationship was small but definite relationship (Hair et al, 
2003). In the case of Development performance it was Process-Style and the 
Monitoring role that made up the best model. At last, Efficiency of the board was 
alone the strongest model in relationship with Overall performance (table 4.3.12).   
 
Table 4.3.12: Stepwise regression with all the independent variables. 
Best model R2 Sig F B Stand 
Beta 
Sig t 










































































Strategic role CSR performance .150** .000 .376 .388 .000 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two tailed). 
 
The interpretation is the same as in section 4.3.2.4 from a theoretical perspective, as 
the results seem to support the assumptions of stewardship theory (Donaldson, 
1990). By controlling for composition variables and context variables, the models 
have, however, been made more robust, as the relationship between the board of 
directors and organisational performance cannot be explained with either the ‘usual 
suspects’ or the usual contextual factors. The process variables and the role 
variables turned out to be the most important variables in relationship with 






4.3.8 The testing process  
Referring to Nietzche’s quote at the beginning of this section, the test of 
relationship in this research has provided some interesting findings. The most 
important is the main hypothesis of this thesis has been supported, as the research 
indicates boards of directors do have a positive relationship with organisational 
performance. The relationship was indicated with the independent variables of 
process factors, and role as tasks factors. Using Composition and Authority, as 
independent variables, did not help to support the hypothesis (figure 4.3.15).  
  










    Gray color indicates relationship cannot be supported. 
 
More precisely, the Strategic role, Monitoring role, Efficiency, Style and Decision, 
the five independent variables, supported the main proposition in relationship with 
different performance variables. A discussion of these variables can be found in the 
next section, where the results are interpreted in a broader view than has been done 






4.4 Interpretation of the results 
 
Patience is necessary, and one cannot reap immediately where one has 
sown.  
 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855) 
 
 
The results in this chapter are promising, as they indicate a relationship between the 
role of the board and organisational performance. The long and winding road of the 
research process has therefore led to a fertile field. This section revisits some of the 
discussions from Chapter 2, the theoretical and empirical discussion in the literature 
review. The results are interpreted in light of theory and previous research, in order 
to understand the implications of the findings.  
 
Figure 4.4.1: Overview of the interpretation of results. 
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In this section the results from previous sections are discussed in a broader setting, 
focusing on their implications (figure 4.4.1). The structure of this section is partly 
based on the literature review. The first part examines the model of this study and 
the summary of results. The second part discusses the role of the board.  The third 
part takes on a more theoretical interpretation. The last section concludes the 






4.4.1 The board and organisational performance 
The main results from testing the propositions can be summarised as follows: There 
is a positive relationship between perceived role of the board and perceived 
organisational performance in SMEs in Iceland. Both roles as tasks and board 
processes showed a relationship with performance. The relationship varied slightly 
with different dependent organisational performance measures.17  
 
In the single regressions, several variables indicated a relationship with Financial 
performance: Monitoring role and Strategic role and Efficiency, Decision and Style 
within the process variables. In stepwise regression the Strategic role indicated the 
strongest relationship to financial performance (figure 4.4.2).  
 





The Strategic role showed also the single strongest relationship with Growth 
performance in the stepwise regression. The relationship was, however somewhat 
weaker (figure 4.4.3).  
 










                                                 
17
 As theoretical assumptions of agency theory, stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, 
stakeholder theory, and other theories all assume independent variables are predictors of dependent 
variables, that same assumption was adopted in this study. The assumption is emphasised here with 
the use of an arrow between variables, instead of just a line without an arrow indicating the 
direction of the relationship. The argument for doing this is it helps interpretation of the results. 






In the single regressions all the role factors and the process factors indicated a 
relationship with Responsive performance. None of the composition or contingency 
variables indicated such a relationship. In stepwise regression a model with three 
independent factors emerged as the strongest, that is the Strategic role, the 
Decision-process and the Efficiency process (figure 4.4.4).  
 












Similarly it was the Strategic role and the Decision process that indicated the 
strongest model in relationship with Satisfaction performance (figure 4.4.5), which 
was a measure of the standard of quality and employee satisfaction. The 
relationship was small but definetly a relationship (Hair et al., 2003).  
 












On the other hand neither the Strategic role or the Decision process made up the 
strongest model relating to Development performance. Instead the Monitoring role 
and the Style process showed the strongest relationship to Development 





underlying performance variables emphasise innovation. The reason might be that 
innovasion usually comes from the front line rather than the top (Porter, 1988; 
Drucker, 1954). There is, however, very little difference between the Monitoring 
role and the Strategic role although the former is a little bit stronger in terms of this 
relationship while the latter is excluded because of multicollinearity.  
 












In single regression there were indications of a relationship by several variables to 
the Corporate Social Responsibility performance measure: Monitoring role, 
Resource and Advice role, Strategic role, Efficiency and Information. Stepwise 
regression indicated, however, the strongest relationship was between the strategic 
role and CSR performance, when controlled for other variables (figure 4.4.7).  
 











The single variable indicator of overall performance loaded equally on Financial 
performance and Competitive performance, but not on CSR performance. All the 
role and process factors indicated a relationship. None of the variables for 
composition or contingency showed a relationship. Stepwise regression indicated 












The results raise several points. First of all, the relationships are generally weak. 
Only in Responsive and Satisfaction performance is the coefficient higher than .20, 
indicating a small but definite relationship (Hair et al., 2003). In the other cases the 
relationship would be considered almost negligible according to Hair et al. (2003). 
A weak relationship would be expected, however, as the influence of the CEO and 
other employees would be significant. It would have been more surprising if the 
relationship was very strong, as that would imply that most variation in 
performance could be explained by board factors rather than for example CEO and 
other employee factors. However, the proposition that there is a relationship 
between the board of directors and organisational performance is supported. 
Secondly, the difference between performance measures needs to be addressed. As 
was noted in the factor analysis, the measures concern different aspects of 
performance. Previous research has focused mainly on narrow financial outcome 
measures. Responsive, Development, Growth, Satisfaction and CSR performance 
are closer to process measures (Brett, 2000), and focused on specific aspects of 
performance. Thirdly, there is a difference between the independent factors that 
relate to different performance measures. Clearly, the strongest factor is the 
Strategic role factor, which is the leading variable in all cases, except in 
Development and Overall performance. The Strategic role is, however, the second 
strongest variable in that case of Overall performance, explaining some .189 of the 
variance. There is, however, high collinearity of .769, and Efficiency is a stronger 
indicator. On one hand, it is possible to argue one item measure of performance will 
not give as good a picture of the relationship between the board and organisational 
performance as a multi-item instruments. On the other hand, many theorists have 
argued a well-organised board should have a positive influence on the organisation 
(Drucker, 1974). The strong influence of the Strategic role is the most significant 





positive relationship to organisational performance as well as other aspects of 
performance.  
 
Lastly, the question of context needs to be examined at this point. This study 
focused on SMEs in Iceland. In the discussion of the sampling frame in Chapter 3, 
it was argued this study was exploratory in nature, and generalisation was not the 
primary purpose, as the cultural context and non-probability sampling frame 
seriously limited such interpretation. On the other hand, the reason for sampling 
SMEs was the belief the relationship between boards and organisational 
performance would be stronger (Huevel et al. 2006). That raised the question 
whether the relationship existed in larger corporations, an issue for further research. 
 
4.4.2 The role of the board 
What boards actually do is an important issue addressed in corporate governance 
literature (Tricker, 1994). Hung (1998) provides a link between roles and theories 
(section 2.1), where eight different theoretical roles were identified. A study of the 
literature isolated two main functions of the board labelled as monitoring (or 
controlling), and directing (Cadbury, 2002; Berghe and Baelden, 2004). In the 
literature review, four roles were conceptualised and operationalised for the purpose 
of this study: Monitoring role, Strategic role, Resource acquisition role, and Advice 
role. Some researchers (for example Westphal, 1999; Heuvel et al., 2006) have used 
the label Service role for all roles for direction (e.g. Strategic role, Resource 
acquisition role, and Advice role). This study, therefore, expands research into the 
direction function of the board, especially in regard to the Strategy role, as a much 
broader measure of strategy was adopted for this study. The factor analysis resulted 
in three clear factors: Monitoring role, Strategic role, and Resource and Advice role. 
The last two roles loaded on one factor. The study concluded the boards in this 
sample had three main roles.  
 
The three roles isolated by factor analysis represent empirical support for those 
suggested by other researchers, who often used different labels (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch and Carter, 2004; Christensen and 





within the context of small and medium-sized firms and family firms (Deakins et 
al., 2000; Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Johannisson and Huse, 2000; 
Mustakallio et al., 2002).  
 
All three roles are important, as the means of the roles were high in all cases (table 
4.4.1). The monitoring role seemed to be the most important role, as it had the 
highest mean, although the difference between the monitoring role and the resource 
and advice role was not significant. The difference between the strategic role and 
the other roles, although very small, was statistically significant, indicating there 
was more focus on the other two roles. This was interesting, as Heuvel et al. (2006) 
found the service role more important than the control role in Belgian SMEs. The 
result of this study does not mean respondents think the strategic role is less 
important, just that they seem to focus less on it. This was surprising in view of the 
strong relationship the strategic role has with organisational performance.  
 
Table 4.4.1: The mean and standard deviation of the role factors. 
Roles Alpha Items Mean SD 
Strategic role .958 14 4.440 .119 
Monitoring role .782 4 4.699 .125 
Resource- & Advice role .782 6 4.655 .118 
 
The strategic role has usually been measured either with a one-item measure or only 
a few measures (Heuvel et al., 2006; Westphal and Carpenter, 2001), if measured at 
all. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the theoretical background within the 
strategic literature for the items. In this study the Strategic role was emphasised 
using instruments for operationalisation adapted from the leadership literature 
(Kanji and Sá, 2001; Kanji, 2002). The scale proved to be robust, with an alpha of 
.958 (table 4.4.1) and all fourteen items loading on the factor, with .692 loadings or 
higher. Furthermore, the mean of 4.440 can be seen as an indication boards are 
heavily involved in the strategic role. This study supports research findings on the 
importance of the strategic role for boards (Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Tricker, 
1994; Lorsch and Carter, 2004).  
 
The positive relationship between the Strategic role and the performance measures 





the board of directors and organisational performance. This is interesting, as this 
relationship has only limited support with empirical research from the process-
based view, as far as the literature review could detect. It, however, supports the 
study of MacAvoy and Millstein (1998) that active boards do have influence on 
organisational performance. This has been accomplished with the use of broader 
measures than have been employed for the strategic role and organisational 
performance before in corporate governance research.  
 
4.4.3 Theoretical implications 
The problem formulation in the first chapter of this thesis included the claim the 
board has no value, and should not remain an organ within the organisation. This is 
the view of management hegemony theory. The results of the research have rejected 
the claim, if not ‘falsified’ it, as Popper (2002) would have put it, because of the 
positive relationship between the strategic role and all performance measures.  
 
As for verification of theories, factor analysis supported the monitoring role of 
agency theory, the strategic role of stewardship theory, and the resource and advice 
role, which can be related to resource dependency theory. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the board and corporate social responsibility was an indicator 
of the stakeholder perspective. Therefore, it may be argued all theories emphasised 
as part of the multi-theoretical perspective have been at least partly verified. The 
need for a multi-theoretical perspective of the board reflects the various tasks and 
responsibilities of boards in general (Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; 
Huse, 2005).   
 
There is, however, another way to interpret the results. In the words of Popper 
(2002, p. 67): 
 
The critical attitude, the tradition of free discussion of theories with the aim of discovering 
their weak spots so that they may be improved upon, is the attitude of reasonableness, or 
rationality. It makes far-reaching use of both verbal argument and observation – of 






The strength of the strategic role is odd according to agency theory. If the primary 
role of the board is to monitor, it can hardly be involved in strategy-making, as this 
would entail a need to monitor itself (Nowak and McCabe, 2003). This empirical 
implication for the research here is grounded in a grander misunderstanding of the 
roots of agency theory. This is important, as no other theory within corporate 
governance literature has come as close to being considered synonymous with a 
‘corporate governance theory’ as agency theory (Lubatkin, 2007). It is important to 
be more critical of theories, even ones like the agency theory. 
 
Agency theory is a response to the Berle and Means (1932) thesis on managerial 
control (a more detailed description of the theory can be found in Section 2.1). 
Their argument, however, has been lost in time. The core of their argument was 
ownership had become so dispersed owners could not control their corporation, and 
had lost interest in so doing. Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the thesis as a 
conflict between CEOs and owners, where the CEOs needed to be controlled as 
they had other priorities, based on self-interest, from the owners. The solution to 
this problem was the board, an organ of control responsible for monitoring 
management. There are several problems associated with this viewpoint, as it can 
be argued the board is not a very effective tool for monitoring management. Lack of 
time, knowledge, information, a critical approach, and independence (Lorsch and 
Carter, 2004; Coffee, 2006; Lubatkin et al., 2007) are all factors making this a very 
difficult job for the board. It seemed not to be a very effective solution. However, 
that is another story. The issue here concerns in the fact the theses of Berle and 
Means (1932), and Jensen and Mecking (1976), are concerned with the problem of 
the separation of ownership from control (Lubatkin, 2007).  
 
The implication of this issue, the problem of separation of ownership from control, 
usually goes unnoticed in corporate governance literature. Gomez-Mejia and 
Wiseman (2007) pointed out in a recent debate on agency theory Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) never intended their model to be applied to settings beyond large 
for-profit organisations operating in developed markets, with widely-diversified 






Taken at face value, I take their comments to mean that the J/M model was not intended to 
apply to less-developed markets, which of course make up a large percentage of the world 
markets. I also take their comments to mean that the J/M model was not intended to apply 
to owner-controlled firms, or those public firms largely controlled by a few large block 
owners who, by virtue of their large stake in the firm, are not likely to be widely-
diversified. [. . .] I take the Gomez-Mejia/Wiseman comment to mean that the J/M model 
was not intended to apply to family owned firms, which are by far the most common 
governance form of business organisation in all nations, including most nations with 
developed markets like the US. For similar reasons, I take this to mean that the J/M wasn’t 
intended to apply to hundreds of thousands of privately-held firms, and to public firms, 
once their managers become owners through compensation plans that entail stock and stock 
options. In short, if the only context that the J/M model is suited to explain is a small subset 
of all firms, then the model lacks generalizability and this represents a serious shortcoming.  
 
The obvious answer is, if the theory is a solution to a problem which arises because 
of the separation of control and ownership, why should it apply when the problem 
does not exist, as for instance when owners can control the corporation because 
ownership is not so dispersed. Lubatkin (2007, p. 64) goes on: “Indeed, I am 
puzzled why this 28+ year old model continues to receive so much positive 
attention from scholars from all over the world, and why alternative governance 
explanations have not also attained similar legitimacy in the academic press.”  
Popper’s (2002) criticism of the scientific process could enlighten here: when the 
aim is to verify theories, which is easy in Popper’s view, theories are never 
challenged and never rejected. This is the crux of the theoretical problem in the 
corporate governance literature, the problem of verification.   
 
The strong indication of a complex strategic role of the board, and the positive 
relationship of the strategic role to organisational performance, has nothing to do 
with agency theory. As Lubatkin (2007) pointed out, the context of SMEs and the 
concentration of ownership in the sample could explain this. The result of this 
research helps to reject agency theory in this context.  
 
4.4.4 Concluding interpretation   
The results of this thesis support the main proposition: the board does have a 





claim of management hegemony the board does not have any value. They also 
indicate agency theory in its purest form does not apply in this study. The 
monitoring role may hold relevance for agency theory. The strategic role, as the 
dual application of the two roles, contradicts the role of the board as interpreted by 
Fama and Jensen (1983), and introduced in section 1.2.1. The reason is simple: the 
board cannot monitor itself effectively (Drucker, 1974). Therefore, the empirical 






4.5 Validating the results 
 
If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a 
nail.  
Abraham Maslow (1908 - 1970) 
 
One of the main assumptions of the realist paradigm is triangulation increases the 
validity of the research and gives a better picture of reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2002). A single research tool could identify a particular solution based solely on the 
function of the specific tool itself. The purpose of this last section of this chapter is 
to increase the conclusion validity of the research, with the help of qualitative 
research tools so as to supplement the quantitative technique used in this chapter.  
 
Figure 4.5.1: Overview of the validation section. 
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The final step in the research work is the validation process, which focuses on 
generalisation of the results (Hair et al., 2006). Hair et al. (2006) argue the results 
should be duplicated with a different sample. In other words, the aim is to increase 
the external validity of the study. It is also possible to increase the conclusion 
validity by checking the internal validity of the study (Hair et al., 2003). This 
section, therefore, is divided into two parts. The first is about internal conclusion 
validity, while the second part focuses on external conclusion validity. The final 






4.5.1 Internal conclusion validity 
The approach adopted to increase the internal conclusion validity of the research 
was based on qualitative techniques. Several authors have noted triangulation 
enhances the conclusion validity of research (for example Jick, 1979; Curran and 
Downing, 1989; Bickman and Rog, 1997; Scandura and William, 2000). Three 
open-ended questions were sent to the respondents of the survey, asking about the 
main findings of the research. Fifteen responses were received, representing 13% of 
the sample used in the study. The main conclusions from the responses are 
discussed below. 
 
 The first question was about the three roles isolated in the factor analysis of this 
study, and whether they were a good description of the respondents’ boards. In 
short, all respondents thought the three roles were a good reflection of their boards 
in practice.  
 
Respondent 7 noted:  
Yes, this is a good description. The Monitoring role has been understood for long in 
Icelandic boards – as it is prescribed by law. The Strategy role and the Resource role have 
been of growing importance and the Advice role is and has been important, especially 
regarding the role of the chairman.  
 
Respondent 9 noted: 
Yes, the board decides the future of the company and is constantly re-examining the 
situation with the aim of developing the company toward different business environment.   
 
The second question was based on the mean of the role factors, which indicated the 
monitoring role was the most important role of the board, although this contradicted 
the main finding the strategic role was predominantly related to organisational 
performance. Only three respondents agreed the monitoring role was indeed the 
most important. Other respondents stated the strategic role was considered the most 
important role of their board. 
 
Respondent 11 noted:  






Respondent 4 noted: 
No, I think the most important role of the board is Strategy and Advice. The board is the 
representative of the owners and the owners themselves sit on the board. Therefore it is 
normal that they want to develop the strategy.  
 
The third question was about the main conclusion of the research, why the strategic 
role had the strongest relationship with performance measures. Most respondents 
noted it is to be expected strategy relates to performance, although two respondents 
argued a well-functioning board, also taking the monitoring role seriously, should 
have the strongest tie to performance.  
 
Respondent 12 noted: 
Strategy is, by definition, a way to look forward. Management spends most of the time on 
daily problems. When managers sit down with the board much time is spent on looking 
ahead. The most valuable board is the one that looks ahead. 
 
Respondent 2 noted: 
If the board is qualified and does what it is supposed to do as well as it reflects a vision of 
professionalism and value creation it is obvious that if it puts work into strategy that it will 
result in better performance for the organisation.  
 
Respondent 14 noted:  
A board that takes the Strategic role seriously is more likely to be an active board which 
secures the future of the company. Many boards are relatively passive and let the 
companies get stuck in the mud for a long time. Managers are often too preoccupied with 
the daily routines but an active board can keep the necessary discussion about direction and 
future paths alive.  
 
The responses to the open-ended question do validate the results, as the respondents 
generally agreed with the main conclusions of the research. Furthermore, the 
answers provide a richer understanding of the conclusions. The main point is, 
however, the qualitative approach has supported the conclusion of the quantitative 






4.5.2 External conclusion validity 
It is important for the purposes of generalisation to validate the results in a different 
context from the original sample (Hair et al., 2006). Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) 
and Jick (1979) note it is possible to increase this type of conclusion validity with 
the use of focus groups. Two focus groups, and comments from several individual 
experienced researchers in the corporate governance field, were used for this 
purpose. The discussions were not recorded, but a few main themes indentified and 
noted. The main conclusions from the responses are discussed below. 
 
The only direct way for a board to influence organisational performance is through 
strategy, initiation and even implementation.  
Several reviewers noted that boards only have direct influence on organisation 
performance throught the strategic role. Some examples were furthermore provided 
of boards, which did more than initiate strategy but also implemented strategy. This 
was considered to be most notable in mergers and acquisitions, as well as in green 
field investments. Examples of Icelandic companies where boards had taken such 
an active role were: Kaupthing, the largest bank in Iceland which has become the 
7th largest bank in the Nordic region in record time; Bakkavor, a producer of fish 
products that conquered the British fresh food market and is becoming a global 
player in the industry; Baugur, which has grown from a local retail chain to a british 
empire in the toy and clothing industry in only six years. One of the reviewers 
argued strongly that the growth of these companies was based on this model of 
active boards, where the role of the chairman and the board was to think about and 
help to implement the growth strategy while the role of the CEO was more focused 
on managing the company.   
 
The results indicate that Iceland and Icelandic boards are a special case and 
cannot be generalised to a larger, multinational population.  
One reviewer argued that the results only showed that Iceland was a special case 
rather than indicating that the results could be generalised to a larger populations. It 
has, however, been noted that the generalisation of the results focused on the target 
population rather than the larger population, in other words the generalisation is for 





indicates that the emphasis of boards might be different in different legal and 
cultural context. Another reviewer argued, however, that similar results had been 
shown in Norway in several studies conducted by Professor Huse. He argued 
furthermore that Neubauer and Lank (1998) supported the results. They argued that 
the role of the board in family businesses should be ‘additive’ and ‘distinctive’. A 
third reviewer argued that the concept of generalisability was somewhat 
overemphasised in research as it was hard to find research that could truly be 
generalised as the samples are never truly random. He discussed the famous cultural 
studies of Hofstede in this context, which were made from results of one company 
and generalised on the larger population. The important thing is, however, to note, 
from the perspective of the researcher that the results are interesting either if Iceland 
is a special case or not. This research is a starting point. Further research should aim 
to detect differences between the Icelandic target population and other populations 
within different legal and cultural context.   
 
The boards of entrepreneurial companies need to be more active than boards in 
larger companies that are in stable and mature industries.  
Several reviewers noted that it was logical that role of boards in entrepreneurial 
companies was more active in terms of strategy than boards in larger companies 
would be, especially larger companies in stable and mature markets. The counter 
argument was, however, if that was not counterproductive for the board, as 
organisations in general need to be more entrepreneurial. One reviewer noted that 
maybe the results were showing the entrepreneurial spirit of small and growing 
companies, relating it to the prospector vision of companies in the terms of Miles 
and Snow (1994). The argument was that fast growing companies need the board to 
be active in terms of strategy as the board, as well as the CEO, need to be awake 
and able to recognise opportunities when the window of the opportunity is open. He 
noted that he had been sitting on such companies where the role of the board was 
not only to monitor the results of implementation but also to suggest possibilities 
for the road ahead. This would indicate that the generalisation of the results of the 
research applied to prospector companies. That is, however, something for further 






4.5.3 Conclusion validity 
This fourth chapter of the thesis has in essence focused on conclusion validity, as 
Trochim (2001) interprets different aspects of validity. The conclusion validity rests 
in the analysis of the data (Trochim, 2001). This section, however, has attempted to 
increase the conclusion validity by posing open-ended questions to the respondents 
of the survey. This would encourage them to express themselves more freely by 
including focus group discussion, and professional opinions on the possibility of 
generalisation. Respondents to the survey agreed with the main conclusions of the 
research, and provided some explanation of the results which supplemented the 
more theoretical discussion in section 4.4. In short, the responses increased the 
internal conclusion validity of this study. The focus groups and the reviewers 
indicated that there was not any good argument for saying that the research was 
only describing SMEs in Iceland as researchers in other countries, like for example 
Norway, and researchers focusing on family businesses had come to a similar 
conclusion as the results of this study indicate. It can therefore be argued that the 
focus groups and the reviewers have increased the external conclusion validity of 
the study although generalisability is not an objective of the research as it is 
considered an exploratory research. 
 
In summary, the conclusion validity is supported because respondents to the 






Summary of chapter 4  – Results and analysis 
This chapter has focused on the results and the analysis of the survey method 
discussed in chapter 3. The chapter is the core of the thesis as it presents the 
empirical findings. It brings the discussion to a close, as the research problem has 
been tested and, in a way, solved. That was the objective of this chapter.  
 
The main points from this chapter are: 
 The dataset was approved for analysis, as the response rate was sufficient at 
21%, including 114 cases to analyse, and the answers were normally distributed. 
 All the instruments, with minor adjustments, were approved to be used in the 
analysis, as they had high alphas and items loaded on relevant factors.  
 Three role factors were used in the analysis, two authority factors, three process 
factors and three performance factors, as well as single item variables.  
 The main hypothesis was supported: There is a positive relationship between 
perceived role of the board and perceived organisational performance in SMEs 
in Iceland. 
 The relatively strongest relationship was between the strategic role and the 
performance measures, although efficiency and decision, two process factors, 
strengthened the relationship and increased support for the main proposition. 
 Management hegemony theory and agency theory were rejected in the context 
of this study. 
 A qualitative approach for conclusion validation supported the results and the 
conclusions reached with quantitative techniques.  
 
The following chapter is the concluding chapter of this thesis, where the 







Chapter 5. - Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter represents both an ending and a beginning. It is the last chapter of this 
thesis, but only the end of the beginning of my research efforts in this field, which 
open the door for further research.  
 
The chapter is designed partly to mirror Chapter 1, the introduction, as it picks up 
on some of the themes and questions proposed there. The triad of academic, 
practical, and personal implications of the thesis underlies the structure of this 
chapter as well (figure 5.1). The chapter will close those discussions.   
 
Figure 5.1: The outline of the concluding chapter. 
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This chapter builds on discussion from Chapter 4, as it further explores the 
implications of the results of the empirical analysis. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section gives a broad perspective for estimating the academic 
contribution of the whole thesis. The second section concerns practical implications 
of the research for boards, CEOs, and organisations in general. The third section 
focuses on personal implications, the learning experience gained from the journey. 
It picks up the discussion from Chapter 1 and reflects on the research process. The 









5.1 Academic implications 
 
The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories 
rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The 
piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any 
natural or ‘given’ base. 
 
Karl Popper (1902-1994) 
 
 
Theories tend to be perceived differently both in terms of their importance and 
relevance. All too often they are regarded as ‘absolute’. This study has questioned 
the wisdom of the application of traditional theories in the SME context. The 
strategic role of the board of directors was shown to be more important for 
organisational performance than previously assumed. This contradicts some major 
assumptions practitioners, academics, and regulators have focused on in the past.  
 
Figure 5.1.1: The outline of academic implications. 
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This section focuses on the academic implications and contribution of this thesis, as 
perceived by the researcher (figure 5.1.1). The first part discusses the main 
contributions this research has made to the body of knowledge. The second part 
discusses some of the limitations of the study.  The third part focuses on future 
research and the steps already taken in that direction. The last section summarises 






5.1.1 Main contributions 
 
Precisely what a doctoral thesis is expected to deliver from an academic perspective 
seems surrounded by ambiguity (Dunleavy, 2003; Remenyi et al., 2002). It is 
generally agreed a doctoral thesis should contribute ‘to the body of knowledge’ 
(Remenyi et al., 2002). The extract of requirements for a PhD and DBA in the rules 
and regulations of Brunel University (as quoted by Remenyi et al., 2002, p. 16) 
state: (a) to show ability to conduct an original investigation; (b) to test ideas; (c) 
demonstrate broad knowledge and understanding of the relevant discipline and 
appropriate cognate subjects. The last indicator can be paraphrased as ‘know the 
literature,’ and the second as ‘use the methodology.’ What constitutes an original 
investigation is less clear. There are, however, two other clues in the Brunel 
University regulations. First, the thesis should make a distinct contribution to 
knowledge, and second, provide evidence of the candidate’s originality by the 
discovery of new facts or the exercise of critical power (Remenyi et al., 2002).  
 
‘Contribution to knowledge’ is sometimes expressed as “something that was not 
known before but which is interesting and important” (Remenyi et al., 2002, p. 20). 
Remenyi et al. (2002, p. 20) suggest contribution to the body of knowledge should 
include one or more of the following: Extending our ability to understand 
phenomena, new ways of applying existing science or theories, creating new 
theories, rejecting invalid theories, providing unifying explanations for events and 
circumstances. Dunleavy (2003) points out university guidelines describe 
‘originality’ in two ways. It can either be in the form of ‘discovery of new facts’ or 
display ‘independent critical power,’ or a combination of both. ‘New facts’ are the 
result of empirical research, an investigation of something not hitherto available 
(Dunleavy, 2003). ‘Independent critical power’ is presumably an indication the 
author can marshal a significant theoretical or thematic argument from a different 
perspective, although the criteria are nearly as vague as ‘originality’ (Dunleavy, 
2003). From this discussion of the requirements for a doctoral thesis, it is not clear 






This section focuses on points which may represent a contribution to the body of 
knowledge. The main points are (1) indication of board influence on performance, 
(2) indication of the role of boards in SMEs, (3) indication of the importance of the 
strategic role, (4) rejection of management hegemony and agency theory in the 
SME context, and (5) the importance of empirical study based on primary data from 
a Nordic country. Other possible contributions are discussed subsequently.     
 
5.1.1.1 The relationship between boards and performance 
This thesis started out by formulating the research question and the problem of 
corporate governance, as the proposition of rejecting the claim the board of 
directors has no value as an organ in the organisation. The claim was shown to have 
arguments and evidence supporting it, as well as theoretical support in management 
hegemony theory (for example Mace, 1971; Drucker, 1974; Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Gillies, 1992; MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). In effort to reject this claim, 
this research proposed to find some clear indication of a positive relationship 
between the board of directors and organisational performance (figure 5.1.2).  
 




The approach adapted in this research was grounded in the process-based view of 
the board. That view is widely accepted in the literature (for example Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Carter and Lorsch, 
2004) and was furthermore emphasised in the common ground of this research. The 
definition of corporate governance, which was based on Cadbury (2002), 
exemplifies the common ground for the discussion, claiming: Corporate governance 
is a system where the boards are the central actors as they monitor and direct 
organisations to positive performance.  
 
Focusing on the process-based view of the board, several measures were used as 









organisational performance was explored and broadened from previous studies 
within the corporate governance literature. Organisational performance was 
measured with instruments for financial and process outcomes. To solve the 
problem formulated in Chapter 1 the relationship between the board of directors and 
organisational performance was tested, and the results can be summarised with the 
following figure.  
 
Figure 5.1.3: Relationship between boards and organisational performance. 
 































The first box in figure 5.1.3 indicates a slight positive relationship between the 
strategic role of the board and financial outcome measure for organisational 





between the independent variables of strategic role and efficiency and decision 
process and the responsive process measure for organisational performance as the 
dependent variable. The third box indicates a small but definite relationship 
between the independent variables of strategic role and decision process and 
performance measured as satisfaction of employees and with standard of quality. 
Therefore all these measures are indicators of a positive relationship between the 
board of directors and organisational performance.  
 
This indication of a positive relationship between strategic role and organisational 
performance was further supported by qualitative techniques where respondents to 
the questionnaire answered open-ended questions. This support is exemplified by 
the answer from respondent 2, who noted: 
 
If the board is qualified and does what it is supposed to do, meaning that it emphasises a 
vision of professionalism and value creation and works on strategy, it will result in better 
performance for the organisation.  
 
Furthermore, the use of simple regressions indicated that boards have wide range of 
value as it influences different types of organisational performance measures. Six 
factors for organisational performance and one item measuring overall performance 
could be predicted with several of the indipendent variables. Although the 
relationships were not strong and often negligible the research shows there is 
indication of a wide effect on the complicated concept of organisation performance. 
Too strong relationship would have been more troublesome as it would indicate that 
other factors like CEO and other employees do not affect performance. While 
multicollinearity limits the analysis somewhat the results are important step in 
understanding the value creation of boards as a more complex phenomenon than a 
single effect on financial measures of organisational performance.  
 
The results were achieved in the setting of small and medium-sized organisations 
and the cultural context of Iceland. This may be regarded as a limitation of the 
research, as it may affect the ability to generalise from the study. However, the 





evidence that ‘some’ boards do in fact have a positive relationship with 
organisational performance. That objective has been achieved.  
 
5.1.1.2 Empirical support for roles of boards in SME’s 
The starting point of this thesis was to establish common ground based on 
definitions of corporate governance (for example Cadbury, 2002; Nørby, 2001). 
The common ground involved looking at corporate governance in terms of the 
board of directors and their role in monitoring and directing the company.  The 
emphasis on ‘monitoring’ and ‘directing’ as functions of the board was based 
mostly on theory, and different theories, implying a multi-theoretical perspective. 
However, empirical support for these two functions is limited by the small number 
of process studies carried out (Gabrielson and Huse, 2005; Heuvel et al., 2006). 
This study provides empirical support for the monitoring and directing functions of 
the board, and therefore supports the definition of corporate governance.  
 
The monitoring role refers to the monitoring function of the board, while the 
strategic role and the resource and advice role refer to the directing function of the 
board. These three roles have been empirically supported in this study with the use 
of factor analysis. From the perspective of internal consistency the three factors are 
very strong, with high Cronbach alphas. From the perspective of the strengths of 
factors there was a clear distinction between the three factors in terms of factor 
loadings, and the loadings of the items within each factor were very high (table 
5.1.1) 
 
Table 5.1.1: The three roles of the board as factors. 
Factor Alpha Items Mean SD Max loading Min loading 
Strategic role .958 14 4.440 .119 .885 .692 
Monitoring role .782 4 4.699 .125 .892 .727 
Resource- & 
Advice role 
.782 6 4.655 .118 .835 .720 
  
 
The high mean of these factors indicates boards do take these three roles seriously 





have a seat on the board (although they attend board meetings) as determined by 
Icelandic law, the validity of these results should be more highly weighted than if 
directors themselves had answered.  
 
The results support the literature review of Zahra and Pearce (1989), one of the 
main references in this study, as it is semantic work in the literature regarding the 
process-based view of the board. The results also support the work of Zahra and 
Pearce (1989), Johnson et al. (1996), Huse (2005) and others, indicating that each 
board has more than one role.  
 
The board is multifunctional as it has multiple roles. This study has empirically 
supported those multiple board roles, which are: Monitoring role, Strategic role and 
Resource and Advice role. Although these roles have been empirically supported in 
the context of SMEs in Iceland, this study has increased our knowledge of what 
boards actually do, which is a major step in opening up the black box of the board. 
It is for further research to discover if and how boards in different cultural and 
organisational contexts perform these roles.  
 
5.1.1.3 Empirical support for the strategic role of the board 
As agency theory has often been used synonymously with governance theory, 
emphasising the monitoring function of the board (Lubatkin, 2007), while the 
directing function of the board, and especially the strategic role, has been 
disregarded. Some have argued the board has no strategic role, except in the case of 
crises (Stiles and Taylor, 2001), and others have argued it contradicts what the 
board should be doing (Jensen and Meckling, 1983). This study, however, supports 
the strategic role of the board as a general role. It also indicates the boards’ strategic 
role is the most important role in relationship to organisational performance.  
 
This study emphasises the strategic role of the board using a much broader measure 
than previously used in corporate governance research. The instrument was adapted 
from the leadership literature (Kanji and Sá, 2001; Kanji, 2002) as it had been 
tested and validated in other contexts. This study has validated this instrument in 





are evidence for validity. The validation in the context of board of directors may 
represent an academic contribution in itself. As supported by the items of the scale, 
the results using this instrument reject the assumptions of Jensen and Meckling 
(1983) the ‘initiation’ step in their theory is the responsibility of management. This 
study indicates ‘initiation’ is also part of what the board does. The broad measure of 
the strategic role here gives a much richer picture of what the strategic role of the 
board includes. The factor contains 14 items and can be split into four different 
factors including values, vision, mission, and strategy, as reflected in strategy 
literature (Kanji, 2002). The study provides, therefore, a much richer understanding 
of the strategic role of the board. 
 
The strategic role became the most important variable measuring the effect of the 
board in the relationship between the board and organisational performance. The 
results show the variable is of utmost importance, not just for the purpose of this 
study, but for understanding what boards should be focusing on. If the strategy role 
of boards can contribute positively to organisational performance, the effort of 
regulators and agency theorists to limit the board to a monitoring device for 
management decisions may undermine this important role. This finding is by no 
means a small contradiction to the ‘common knowledge’ which often seems to 
drive corporate governance discussion. It may represent an important step for 
understanding the structural importance of the board of directors as an organ within 
the organisation. This important implication resulted from using a broad 
measurement of the strategic role of the board.  
 
5.1.1.4 Theoretical support and rejection 
The problem formulation introduced in the first chapter focused on rejecting the 
management hegemony theory. It was argued the main premise of that theory was 
actually the claim the board has no value in terms of organisational performance. 
The main proposition therefore focused on finding a positive relationship between 
the board of directors and organisational performance. The results of this study have 
indicated there is a positive relationship between the two concepts in the context of 
this study. Therefore, it is argued management hegemony theory can be rejected in 






The design of the study included both the monitoring role and the strategic role. The 
monitoring role is the role agency theory prescribes for the board, while the 
strategic role contradicts some of the assumptions of agency theory, as discussed 
above. As the study finds support for the monitoring role of the board, it therefore 
supports agency theory. On the other hand, the study also finds the strategic role to 
be important, in contradiction to agency theory. Furthermore, it has been argued the 
major assumptions of agency theory do not apply in this context, as the theory 
focuses on big organisations with dispersed ownership rather than SMEs with 
concentrated ownership (Lubatkin, 2007). This study rejects agency theory both 
empirically and theoretically in the context of this study.  
 
Two of the original roles operationalised were actually found to be one single 
factor, called Resource and Advice role. The resource part is based on resource 
dependency theory, which claims the board provides resources to the organisation. 
This theoretical perspective was supported in the study as the Resource and Advice 
role emerged as a strong factor (table 5.1.1).  
 
Last, but not least, the strong strategic role factor and its relationship with 
organisational performance has supported stewardship theory. Contrary to the 
assumptions of agency theory, stewardship theory indicates the board and 
management work together on strategy and other issues, and the primary role is not 
to monitor management. As there is only limited empirical support for stewardship 
theory, this result may be considered a major contribution to the stewardship theory 
literature.  
 
The results would indicate this thesis has made a theoretical contribution within the 
corporate governance literature, as it has supported stewardship theory and resource 







5.1.1.5 A Nordic study based on the process view of the board 
Several scholars have called for more studies of boards of directors to further 
understand what happens in the black box (for example Zahra and Pearce,1989; 
Tricker, 1994; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Gabrielson and Huse, 2005). Studies have 
been called for in contexts other than the Anglo-Saxon context, as there have been 
only a handful of European studies focusing on the process rather than structure of 
the board (Huse, 2005). As a major Nordic study focused on the process-based view 
of the board, this study addresses this need.  
 
This is an original study based on primary data, introducing new facts resulting 
from an empirical investigation into SMEs in Iceland. This is the first study in 
Iceland based on the process view of the board, and the first study after regulators 
introduced the Icelandic governance code in 2004. Previous studies have been 
opinion polls, focusing on descriptive statistics. This study has added a dimension 
based on the causal design of surveys. Indeed, very few studies based on the 
process view of the board have been done in Nordic countries, most in Norway and 
Sweden (for example Borch and Huse, 1993 and Gabrielson and Huse, 2002). 
Furthermore, few studies have focused on SMEs in Europe (Heuvel et al., 2006). 
This research introduces new facts unavailable anywhere else as a contribution to 
the body of knowledge.   
 
5.1.1.6 Other contributions 
The main contributions have been described above, although it is a matter of 
opinion what should be regarded as the main contribution of this thesis. Some other 
contributions made in this thesis may deserve to be mentioned, although they will 
not be discussed in detail. Some of these may have been mentioned already as part 
of the main contribution, but are stressed here by themselves in no special order.  
 
Process-based studies are better than structural-based studies. This study applied 
both the structural-based view of the board and the process-based view of the board, 
which resulted in the composition variables not leading to any interesting results 
while the process variables, described as ‘process’ and ‘roles,’ proved to be very 





(Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Huse, 2005; Zahra, 
2007). 
 
A broad measure of organisational performance based on perception. This study 
used a broader measure for organisational performance than has been used in 
previous studies within the corporate governance field (Dalton et al., 1999; Coles et 
al., 2001). Furthermore it used subjective measures based on perception that have 
not been used much in the field, but which could prove to be a major supplement to 
future studies (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Brett, 2000). The broad view 
of performance gives richer scope for interpreting the importance of the board (Hart 
and Banbury, 1994; Zahra and Pearce, 1991). This study is therefore innovative in 
terms of measurements.  
 
Refining and validating tested instruments. The questions in the survey were based 
on instruments used by other researchers and published in respected journals (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1991; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Heuvel et al., 2006). These 
instruments were validated to some degree, and some refined for the analysis, 
which could prove important for future use. This study has therefore contributed to 
refining measurement instruments that can be used in future research.    
 
The use of rigorous instrumentalism. Although the research paradigm was defined 
as realism, this study has followed the rigour of instrumentalism. Criticism of 
previous studies has somewhat focused on their lack of rigour (Bøhren and 
Ødegaard, 2003; Larcker et al., 2004; Heuvel et al., 2006). This study has used a 
stepwise approach recommended by Churchill (1995), Hair et al. (2006) and Hair et 
al. (2003) to make every step of the process as rigorous as possible, describing both 
mistakes as well as successes (Wacker, 2004). The approach of instrumentalism 
can, therefore, be regarded as a contribution by itself.  
 
Formulation of the problem. Although the formulation of the problem seems 
obvious enough it can be regarded as an innovative approach to understanding 
theories and the literature. It is based on the ideas of Popper (2002) where theories 





value in terms of organisational performance, the focus of the study is different 
from previous studies that have sought to verify theories, primarily the agency 
theory. This approach to formulating problems may be a start for cleaning up the 
theoretical forest of the corporate governance literature (Popper, 2002). The 
problem formulation itself may, therefore, be regarded as a contribution.  
 
The definition of corporate governance. At the beginning of the thesis some 
definitions of corporate governance were reviewed and then refined. It was argued 
the difference from previous definitions, as for example Cadbury (2002), was the 
difficulty detecting what corporate governance was not, making the definition 
weak. Therefore, the refined version was narrowed to reflect research efforts in the 
field. This refined definition has been supported empirically in this study, as well as 
in Heuvel et al (2006). It can, therefore, be argued the refined definition of 
corporate governance, on which this thesis is based, also makes a contribution.  
 
Classification of the literature. A lot of effort was put into trying to classify the 
literature, as it is fragmented and contradictory. This effort was supported with the 
methodological discussion of paradigms, theories, models, and concepts and their 
classification (Patton, 2002; Silverman, 2005). Some classifications were used as a 
foundation, and reviewed and refined for further discussion, as in the case of 
Hung’s (1998) typology, Berghe and Balden (2004) roles dualism, and the 
integrated model of Zahra and Pearce (1989). The efforts to classify theories, 
models, and concepts in the literature may help further research (Weick, 1995) and 
be regarded as a contribution to the literature.  
 
Theorisation as a supplement to empiricism. The methodology chapter focused 
heavily on paradigms and theories with the purpose of understanding what ‘good’ 
theory is (Wacker, 2004). The perspectives discussed in the first section of the 
methodology chapter, especially Popper’s (2002) arguments for theorising, have 
been used widely in this thesis, in the problem formulation and in discussions of the 
results. This approach has added a dimension to this thesis that makes it much more 
valuable, as it aims to scrutinize theories and not just verify them. This approach is 





theoretical focus (Tricker, 2000; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The approach of 
theorisation may, therefore, be regarded as a contribution.  
 
First step to building a more complete research model. The difficulty faced in the 
beginning of this thesis was models in the literature were mainly theoretical, if one 
can use that word, as it implies they were simplified versions of specific theories, 
which they are not. They were multi-theoretical rather than empirically supported 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001). Furthermore, it was evident in terms of taxonomy the 
classification was flawed, and the possibility of multicollinearity highly probable. 
Therefore, the study design became more exploratory than originally planned. The 
results of this exploratory approach have, however, provided a basis for a more 
robust model for future research. It is a step towards a more sophisticated research 
model based on empirical investigation and theorisation (Popper, 2002). This first 
step may be regarded as an academic contribution.  
 
5.1.1.7 Reflecting on the contribution 
The discussion at the beginning of this section pointed out the lack of clarity about 
what contribution a doctoral thesis should make, and ill-defined terms like ‘the 
body of knowledge’ (Remenyi et al. 2002). Using some of the key words from that 
discussion it is possible to argue this thesis may make a contribution to the ‘body of 
knowledge’ if the ‘contribution’ is measured in terms of ‘conducting an original 
investigation,’ ‘to test ideas,’ and ‘to demonstrate broad knowledge and 
understanding of the relevant discipline.’ In this research, a survey was made in a 
new setting, and relevant ideas based on a literature review were tested.  
 
Using the phrase ‘something that was not known before but which is interesting and 
important,’ it can also be argued a contribution has been made by this research. The 
results about SMEs in Iceland were ‘not known before.’ The results are ‘interesting’ 
because they contradict the major theory in the field. Finding the strategic role is 
positively related to performance is important, as the focus of regulators and agency 
theories is to starve this role rather than to feed it. Reflecting on some other key 
words, the empirical evidence of three roles has ‘extended our ability to understand 





instrumentalism in an empirical approach and theorisation for formulating the 
problem and rejecting theories may be described as ‘new ways of applying existing 
science or theories.’ The results of the study indicate ‘rejecting invalid theories’ was 
possible, as management hegemony theory and agency theory were in this context. 
One of the main contributions of this thesis was to find indications of the positive 
relationship between the board and organisational performance, which supports the 
existence of the board as an organ in the organisation, and therefore may provide a 
‘unifying explanation for events and circumstances.’ This thesis did not attempt to 
‘create a new theory.’ However, the results may be regarded as a first step to a more 
sophisticated research model.     
 
The last key term in the argument for the contribution of this research is 
‘independent critical power.’ This has been the underlying theme of this thesis. The 
researcher has taken risks that may be understood to demonstrate independence and 
critical power. The major risks were focusing on a relationship supported by limited 
evidence, researching SMEs in Iceland, adapting measures from other fields, and 
focusing on a the strategic role of boards, which is generally negated by most theory 
in the field. Through review of the key terms related to the concept of ‘the body of 
knowledge,’ it may be argued this thesis has made a significant contribution.  
 
  
5.1.2 Limitations of the research 
There are several issues that can and should be regarded as limitations to the 
research. Some of these limitations will be discussed briefly below.  
 
5.1.2.1 Cultural context 
The research was conducted in Iceland, which may be regarded as a special case 
since it has structural elements of both the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance system (Weimer and Pape, 1999). It is debatable how much results 
from such a cultural setting may be generalised to other contexts. However, plans 
have already been made to repeat the study in Denmark and Sweden to gain more 






5.1.2.2 Organisational context 
The research focused on small and medium-sized companies and results were 
interpreted and theories rejected in that context. Future research might explore 
whether the positive relationship between the board and organisational performance 
holds for larger companies, and whether the strategic role is as strong as in the case 
of SMEs. A study planned in Sweden is designed to include larger organisations.  
 
5.1.2.3 Generalizability  
The sampling method used was a non-probability approach, thus limiting the 
possibility to generalize from the target population. The choice of that approach was 
pragmatic. However, a more rigorous approach for sampling might increase the 
generalizability of future studies.  
 
5.1.2.4 Key informant problem 
The original survey design planned to ask both the CEO and the chairman the same 
questions, as the study was built around self-reporting instruments. The plan failed 
in practice, as there were too few responses from chairmen. It would have increased 
the validity of the study if two informants were to respond. It has to be noted, 
however, obtaining even one respondent from a top management team is a luxury. 
Obtaining two respondents could be more of a fantasy.    
 
5.1.2.5 Reliability of self-reported instruments 
This study employed self-reported instruments, as any other approach was not 
possible given the constraints of the research. The use of some ‘objective’ 
measures, especially in the case of organisational performance, would have 
increased the validity of the study in terms of triangulation. Both subjective and 
objective measures are to be used in the Swedish and the Danish studies.  
 
5.1.2.6 Multicollinearity between variables 
The issue of mulitcollinearity was expected to be a concern, as there was a problem 
with the theoretical models and concepts used in these models. Better definitions, 
based on taxonomy, need to be established for some of the concepts, for example 





The multicollinearity problem resulted in a model with only one or two variables as 
independent variables. Efforts are being made to define the concepts more precisely 
in future research. 
 
5.1.2.7 Measurement issues  
Some of the instruments intended to measure process, such as Decision and Style 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1991), turned out to be problematic and violated some statistical 
requirements used in the analysis. However, these instruments were improved in the 
process of the study and some of their weaknesses identified. The work done in this 
thesis could therefore help to make those measurements more robust.  
 
5.1.2.8 Main limitations 
The main limitations of the research concern its generalizability. The cultural and 
organisational context of the study, and the sampling approach employed, limit 
application to a wider population. The problem formulation and problems with 
models and concepts in the literature were consistent with exploratory research, 
although the design model was more similar to descriptive and causal designs 
(Churchill, 1995). The results made it possible to support and reject theories in the 
context of the sample, which was the objective of the study. The results indicate 
important concepts and relationships upon which future research can be built. 
  
5.1.3 Future research 
From the start this study was regarded as a first step in a wider research effort. The 
original plan was to perform the study in two or three countries, but was clearly too 
ambitious for a doctoral study. As previously noted, there are plans to do the study 
in Denmark in association with Copenhagen Business School, and in Sweden in 
association with Active Owner Partners, a consulting group focusing on corporate 
governance. Some issues described here as potential future research will be 
considered in the extended research based on this thesis. Some fruitful areas for 






5.1.3.1 Testing for the same relationships in different context 
The cultural and organisational context has already been noted as being the major 
limitation of this study. Future research may increase the external validity of this 
study by testing the same concepts and relationship in a different context. More 
studies in the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon context may indicate how rare or 
frequent the Icelandic case is. Studies in larger corporations could indicate how or 
whether the relationship changes with size. A longitudinal study show how the role 
of board changes over time, with size and other external contingencies, and how the 
relationship with organisational performance evolves.  
 
5.1.3.2 Testing interaction between variables for more complex models 
As the problem formulation was simple, the study design used a classic model, with 
independent variables on one side and dependent variables on the other. It is 
possible to test some of the relationships between these variables to understand their 
interaction. This work was regarded as outside the scope of this thesis, as it may 
take the focus away from the main objective. Further research could focus on these 
intermediate relationships.  
 
5.1.3.3 Expanding and improving the measurement for tasks 
One of the principles for this research was to use instruments already developed, 
and alter them as little as possible. However, a broader measure for the roles, and 
more distinct measures to minimize the problem of multicollinearity, could be 
adopted. This research provides a solid platform to refine the measures to make 
classification between variables more like taxonomy than typology. Future studies 
testing the concepts to improve measurement would be a great service to the field.  
 
5.1.3.4 Testing with subjective and objective measures of performance 
This survey relied on subjective measures. Future studies could supplement the 
study design with objective measures to increase the validity of the results. 
Organisational performance measures based on perceptions are still regarded as 
inferior to objective measures, although they do have many advantages. Including 
objective performance measures would increase the possibility of publication in 






5.1.3.5 Testing whether the roles change with different circumstances 
The roles of the board indicated empirically with factor analysis provide a basis for 
understanding what boards actually do. It would be interesting to find out how the 
roles change, and whether, for example, the strategic role is more important in a 
business cycle downswing than upswing, or if it is related to the goals of the 
organisation, as in strategic outcome models developed by Miles and Snow (1994). 
Such research efforts could provide a much more detailed understanding of the role 
and value of the board.  
 
5.1.3.6 Clustering boards with different role mixtures 
One of the statistical techniques seriously considered for this research was cluster 
analysis. Cluster analysis has not been used in corporate governance research, at 
least none was found after a literature review. Cluster analysis is interesting in this 
context, as it could test whether boards do cluster, and provide some criteria to 
establish an empirical approach for classifying boards in terms of types. The 
typology of boards today assumes boards only adopt one role, when in fact they are 
more likely to have many roles, as this study indicates. Clusters with different 
mixtures of roles could increase the understanding of how and why boards differ.   
 
5.1.3.7 The future of future research 
Research in corporate governance has in some ways stumbled into a blind alley and 
not found its way out, as researchers continue to debate structural characteristics of 
boards, although that discussion seems to lead to nowhere (Daily et al., 2003). This 
research has challenged some major assumptions that have dominated the corporate 
governance field, by formulating the problem in an unusual way and adopting a 
different research method from the one that has led researchers into a blind alley. If 
research in corporate governance is to prevail, different research approaches and 
focus are needed than those used to date. It is not the task of the researcher to 
dictate what the purpose of the board should be, and it is naïve to assume all boards 
follow what often seems to be an irrational approach. Chandler (1962) pointed out 
forty-five years ago structure follows strategy, not the other way around, which 






Future research in the field of corporate governance has many things to discover to 
increase the understanding of the functions of the board of directors and its 
importance. The perceived fatigue in the field is not due to the subject of research, 
but rather the purpose and the approach to researching the subject.  
 
5.1.4 Academic contribution 
It has been argued in this section this thesis has made an academic contribution. The 
discipline required of researchers at a doctoral level has been applied, and an 
understanding achieved of the literature in the field of corporate governance and 
scientific methodology. The results of the research are interesting and important 
from both a theoretical and practical point of view. The research also provides a 
platform for further research that could broaden our knowledge of corporate 
governance.  
 
This section has focused on the academic implications, mainly the contribution 
which the thesis has made to the body of knowledge. The next section focuses on 






5.2 Practical implications 
 
In fact, we philosophers and ‘free spirits’ feel ourselves irradiated as by a 
new dawn by the report that the ‘old God is dead’; our hearts overflow with 
gratitude, astonishment, presentiment and expectation. 
 




If agency theory were not the dominant theory of corporate governance, and 
monitoring not perceived as the one and only role of the board, it would open wide 
new possibilities for boards in organisations. The existence and the value of the 
strategy role is not news to those who have focused on consulting boards (Charan, 
1998; 2005; Hilb, 2006). For those grounding their work in empirical research, such 
news should ‘irradiate.’ The purpose of this section is to discuss the practical 
implications of the results for organisations.  The DBA program requires the 
research to benefit business in some clear and concise manner. The following 
discussion is somewhat more consulting-orientated than previous discussions in this 
thesis.   
 
Figure 5.2.1: The outline of practical implication. 
  5.1. Academic
         implications
  5.2. Practical
         implications
  5.4. Final
         words
  5.3. Personal
         implications
 5.2.1. Valuable
boards
  5.2.2. Implications
for monitoring
  5.2.3. Board as
a resource
  5.2.4. Strategic
focused board




The first part is a general discussion about the value of boards. The next three parts 
discuss the three factors which resulted from the study, and the practical 
implications of each of them. The last part concludes the section with a focus on the 






5.2.1 Valuable boards 
The main purpose of this study was to find evidence for the value of the board. This 
was accomplished by showing a positive relationship between the board and 
organisational performance. The evidence indicates the arguments of management 
hegemony theory are invalid, at least in the context of this study. Boards can have 
other roles than rubber-stamping managerial decisions. The board meeting is simply 
not another word for the meeting of the family as Drucker (1954) worried about. 
Indeed, the study indicates boards are highly involved in initiating decisions. 
Boards can and should have value as an organ within the organisation. 
 
The question is whether organisations are using the full potential of their boards. 
Lorsch and Carter (2004, p. 1) ask the reader at the beginning of their book: “Do 
you believe that the board performs anywhere near to its potential?” Their own 
answer is ‘no,’ despite all the effort of regulatory reforms (Lorsch and Carter, 
2004). Coffee (2006) argues the blame game initiated by the media and regulators 
for corporate failure has focused too much on the board of directors, when the 
blame, at least partly, should fall on the gatekeepers. They are the true monitoring 
mechanism in the grand scheme of corporate governance. The blame game has in 
many ways paralysed the board. Boards are being structured in accordance with 
rules and regulations, and the process reduced to ticking boxes (Stiles and Taylor, 
2001; Lorsch and Carter, 2004). It is the premise of institutionalism all boards 
should look and be the same. Agency theory seems to indicate the role of board is to 
monitor management, because managers are selfish and opportunist, and 
shareholders are so dispersed they are powerless. Institutionalism and agency theory 
are based on weak assumptions rejected in this study.  
 
If boards do not perform anywhere near their potential, as Lorsch and Carter (2004) 
indicate, the board as an organ must be a waste of resources. The question then 
becomes, how can boards perform to the promise of their potential? This study 
indicates when boards adopt three roles they can influence organisational 
performance, and the strategic role is the predictor for performance. The results 





theory, and agency theory (figure 2.1.2). The premise of contingency theory is one 
size does not fit all. This is, indeed, the view emphasised by Lorsch and Carter 
(2004) (figure 5.2.1). Boards need to be rescued from the institutional perspective if 
they are to perform and deliver value for the organisation. This argument is further 
supported with the conclusion of Chandler (1962) noted above, that structure 
follows strategy in corporate development. The structural issues of the board should 
therefore be a result of decisions about what the purpose and the process of the 
board is to be. That purpose and processes should not be predetermined by 
institutionalism based on weak and often irrelevant assumptions. It is by means of 
contingency theory that boards can perform best and have real value.   
 









Adapted from Lorsch and Carter (2004, p. 9). 
 
The results of this study indicate it is the strategic role that gives the board value. 
This does not mean it is the only valuable board role. The claim indicates, in the 
context of SMEs in Iceland, the strategic role is the most important in relation to 
organisational performance. The trap of concluding this is a special case should, 
however, be avoided. The limited scope of the study affects how broadly the results 
can be interpreted and generalized. It does not necessarily mean things are different 





because the strategic role is usually not measured as thoroughly as has been done in 
this study.  
 
The practical question could also be ‘why?’ Why should boards be paralysed within 
the instrumentalist perspective if it renders the board irrelevant? Why should boards 
focus on the selfishness and the opportunism of management if that is really not an 
issue or the most important role the board can have? Why should boards be 
structured and have integrated processes based on the assumption shareholders are 
so dispersed they cannot control the organisation, when the opposite is true in far 
more cases? (La Porta et al., 1999; Lubatkin, 2007). The answer is ‘they should 
not,’ if the premise of corporate governance is boards should have value as organs 
within the organisation.  
 
5.2.2 Implications for monitoring 
This study has indicated the monitoring role is one of the three main roles of board 
in the context of the study, and the monitoring role is the one boards focus on the 
most. A comparison between the roles is, however, ambiguous, as the instruments 
for measuring the roles have different numbers of items and internal validity. It is 
interesting to note when respondents to the survey were asked to comment on the 
results, and whether the monitoring role was the most important role, most chose 
the strategic role as the most important, and when they talked about the monitoring 
role, they used it synonymously with regulations. This indicates it is the role of 
institutionalism as well as the role of agency theory.  
 
The existence of the monitoring role and the strategic role within the same board 
highlights the classical controversy regarding the role of the board. A board cannot 
be both a decision-maker and at the same time an instrument to monitor its own 
decisions. It would seem the role has to be ‘either/or’. Theoretically it could, 
however, be interpreted differently. Using the decision model of Jensen and 
Meckling (1983) once again can facilitate the explanation. The results of this study 
have indicated the board takes part initiating strategy, if not leading the process. 
This study does not claim the board implements strategy. Therefore, it can be 





monitoring the implementation in accordance with the proposed strategy from the 
initiation and ratification process. The focus then is not the assumption the CEO 
initiates and implements self-serving strategy rather than safeguarding shareholders, 
but that the CEO implements strategy initiated and ratified by the joint effort of the 
board and the CEO. From this perspective the strategic role and the monitoring role 
do not oppose one another or conflict. This can be seen as the argument of 
stewardship theory.  
 
The basic assumption of regulators, media, and institutional and agency theorists is 
the board has the means to monitor management initiation and implementation.  
Taking into account the scandals and the general disappointment with the efforts of 
boards, it is evident boards do not function well as monitoring organs. Perhaps this 
should be the role of the gatekeepers (Coffee, 2006). Drucker (1974, p. 628) makes 
this point: 
 
The decline of the board is a universal phenomenon of this century. Perhaps nothing shows 
it as clearly as that the board, which, in law, is the governing organ of a corporation, was 
always the last group to hear of trouble in the great business catastrophes of this century.  
 
Whenever one of the “scandals” breaks, the board’s failure is blamed on stupidity, 
negligence of board members, or on failure of management to keep its board informed. But 
when such malfunction occurs with unfailing regularity, one must conclude that it is the 
institution that fails to perform rather than individuals.  
 
If Drucker (1974) had already come to this conclusion forty years ago the question 
remains, why are we still trying to fix a failed institution? Why has the board not 
been eliminated from the organisation, as it only seems to provide a false sense of 
security? Why has the board not be eliminated, as it has no value? This brings the 
discussion back to the starting point of this thesis, to the main proposition. The 
result from this study indicates the board has value because of its strategic role. The 
results imply the board in the context of this study is a different organ than 
prescribed by institutionalism, and as this different organ it has value for the 
organisation. The question is then, what to do about the monitoring role. The 





implementation of strategy. This is, however, not radically different from the 
original problem of the institution Drucker (1974) refers to, as the board can be 
equally badly equipped to monitor strategy initiated either by the CEO or the board 
itself. It is possible to take the road to increased rigour of the monitoring role and 
strengthening the institutional framework, with the aim of improving board 
monitoring, as has been the focus of regulators and agency theorists. There is 
another possibility. To admit the limitation of the monitoring function, empower 
gatekeepers, and increase their responsibility. This would not decrease the 
responsibility of the board, as it should stand or fall with the organisation, but it 
does broaden the range of the board as value creator for the organisation. The 
monitoring role does not have to be the only or the most important role of the board.  
 
The main assumption of agency theory, as built on the work of Berle and Means 
(1932), is ownership is dispersed. This assumption has been shown to hold water in 
very few cases in organisations (La Porta et al., 1999; Lubatkin, 2007). This is very 
important with regard to the purpose and the role of the board. The argument is if 
ownership is dispersed, the board needs to secure the control of shareholders in 
order to manage. When ownership is concentrated, there is seldom very much doubt 
who controls the organisation, as it is one or a few owners, rather than management. 
In this study most of organisations had very concentrated ownership, as to be 
expected in the case of SMEs (Heuvel et al., 2006). It can be argued the purpose of 
the board is different in the case of organisations with concentrated ownership than 
dispersed ownership, as the issue of control is almost irrelevant. At the same time it 
can be argued the monitoring function of the board should be different. If the board 
is to monitor those who have the control, the board has to monitor the largest 
owners rather than management. This implies the monitoring role of the board 
becomes more complicated, not less so, as it must still monitor management for 
implementation, but now also needs to monitor the largest owners regarding the 
initiation and the ratification process. An in-depth examination of these 
complexities is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it may be concluded if 
monitoring management is too big a task for the board, monitoring both 






The discussion of the monitoring function has focused on the shareholder 
perspective, management and shareholders. If the discussion is expanded to the 
stakeholder perspective, it is obvious the issue of monitoring could be regarded as 
even more complex than before. This study did not ask directly about whether the 
board monitors from the shareholder perspective or the stakeholder perspective. The 
shareholder perspective was indicated within the format of the questions. The 
stakeholder perspective was, however, referred to in the context of the resource 
role. The main point to make in this discussion of practical implications is that the 
monitoring role should be different if it is based on the stakeholder rather than the 
shareholder perspective, as the latter takes many more actors into consideration and 
makes the monitoring role of the board considerably more complex.  
 
5.2.3 Board as a resource 
The results of factor analysis showed one of the factors could be regarded as both 
resource and advice role. The implication of the resource part of the role is a 
broader focus for the board, taking the discussion outside the organisation. Hung 
(1998) called this role the linking role, as it links the board and the organisation 
with outside actors. It has, furthermore, some elements of the stakeholder 
perspective, as some items focus on reputation and relationship with stakeholders, a 
coordinating role, to use Hung’s (1998) term. The resource and advice role 
indicates the board has a role attracting or supplying resources to the organisation, 
as well as marketing its image.  
 
The resource and advice role has somewhat been overshadowed by the monitoring 
and the strategic role in this thesis, as has occurred generally in the literature. This 
does not indicate the role is not important. This study has indeed shown the 
resource and advice role is as important as the other two, as shown by the means of 
the factors. From a contingency perspective, the most important role of the board 
might be to attract new resources, or to coordinate and influence the view of 
different stakeholders at times. There is little need for this role according to the 
institutional perspective, further undermining the managerial hegemony theory. 





value by breaking the isolation of the manager. This role could add value to the 
board, although this study has not emphasised its importance.  
 
5.2.4 Strategy focused boards 
The strategic role turned out to be the most important role for the board in terms of 
the relationship with organisational performance. The role was important in the 
theoretical discussion, as the involvement of the board in strategy has been used to 
reject agency theory in the context of the study. The strategic role is also interesting 
because it emphasises a different purpose and process of the board than regulators 
emphasise (Nadler, 2005). A good rationale for the role was given by one of the 
respondents to the open-ended questions meant for increasing the conclusion 
validity:  
 
I think the most important role of the board is strategy and advice. The board is the 
representative of the owners and the owners themselves sit on the board. Therefore it is 
normal that they want to develop the strategy.  
 
It is normal that the owners want to decide what values the organisation stands for, 
what the vision is, the main mission, and generally how their organisation is run. Of 
course there is a fine line between a director who contributes ideas to company 
strategy and one who tries to manage the company (Lorsch, 1995). The implications 
of the strategic role need therefore to be clear (Lorsch and Carter, 2004). The Berle 
and Means (1932) study alludes to dread of people called ‘professional managers,’ 
which Chandler (1977) discusses in some detail. During fourth decade of the 20th 
century this might have been the case, but the situation has changed dramatically, as 
owners of organisations are now just as likely to have an MBA in management and 
business as the managers. It is, therefore, likely owners know just as much, or even 
more, about the implications of strategy as managers. The managerial monopoly of 
strategy is, therefore, to a large extent obsolete. This professionalism could have 
been regarded as an argument for managerial strategy initiation at the time of Berle 
and Means (1932), but can probably not be regarded as a valid today. Why should 






The board, with or without the owners, might also be in better position to see the 
big picture needed to initiate and formulate good strategy. Several of the 
respondents to the open-ended questions emphasised this point, for example 
respondent 14: 
 
A board that takes the strategic role seriously is more likely to be an active board which 
secures the future of the company. Many boards are relatively passive and let the 
companies get stuck in the mud for a long time. Managers are often too preoccupied with 
the daily routines but an active board can keep the necessary discussion about direction and 
future paths alive.  
 
Management cannot see the forest because of all of the trees which dominate its 
daily routine, destined to spend much of its time putting out fires (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1985). It needs someone else to provide the helicopter view of the forest. 
The board could, therefore, be a valuable tool in the strategic formulation process, 
from start to end. This is why the strategic role could be an important role for all 
boards, not just boards of SMEs in Iceland.  
 
The practical implication of the importance of the strategic role is boards need to be 
trained in strategy to optimise the potential of the role. Such training specifically for 
boards hardly exists today. It is, however, important boards take a broad view of 
strategy, and not adopt the tunnel view of any single school of strategy (Mintzberg 
et al., 1998). The first step is to acknowledge the importance of the board’s strategic 
role, from the perspective of owners, CEOs, and shareholders. This could represent 
a way to increase the value of the board.  
 
5.2.5 Choosing the role 
The history of the board in organisations has shown it has been traditionally 
somewhat lost if it only had a formal and ceremonial role (Mace, 1971; Herman, 
1981; Vance, 1983). Those boards didn’t function (Drucker, 1974). This might 
seem strange, when in the words of Drucker (1954, p. 178), “to the law, the Board 
of Directors is the only organ of the enterprise. [. . .] Legally it is considered the 
representative of the owners, having all the power and alone having power.” In 





the board is to be. Directors have responsibility, as well as the power to decide what 
to do with that responsibility.  
 
The discussion of the results of this thesis from a practical perspective has reached 
the conclusion the board can, and should, choose its role. This conclusion was 
reached by studying SMEs in Iceland and discussing the implications of the results. 
This supports the contingency perspective of ‘one-size doesn’t fit all,’ indicating 
boards determine their own value. This conclusion is similar to that reached by 
Lorsch and Carter (2004) after studying large leading corporations in North 
America and Europe. They argue (Lorsch and Carter, 2004, p. 61):  
 
We believe strongly that each board must define the value it will provide. It must explicitly 
choose the role it will play, and its choice must be informed by a good understanding of its 
company’s specific situation and its own capabilities and talents. Defining its role is the 
first step in effective board design. It is as important as laying a foundation before a house 
is built.  
  
The conclusions reached in this thesis seem not only to apply to SMEs in Iceland. 
There seem to be global similarities not affected by size of organisation. The 
emphasis on the board’s freedom to choose its role is based on the contingency 
perspective rather than institutionalism. Directors need to understand the board as 
an organ in an organisation, as well as becoming ‘professionals’ and ‘activists’ 
(MacAvoy and Millstein, 2003). The value of the board as an organ and the value of 
the whole organisation may be determined by the foundation the board itself 






5.3 Personal implications 
 
Only in a quite limited sense does the single individual create out of himself 
the mode of speech and of thought we attribute to him. He speaks the 
language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks. 
 
Karl Mannheim (1936 - ) 
 
 
Work on a doctoral thesis is a learning experience designed to gain a better 
understanding of the craft of scientific research. It is a life-changing experience 
which influences the premises and paradigms of one’s life. It is enlightenment. The 
process is a journey from one place to another, and in some ways from one group to 
another. Strangely, one no longer speaks the language of the group one used to 
embrace. Instead one speaks a new language and identifies with a new group. The 
new group call themselves scientists. Membership in this group implies there has 
been some progress and personal achievement during the journey.   
 
Figure 5.3.1: The outline of personal implications. 
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This section takes the discussion to a more personal level. It is a reflection upon the 
meaning of the journey for the researcher. The first part is about the implications 
and experience of being a researcher. The second part discusses some milestones of 
the learning experience and the take-away value of the process. The third section is 






5.3.1 Being a researcher 
The process of becoming a researcher has sometimes been described as learning a 
craft. It is a good metaphor. It alludes to the hard labour of a craftsman and the skill 
one acquires going through the process and understanding its implications and 
limitations. It may better be described as a discipline calling for self-control and 
hard work, where the aim is rigorous analysis, a quest for understanding, criticism, 
and contribution. It is a discipline needing to be constantly reviewed, enforced, and 
advanced.  
 
Being a researcher is like being a member of a club seeking to advance the 
knowledge of mankind. Individuals can disagree utterly and fundamentally, but 
ultimately they are on the same quest, just by different means. Although the debate 
is not always about the issues, it can also be about pride and prejudice, the club of 
researchers works hard to generate new ideas and advance understanding. That is a 
great club indeed.   
 
Popper (1994, p. 123) argues scientists should take an ethical oath. He even 
proposes a refined version of the Hippocratic oath for scientists. The main points 
are along the following lines.     
 
1. Professional Responsibility. The guiding light must be the growth of knowledge 
by taking part in the search of truth, or more precisely, the approximations of 
the truth. Mistakes are unavoidable and therefore they should not be taken over-
seriously, although not taken over leniently, as the goal is, through hard work, to 
constantly raise the standards by which the work is judged. We must constantly 
be reminded of the finitude and fallibility of our knowledge and of the infinity 
of our ignorance.  
 
2. The student. One belongs to a tradition and a community as a scientist. One 
owes respect to all those who contribute to the search for truth and loyalty to the 
teachers. There is a duty, however, to be critical towards others, teachers, and 
colleagues, and especially towards oneself. It is most important to beware of 






3. The Overriding Loyalty. One owes the overriding loyalty to mankind – just as 
the physician owes his overriding loyalty to his patients. One needs to be aware 
studies may produce results that may affect the lives of many people, and one 
must constantly try to foresee and guard against any possible dangers or misuse 
of the results. In other words ‘do no harm.’  
 
I subscribe to this oath as a researcher using a slightly different focus: the role of 
the researcher is to search for insight that helps to solve problems and find 
opportunities, respect the work of other scientists by acknowledging it, criticising 
and challenging it, but first of all: to do no harm. This is the ethical guideline I will 
follow as a researcher.   
 
5.3.2 The learning experience 
You live and you learn, they say. However, how much you learn may depend on 
how you live. Learning by trial and error implies those who make the most mistakes 
are also likely to learn the most. There was no lack of mistakes in the process of 
producing this thesis (figure 5.3.2). However, the mistakes are not most important 
per se, but rather meeting the challenges. A life challenged is a life bound to learn 
both from success and failure. A doctoral thesis is such a challenge. It is a journey 
requiring dedication and motivation to reach the end. It is a journey of pleasure and 
pain, hopes and disappointments, dreams and nightmares, and success and failure. 
These are all part of the journey. And one learns.  
 
To make a short story longer this section is divided into three parts, which 
demonstrate what and how this researcher has learned from the process. The first 
section is about learning by writing, the second about self-knowledge, and the third 
































































































4th and 5th paper
CG conference HMC
and BAM, Published
in Corporate Board -
role, duties &
composition.










5.3.2.1 Learning by writing 
One of my guiding lights in business literature and in many ways my role model is 
the legendary Peter F. Drucker. He remains so, even after the doctoral process when 
I understand the weaknesses of his writings and although he is curiously absent in 
academic references. He passed away in the year 2005, and although he was over 
ninety he was still writing and teaching about business. I have always found him 
impressive because of the depth of knowledge of different issues that jump from the 
pages of his books. He was a great teacher and a first-class writer. I think the reason 
for this is Drucker was probably one of the most dedicated students alive. Drucker 
(2001, p. 221) tells the story of how some first-class writers sometimes fail 
miserably in school. “The explanation is that first-rate writers do not, as a rule, learn 
by listening and reading. They learn by writing.” I can relate to this. I best 
understand subjects and arguments when I start writing about them. Listening to 
lectures never contributed much to my education. I have, however, always enjoyed 
writing and speaking about things. This approach to learning can be supported by 
the theory of multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1982) and the theory of experiential 
learning (Kolb and Fry, 1975). I think this is important self-knowledge. Drucker 






Actually, of all the important pieces of self-knowledge, this is one of the easiest to acquire. 
When I ask people, “How do you learn?” most of them know it. But when I then ask, “Do 
you act on this knowledge?” few do. And yet to act on this knowledge is the key to 
performance–or rather not to act on this knowledge is to condemn oneself to non-
performance.  
 
I agree with Drucker and I have acted on this knowledge in the last few years, using 
writing as a learning tool and as the barometer of my learning progress. Therefore 
writing this thesis has been an immense learning experience.  
 
I feel I have learned more than I think I have. Much of it has been about the infinity 
of my ignorance, to quote Popper (1994). I have learned about the subject of 
corporate governance, the breadth of it and some of its depth. More importantly I 
have learned to tackle a subject in a systematic fashion, from a theoretical to a 
practical level, and from claims to arguments to evidence. I have learned one needs 
to understand where one is coming from before one can understand where one is 
going. I have also learned about research methodology, how to research a subject, 
to challenge existing knowledge, and to seek new approximations of the truth. I 
have learned if one wants to see farther, one needs to stand on the shoulders of 
giants, to paraphrase Isaac Newton. Last, but not least, I have learned the 
importance of science as probably the greatest achievement of mankind (Gribbin, 
2002). The scientific method is the mother of all science. That was a huge leap for 
this researcher.   
   
5.3.2.2 Self-knowledge 
One result of doing a doctorate is learning about oneself. Some experiences were 
scary and disappointing, but others surprising and exhilarating. The strangest 
realisation of the doctoral process was one’s strengths had become weaknesses. I 
had always considered my creativity, broad knowledge of the business literature, 
and skills as an editor as being my strengths. However, they were not a source of 
fortune. The creativity tended to wander different paths deeper into dark forests and 
blind alleys, when a more level-headed approach would have made the process 
more straightforward. Similarly, the broad knowledge of the grand spectrum of 





focus. The experience as an editor led to overconfidence in the ability to mould a 
big and complex project into a single and clear thesis. On the other hand, by 
understanding the weaknesses of my strengths I could better convert them to an 
advantage.   
 
This process of self-knowledge is in essence how I understand the difference 
between single and double loop learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978). It is a question 
of ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness,’ or in other words ‘doing things right’ and ‘doing 
the right things’ (Drucker, 1954). One tends to, as I did during most of the process 
of working on this thesis, want to focus on doing things right, only to realise later in 
the process those were the wrong things. What one should have been focusing on 
was doing the right things. It seems from the experience of this research, however, 
that one sometimes needs to take several rounds in the single loop before one 
realises the double loop. It not only describes the personal learning experience in 
terms of self-knowledge, it actually describes the research process and the structure 
and the strategy of the thesis. It was only late in the game that I figured out what the 
essence of the thesis was, and what work had to be done, and what the right focus 
was. Initially, the work had mainly emphasised following the procedures of good 
research practice.  
 
The learning experience will help me to become a better researcher. I understand 
now that one needs to try to find out what the right things are before doing things 
right. I have also learned sometimes one needs to do something, as in contrast to 
just looking at the problem, to figure out what those right things are, as sometimes 
they emerge as part of the process. This self-knowledge is in a sense about 
understanding, if not unlearning, one’s bad habits, and learning from mistakes. 
 
5.3.2.3 Lifelong learning 
Lastly, another very important lesson was acquired from the doctoral journey, and 
that is about lifelong learning. Drucker (1997, p. 105) taught this lesson, as he made 
lifelong learning into a discipline. For over sixty years he made it a rule to learn a 






It may be statistics, it may be medieval history, it may be Japanese art, it may be 
economics. Three years of study are by no means enough to master a subject, but they are 
enough to understand it. So, for more than sixty years, I have kept on studying one subject 
at a time. This has not only given me a substantial fund of knowledge, it has also forced me 
to be open to new disciplines and new approaches and new methods – for every one of the 
subjects I have studied, makes different assumptions and employs a different methodology.  
 
I think Drucker made an important discovery. Three years is roughly the time it 
takes to get some insight into a subject. It is no coincidence, in my view, that a 
doctoral degree usually takes three to four years. I have chosen to look at my DBA 
studies in this light, to learn the process of learning a subject in three or four years.  
In a way, this is probably the most valuable skill that a doctorate degree can give 
me, the discipline to focus on a subject for three years and gain a fundamental 
understanding of it. Hopefully, I will also be able to retain this knowledge to build 
on and cherish. This time it was corporate governance. Hopefully there will be more 
subjects to come.  
 
5.3.3 A new turning point 
In the introduction I discussed some of the personal goals I made as part of my 
CDP. They were goals I wanted to achieve as part of the doctoral process. The goals 
are indicators of the new turning point I foresaw as part of taking this challenge. 
Each of the goals will be discussed in terms of the results achieved, and speculated 
about as to whether they did indeed represent a turning point in my life as I 
anticipated.  
 
Researcher – As a researcher I have gained a much broader spectrum of tools and 
theories to work from. I think I am fairly well educated in research theory and 
quantitative and qualitative research tools. For most of the first two years my focus 
was on qualitative methods. For the second two the focus was on quantitative 
methodology. I have not mastered either discipline yet, but I feel comfortable 
applying them, separately or together, as I think they should be used, to supplement 






Consultant – I believe modern consulting should be more research-focused than 
previously. I believe, therefore, the research process has made me a better 
consultant, and vice versa. I started an advisory board programme in 2006, the A-
Board, where I chaired five boards of Danish entrepreneurial companies. In 2007 
the programme was also started in Iceland, and expanded to twenty companies in 
Denmark. From this work I have a better understanding of the needs of small and 
growing companies. Furthermore, I started a consulting agency in the spring of 
2007, specialising in corporate governance issues in Nordic countries 
(www.performingboards.com).  
 
Educator – I was not going to focus much on teaching while I was doing my 
doctorate. It turned out differently. In 2006, I started to teach entrepreneurship at 
the MBA level at the Copenhagen Business School in Denmark. The programme 
was expanded in 2007, and even grander plans have been made for 2008. I taught 
also as a guest lecturer on the MBA program at the University of Iceland, and in top 
management education at the Reykjavik University. Some other programmes with 
three other universities are scheduled for 2007/2008. In March 2007, I accepted a 
part-time position as associate professor at Copenhagen Business School. I have 
emerged as an educator. I think the confidence gained from discussing theories and 
ideas at a top academic level made that step much easier. Furthermore, it was my 
link to research and researchers that made this possible.  
  
Writer – One goal had more influence on the decision to take the DBA than any 
other, and it was to become a better writer, someone who could write sufficiently in 
English. I could not do that before with any confidence. I published my first 
“scientific” article in English in 2005. Since then I have published three others in 
scientific journals. Two articles written by me can be found in the Henley 
Management College Working Paper Series, and I have written more than ten 
conference papers. Last but not least, I have managed to put together a thesis in 
English. It has rewarded me with the confidence to pursue further writing in 






Entrepreneur – Although it was not clear how the goal of entrepreneurship would 
be realised, it was very important to actively seek to broaden my scope as an 
entrepreneur. Early in 2007 I started a research and consulting agency focused on 
corporate governance in Nordic countries. Although it is not much it is a venue for 
my research and consulting on corporate governance. I am considering several other 
projects, and the only thing standing in the way is my desire to focus on finishing 
my doctorate before I take on any further projects. Furthermore, as already 
mentioned, I have been teaching entrepreneurship at three different universities, 
which has provided me with tools and a network to make it easier for me to start 
new ventures in the future.  
 
Student – I do subscribe to the lifelong discipline that Drucker practised. I 
understand the value of the three-year focus much better now than before. I believe 
my research into learning theories has helped me to learn from different 
perspective. More interestingly, my curiosity and desire to understand theories and 
theory-building has had a profound influence on my ability to understand how and 
what to learn. There is little doubt the DBA process has made me into a much better 
student than I was before, especially in terms of approaching it as a discipline.  
 
Network – The DBA programme at Henley Management College turned out to be a 
disappointment in terms of a networking venue. I have, however, on my own 
initiative travelled to different countries and conferences where I have met lot of 
people with similar interests. One of my initiatives has, furthermore, been to start a 
DBA-HMC Network, were I tracked down DBA graduates from Henley 
Management College and proposed an informal network and a yearly gathering. By 
the end of April the network had nearly forty members, after less than three months 
in existence. I have also become better at networking, understanding what the 
nature of relationships can be. I have good relationships with top ranking professors 
of many different universities around the world. I cannot say that I had many before 
I started the journey. 
 
A new research area – My original idea was to do my research within the field of 





more leverage within the field of corporate governance. I knew the field from the 
perspective of governance codes, and had somewhat led the discussion in Iceland as 
an editor. I cannot, however, say I really knew the field until I started researching it. 
I found out I had misunderstood some issues, and not thought enough about others. 
Corporate governance has become my new field, an area I shall continue to research 
as I think it is a very interesting field. Four years of exploration have given me the 
ability to call this field my area of expertise.  
 
International life – Life has become international. I live in Denmark, spend lots of 
time in the UK, Norway and Italy, and less and less time in my home country. The 
network I have built during the programme is truly international. There are now 
more opportunities to live wherever I choose and the Henley DBA will give me the 
international credentials I needed. Furthermore, I have become much more 
independent and confident than before, which permits me to make dreams come 
alive, rather than just be a spectator to the life I dreamt of living. That is an 
important achievement.  
 
Some turning points are hard to see whilst one is still involved in the process, 
although they become clearer in retrospect. Four years feel like a long time. In some 
ways, I feel I am still on the same track as I was on before. What I have achieved 
does become clearer when I reflect on the above goals. I wanted the DBA to be a 






5.4 Final words 
 
The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet.  
 
Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC)  
 
It has been like a marathon. One should say it has been an intellectual marathon, but 
that would be an overstatement, as it was more about resilience and survival. 
‘Never, never, never give up’ – to quote Winston Churchill. Marathon is a good 
metaphor. It started out as a journey where the length and the struggle were known 
beforehand. However, it then turned out to be a marathon where the roads were 
unmarked and the supplies limited. It was a jungle marathon. 
 
The wonderful thing about a marathon is although it is like a venture through hell 
during the run, it is like finding heaven reaching the goal – that applies to both if 
you are still breathing (heavily), as well as if you are dead on arrival. Two 
experiences might give some clue about how I have perceived this doctoral journey. 
First, I ran my first marathon in the second year of my DBA, and have run two 
other marathons since – one of those on the Great Wall of China. Second, I started 
singing in a gospel choir. These two things indicate how desperate one can become 
on this journey. Masochism and the last resort for hope is what got me through. The 
side effects, or the parallel spiritual journey if you like, were not just the strife for 
mental sanity, but actual goals from the past that wouldn’t have been realised 
without the trial of the doctorate. The mantra has been – ‘if I can do this I can do 
anything.’ That is the dearest achievement of the journey.    
 
I do feel that I have made my contribution to the body of knowledge, and learned to 
understand the discipline of research and what it is to be a ‘scientist’. If nothing 
else, I learned to appreciate my ignorance and use it as an incentive for further 






Summary of Chapter 5. - Conclusions 
 
This summary brings the thesis to a close. The issues presented in the first chapter 
are discussed in terms of the results of the study. The main focus is the contribution 
the thesis has made to the body of knowledge from an academic perspective. The 
implications of the practical and the personal dimensions are also discussed. The 
argument is the contribution of this thesis demonstrates the researcher has 
understood the discipline of scientific research.   
 
The main points from this chapter are: 
 
 The main contribution of this thesis, a major original study based on the process 
view of the board, indicates a positive relationship between the board of 
directors and organisational performance. It provides empirical support for three 
theoretically different roles of board, one of those being the strategic role 
measures, with instruments adapted from other disciplines. The empirical results 
and theoretical discussions reject the managerial hegemony theory and the 
agency theory in the context of SMEs in Iceland.  
 The thesis, furthermore, contributes to the methodology of the process-based 
view by introducing broader organisational performance measures, refining and 
validating board instruments, and by using the approach of rigorous 
instrumentalism.  
 The thesis also contributes to the corporate governance literature with the 
definition and the problem formulation based on theorization, as well as with 
the classification of previous empirical and theoretical discussions. 
 The practical implications of the study are boards can choose how they can be 
most valuable by understanding the implications of the three different roles 
empirically supported in this thesis. It indicates a fundamentally different 
perspective of the role of board as an organ within the organisation.  
 The personal implication of the journey was goals set in the beginning were 
mostly achieved, indicating the process has indeed been a turning point in the 
life of the researcher.  
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Appendix 2: Final Version of Questionnaire  
